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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK

POCATELLO HOSPITAL, LLC, d/b/a
PORTNEUF MEDICAL CENTERS, LLC,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

vs.
QUAIL RIDGE MEDICAL INVESTOR,
LLC,
Defendant-Appellant,
And
CENTURY PARK ASSOCIATES,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Supreme Court No. 40566-2012

_________________________)
CLERK'S RECORD

Appeal from the District Court of the Sixth Judicial District of the State of
Idaho, in and for the County of Bannock.
Before HONORABLE Mitchell W. Brown District Judge.
For Appellant:
Michael D. Gaffney
Beard St. Clair Gaffney PA
2105 Coronado Street
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For Respondent:
Kent L. Hawkins
Merrill & Merrill, Chartered
P.O. Box 991
Pocatello, Idaho 83204-0991
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Case: CV-2010-0002724-0C Current Judge: Mitchell Brown
Pocatello Hospital, LLC vs. Quail Ridge Medical Investors, Lie, etal.

Pocatello Hospital, LLC vs. Quail Ridge Medical Investors, Lie, Century Park Associates, Lie
Date

Code

User

6/28/2010

LOCT

MAR LEA

Clerk's Vault

Mitchell Brown

NCOC

MAR LEA

New Case Filed-Other Claims

Mitchell Brown

COMP

MAR LEA

Verified Complaint: atty Dave Gallafent

Mitchell Brown

SMIS

MAR LEA

Summons Issued

Mitchell Brown

MAR LEA

Filing: A - All initial civil case filings of any type not Mitchell Brown
listed in categories B-H, or the other A listings
below Paid by: merrill and merrill Receipt
number: 0023109 Dated: 6/28/2010 Amount:
$88.00 (Check) For:

LINDA

Plaintiff: Pocatello Hospital, LLC Attorney
Retained Dave Robert Gallafent

Mitchell Brown

MEGAN

Filing: 11 - Initial Appearance by persons other
than the plaintiff or petitioner Paid by: Beard St.
Clair Gaffney PA Receipt number: 0023993
Dated: 7/6/2010 Amount: $58.00 (Check) For:
Century Park Associates, Lie, (defendant) and
Quail Ridge Medical Investors, Lie, (defendant)

Mitchell Brown

CAMILLE

Defendants Notice of Appearance; aty Michael
Gaffney for Defendants

Mitchell Brown

ATTR

CAMILLE

Defendant: Quail Ridge Medical Investors, Lie,
Attorney Retained Michael D Gaffney

Mitchell Brown

ATTR

CAMILLE

Defendant: Century Park Associates, Lie,
Attorney Retained Michael D Gaffney

Mitchell Brown

8/2/2010

CAMILLE

Answer and Jury Demand ;

8/13/2010

CAMILLE

Note of Issue and request for Trial Setting;
Michael Gaffney for defs

CAMILLE

Amended Note of issue and request for Trial
Setting; aty Michael Gaffney for defs

Mitchell Brown

8/20/2010

CAMILLE

Notice of Service- Plaintiffs First set of lnterrog.
requests requests for PRoduction and requests
for admission to defs: and this Notice: aty R
William Hancock for plntf

Mitchell Brown

8/23/2010

CAMILLE

Order for submission of information for
scheduling order; sf J Brown 8-20-2010

Mitchell Brown

9/8/2010

CINDYBF

Joint Statement of Information for Scheduling
Conference- by PA Hawkins and DA Gaffney.

Mitchell Brown

ORDR

CINDYBF

Scheduling Order, Notice of Trial Setting and
Mitchell Brown
Initial Pretrial Order- jury trial set 1st setting
5-24-11 at 9:00am, 2nd setting 10-25-11 at 9:00
am. No pretrial conference will be held. s/Brown
9-13-10.

HRSC

CINDYBF

Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 05/24/2011 09:00 Mitchell Brown
AM) 1st Setting

HRSC

CINDYBF

Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 10/25/2011 09:00 Mitchell Brown
AM) 2nd Setting

ATTR
7/2/2010

7/6/2010

9/13/2010

Judge

aty Michael Gaffney Mitchell Brown
aty

Mitchell Brown

uate: 2/25/2013
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Case: CV-201 0-0002724-0C Current Judge: Mitchell Brown
Pocatello Hospital, LLC vs. Quail Ridge Medical Investors, Lie, etal.

Pocatello Hospital, LLC vs. Quail Ridge Medical Investors, Lie, Century Park Associates, Lie
Date

Code

User

Judge

9/13/2010

CAMILLE

Notice of service - Defs Responses to Plntfs First Mitchell Brown
set of Req for Admission : aty Michael Gaffney
for def

9/14/2010

CAMILLE

Notice of service - Plntfs Second set of lnterrog
requests for production and requests for
admission to the Defendant; aty Kent Hawkins
for plntf

Mitchell Brown

9/29/2010

CAMILLE

Notice of service - Defs First set of Requests for
Admission, lnterrog and requests for Production
to Plntf: aty Michael Gaffney for defs

Mitchell Brown

10/12/2010

CAMILLE

Notice of service - srvd Defs Response to Plntfs
Second set of requests for Admission; aty
Michael Gaffney for def

Mitchell Brown

10/27/2010

CAMILLE

Notice of service - Plaintiffs Responses to Defs
First set of Requests for Admission; aty Kent
Hawkins for plntf

Mitchell Brown

1/27/2011

CAMILLE

Expert and lay witness disclosure; aty Kent
Hawkins for plntf

Mitchell Brown

3/11/2011

CAMILLE

Defendants Expert witness disclosures; aty
Michael Gaffney for def

Mitchell Brown

CAMILLE

Notice of service - Defs Responses to plntfs first Mitchell Brown
set of lnterrog and requests for production and
Defs Responses to plntfs Second set of lnterog
and req for production : aty Michael Gaffney for
def

3/23/2011

CAMILLE

Motion to vacate Trial setting;
for plntf

3/25/2011

CAMILLE

Notice of hearing; set for Plaintiffs Motion to
vacate trial setting on 4-15-2011 @ 3pm: aty
Kent Hawkins for p lntf

Mitchell Brown

CAMILLE

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 04/15/2011 03:00
PM)

Mitchell Brown

BRANDY

Defendants Lay Witness Disclosures; Michael
Gaffney aty for dfdt

Mitchell Brown

BRANDY

Lay Witness Disclosure; Kent Hawkins aty for pltf Mitchell Brown

HRVC

BRANDY

Hearing result for Jury Trial held on 05/24/2011
09:00 AM: Hearing Vacated 1st Setting

Mitchell Brown

INHD

BRANDY

Hearing result for Motion held on 04/15/2011
03:00 PM: Interim Hearing Held

Mitchell Brown

CAMILLE

Minute Entry and Order; (Court GRANTED, the
Mitchell Brown
Motion to Vacate Trial setting, Jury Trial, in this
s/
matter is now set for 10-25-2011 @ 9am)
Judge Brown 5-5-2011

CAMILLE

Notice of service - Plaintiffs Responses to Defs
First set of lnterrog. and requests for production
to plntf: aty Dave Gallafent

CAMILLE

Plaintiffs motio for summary judgment; aty Kent Mitchell Brown
Hawkins for plntf

3/30/2011

HRSC

4/12/2011

4/15/2011

5/6/2011

3/10/2011

aty Kent Hawkins Mitchell Brown

Mitchell Brown

Date: 2/25/2013

ial District Court - Bannock Cou
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Case: CV-2010-0002724-0C Current Judge: Mitchell Brown
Pocatello Hospital, LLC vs. Quail Ridge Medical Investors, Lie, etal.

Pocatello Hospital, LLC vs. Quail Ridge Medical Investors, Lie, Century Park Associates, Lie
Date

Code

6/10/2011
6/13/2011

HRSC

7/6/2011

7/22/2011

7/25/2011

8/1/2011

8/3/2011

ORDR

User
CAMILLE

Notice of hearing; set for 8-5-2011 @ 9am; aty
Kent Hawkins for plntf

Mitchell Brown

CAMILLE

Hearing Scheduled (Motion for Summary
Judgment 08/05/2011 09:00AM)

Mitchell Brown

CAMILLE

Affidavit of Don Wadle; aty Dave Gallafent for
plntf

Mitchell Brown

CAMILLE

Affidavit of Brad Janoush; aty Dave Gallafent for Mitchell Brown
plntf

CAMILLE

Mitchell Brown
Memorandum in support of plaintiffs motion for
summary judgment; aty Dave Gallafent for plntf

CAMILLE

Affidavit of Greg Kelley; aty Michael Gaffney for Mitchell Brown
defs

CAMILLE

Defendants Memorandum in opposition to
plaintiffs motin for summary judgment; aty
Michael Gaffney for def

Mitchell Brown

CAMILLE

Affidavit of Brent Thompson; aty Michael
Gaffney for def

Mitchell Brown

CAMILLE

Affidavit of Michael D Gaffney; aty Michael
Gaffney for def

Mitchell Brown

CAMILLE

Defendants motion to enlarge time to file affidavit; Mitchell Brown
aty Michael Gaffney for def

CAMILLE

Notice of hearing; set for 8-5-2011 @ 9am:

CAMILLE

Plaintiffs reply memorandum supporting summary Mitchell Brown
judgment motion; aty Dave Gallafent for plntf

DCANO

Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment;
Michael D. Gaffney, Attorney for Defendants:
Quail Ridge Medical Investors, etal

Mitchell Brown

DCANO

Notice of Hearing for Defendants' Motion for
Summary Judgment on 8-19-11 at :1:30pm.
Michael D. Gaffney, Attorney for Dfdts.

Mitchell Brown

DCANO

Mitchell Brown
Defendants' Motion to Shorten Time or, in the
Alternative to Consolidate Hearings on Motions
for Summary Judgment: Michael D. Gaffney, Atty.
for Dfdts.

SHAREE

Order Shortening Time [Order shortening time for Mitchell Brown
Hearing on Quail Ridge's Motion for Summary
Judgment] - GRANTED- Motion set for August 5,
2011@ 9 am

Mitchell Brown

/s/ J Brown 8/3/2011
8/5/2011

HRHD

SHAREE

Hearing result for Motion for Summary Judgment Mitchell Brown
scheduled on 08/05/2011 09:00AM: Hearing
Held

MEOR

SHAREE

Minute Entry and Order- Plaintiffs Motion for
Summary Judgment- TAKEN UNDER
ADVISEMENT

IS/ J Brown 8/5/2011

Mitchell Brown

Date: 2/25/2013

icial District Court - Bannock Cou
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Case: CV-2010-0002724-0C Current Judge: Mitchell Brown
Pocatello Hospital, LLC vs. Quail Ridge Medical Investors, Lie, etal.

Pocatello Hospital, LLC vs. Quail Ridge Medical Investors, Lie, Century Park Associates, Lie
Date

Code

User

8/5/2011

HRVC

BRANDY

Hearing result for Jury Trial scheduled on
10/25/2011 09:00AM: Hearing Vacated 2nd
Setting

8/10/2011

CAMILLE

Available dates for Jury Trial;
for plntf

8/15/2011

CAMILLE

Defendants notice of available trial dates; aty
Michael Gaffney for def

Mitchell Brown

8/26/2011

CAMILLE

Scheduling order, notice of trial setting and initial
pretrial order; s/ Judge Brown 8-26-2011

Mitchell Brown

CAMILLE

Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 03/20/2012 09:00 Mitchell Brown
AM)

CAMILLE

Plaintiffs motion to reconsider; aty Dave Gallafent Mitchell Brown
for plntf

CAMILLE

Minute entry and order; Court DENIED both
parties motions for summary judgment; s/
Judge Brown 1-7-2012

CAMILLE

Notice of hearing ; on plntfs motion to reconsider Mitchell Brown
on 2-3-2012@ 9am:

CAMILLE

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 02/03/2012 09:00
AM)

1/26/2012

CAMILLE

Notice of service- Defs Supplemental Response Mitchell Brown
to plaintiffs first set of lnterrog : aty Michael
Gaffney for def

1/27/2012

CAMILLE

Second affidavit of Michael D Gaffney; aty
Michael Gaffney for def

Mitchell Brown

CAMILLE

Defendants supplemental Lay Witness
disclosures; aty Michael Gaffney for def

Mitchell Brown

CAMILLE

Defendants Memorandum in opposition to
plaintiffs motion to reconsider; aty Michael
Gaffney for def

Mitchell Brown

HRSC
1/9/2012

1/11/2012
HRSC

Judge
Mitchell Brown

aty Kent Hawkins Mitchell Brown

Mitchell Brown

Mitchell Brown

2/1/2012

MEMO

BRANDY

Plaintiffs Reply Memorandum in Support of its
Motion to Reconsider; pltf aty

Mitchell Brown

2/3/2012

HRHD

BRANDY

Hearing result for Motion scheduled on
02/03/2012 09:00AM: Hearing Held

Mitchell Brown

HRVC

BRANDY

Mitchell Brown
Hearing result for Jury Trial scheduled on
03/20/2012 09:00AM: Hearing Vacated; vacated
on the record by Court will be reset after
mediatioln in March

CAMILLE

Minute Entry and Order; (if Mediation is
unsuccessful, the court will then take the matter
under advisement; trial in this matter is hereby
VACATED,) s/ Judge Brown 2-10-2012

BRANDY

Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 05/14/2012 09:00 Mitchell Brown
AM)

CAMILLE

Minute Entry and Order and order scheduling trial; Mitchell Brown
Court GRANTED the parties and extension of
(15) days; s/ Judge Brown 3-13-2012

2/9/2012

3/1/2012
3/13/2012

HRSC

Mitchell Brown

Date: 2/25/2013

ial District Court - Bannock

Time: 12:10 PM
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ROAReport

Page 5 of 11

Case: CV-201 0-0002724-0C Current Judge: Mitchell Brown
Pocatello Hospital, LLC vs. Quail Ridge Medical Investors, Lie, etal.

Pocatello Hospital, LLC vs. Quail Ridge Medical Investors, Lie, Century Park Associates, Lie
Date

Code

User

Judge

CAMILLE

Order setting status conference; s/ Judge Brown Mitchell Brown
3-13-2012

CAMILLE

Hearing Scheduled (Status Conference
03/16/2012 11:30 AM)

Mitchell Brown

3/14/2012

CAMILLE

Plaintiffs amended lay witness disclosure; aty
William Hancock for plntf

Mitchell Brown

3/16/2012

CAMILLE

Report of Mediator;

Mitchell Brown

INHD

BRANDY

Hearing result for Status Conference scheduled
on 03/16/2012 11:30 AM: Interim Hearing Held

Mitchell Brown

3/21/2012

HRSC

BRANDY

Hearing Scheduled (Further Proceedings
03/26/2012 01:30PM); order setting hearing to
announce decision; J Brown

Mitchell Brown

3/26/2012

INHD

BRANDY

Hearing result for Further Proceedings scheduled Mitchell Brown
on 03/26/2012 01:30PM: Interim Hearing Held

CAMILLE

Plaintiffs second amended Lay witness
disclosure; aty William Hancock for plntf

Mitchell Brown

CAMILLE

Plaintiffs disclosure of rebuttal expert witness:
aty William Hancock for plntf

Mitchell Brown

CAMILLE

Notice of deposition of Greg Kelley on 5-4-2012
@ 11 am: aty Dave Gallafent for plntf

Mitchell Brown

CAMILLE

Notice of deposition of Brent Thompson; on
5-4-2012@ 10am: aty Dave Gallafent for plntf

Mitchell Brown

CAMILLE

Notice of taking rule 30b6 Deposition duces
tecum of quail ridge medical investors, LLC:
Dave Gallafent for plntf

Mitchell Brown

3/13/2012
HRSC

4/3/2012

4/4/2012

4/10/2012

4/12/2012

4/13/2012

aty

CAMILLE

Notice of service - Plntfs first supplemental
Mitchell Brown
responses to defs first set of interrog and
requests for production to plaintiff; and this notice:
aty William Hancock for plntf

CAMILLE

Notice of taking rule 30b6 Deposition duces
tecum of Century park Associates, LLC: aty
William Hancock for plntf

CAMILLE

Minute Entry and Order; Court DENIED, Plaintiffs Mitchell Brown
Motion for reconsideration: s/ Judge Brown
4-11-2012

CAMILLE

Notice of service - Plntfs second supplemental
Mitchell Brown
responses to defs first set of lnterrog and req for
production to plaintiff and Notice of service aty
William Hancock for plntf

CAMILLE

Plaintiffs motion to vacate May 14,2012 Jury Trial; Mitchell Brown
aty Kent Hawkins

CAMILLE

Notice of hearing; on motin in limine and Motion
to vacate May 14,2012 Jury Trial

Mitchell Brown

CAMILLE

Plaintiffs motion in limine on 2001 Landlord
consent and estoppel certificate; aty aty Kent
Hawkins for plntf

Mitchell Brown

Mitchell Brown

icial District Court ~ Bannock

Date: 2/25/2013
Time: 12:10 PM
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Case: CV-2010-0002724-0C Current Judge: Mitchell Brown
Pocatello Hospital, LLC vs. Quail Ridge Medical Investors, Lie, etal.

Pocatello Hospital, LLC vs. Quail Ridge Medical Investors, Lie, Century Park Associates, Lie
Date
4/13/2012

4/16/2012

4/18/2012

4/19/2012

4/23/2012

4/25/2012

Code

User

Judge

CAMILLE

Plaintiffs motion in limine on defs experts; aty
Kent Hawkins

Mitchell Brown

CAMILLE

Plaintiffs Motion in limine on presentatjion of
irrelevent extrinsic evidence: Oral Modification ,
Equitable arguments , any evidence unrelated to
the intent of the parties in 1983: aty Kent
Hawkins for plntf

Mitchell Brown

CAMILLE

Plaintiffs motion i nlimine on speculation and
opinion testimony:
aty Kent Hawkins for plntf

Mitchell Brown

CAMILLE

Affidavit of Sam Langston; aty Kent Hawkins for Mitchell Brown
plntf

CAMILLE

Amended notice of hearing; on motions in limine
and motion to vacate May 14,2012 Jury Trial

Mitchell Brown

CAMILLE

Notice of telephonic Trial deposition of Everett
Goodwin; aty William Hancock

Mitchell Brown

CAMILLE

Amended notice of telephonic depsotion of Guy Mitchell Brown
Kroesche on 5-3~2012: aty William Hancock for
plntf

CAMILLE

Defendants objection to telephonic trial deposition Mitchell Brown
of everett goodwin; aty Michael Gaffney for def

CAMILLE

Notice of telephonic deposition of Chris Anton; on Mitchell Brown
Chris Anton on 5-2-2012@ 10:30; aty William
Hancock

CAMILLE

Amended Notice of telephonic depositon of
Everett Goodwin; on 5-8-2012@ 10am: aty
William Hancock

Mitchell Brown

CAMILLE

Defendants first motion in limine; aty Michael
Gaffnery for def

Mitchell Brown

CAMILLE

Defendants Memorandum in opposition to
motions in limine; aty Michael Gaffney for defs

Mitchell Brown

CAMILLE

Defendants Memorandum in opposition to
Mitchell Brown
plaintiffs motion to vacate May 14 2012 Jury Trial;
aty Michael Gaffney for defs

CAMILLE

Notice of hearing; set for 4-30~2012@ 10am:

DCANO

Amended Notice of Hearing for Defendants' First Mitchell Brown
Motion in Limine on 4-30-12 at 10:00 am. Michael
D. Gaffney, Attorney for Dfdts.

DCA NO

Motion to Shorten Time: Michael D. Gaffney,
Attorney for Dfdts.

Mitchell Brown

CAMILLE

Plaintiffs motion to enforce Jury waiver clause in
2001 Landlord consent and estoppel certificate:
aty William Hancock for plntf

Mitchell Brown

CAMILLE

Notice of hearing on plaintiffs motion to enforce
Mitchell Brown
Jury waiver clause in 2001 landlord consent and
estoppel certificate: aty William Hancock for plntf

Mitchell Brown

Date: 2/25/2013

udicial District Court - Bannock

Time: 12:10 PM

ROAReport
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User: DCANO

Case: CV-2010-0002724-0C Current Judge: Mitchell Brown
Pocatello Hospital, LLC vs. Quail Ridge Medical Investors, Lie, etal.

Pocatello Hospital, LLC vs. Quail Ridge Medical Investors, Lie, Century Park Associates, Lie
Date

Code

User

Judge

4/25/2012

CAMILLE

Motion to shorten time on hearihng of plaintiffs
motion to enforce Jury waiver clause in 2001
landlord consent and estoppel certificate: aty
William Hancock forp lntf

4/26/2012

CAMILLE

Minute Entry and Order; (court shall be provided Mitchell Brown
with a copy of the deposition as soon as possible
to allow the ocurt to review and consider the
objections prior to trial; s/ Judge Brown
4-25-2012

4/27/2012

CAMILLE

Order shortening time;
4-27-2012

CAMILLE

Order shortening time on the hearing of plaintiffs
motion to enforce Jury waiver clause in 2001
Landlord consent and estoppel certificate; s/
Judge Brown 4-27-2012

Mitchell Brown

CAMILLE

Defendants Objection to plaintiff motion to
enforce Jury waiver clause in 2001 Landlord
consent and estoppel certificate: aty Michael
Gaffney

Mitchell Brown

CAMILLE

Affidavit of ocunsel ;

Mitchell Brown

CAMILLE

Plaintiffs reply in support of its motions in limine
and in support of its motion to vacate: aty
William Hancock

4/30/2012

CAMILLE

Notice of service - Defs Supplemental Responses Mitchell Brown
to Plaintiffs first rrequests for production ; aty
Michael Gaffney

5/1/2012

CAMILLE

Motion to amend complaint and notice of hearing; Mitchell Brown
set for 5-4-2012@ 1:30pm

CAMILLE

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 05/04/2012 01:30
PM)

Mitchell Brown

CAMILLE

2nd Amended Notice of telephonic deposition of
Guy P Krosesche on 5-7-2012@ 3pm: aty
William Hancock for plntf

Mitchell Brown

CAMILLE

Amended Notice of Telephonic Deposition of
Mitchell Brown
Chris Anton on 5-10-2012@ 10:30: aty William
Hancock fo rplntf

CAMILLE

Amended Notice of Deposition of Greg Kelley on Mitchell Brown
5-9-2012@ 11am: aty William Hancock for plntf

CAMILLE

Amended notice of deposition of Brent
Thompson; set for 5-9-2012@ 10am: aty
William Hancock fo rplntf

Mitchell Brown

CAMILLE

Notice of telephonic deposition of Cal Northam;
aty William Hancock for plntf

Mitchell Brown

CAMILLE

Defendants Memorandum re: Plaintiffs Motion to
enforce Jury waiver clause in 2001 landlord
consent and estoppel certificate: aty Michael
Gaffney for def

Mitchell Brown

5/2/2012

HRSC

s/ Judge Brown

aty William Hancock

Mitchell Brown

Mitchell Brown

Mitchell Brown

oate: 2/25/2013

District Court - Bannock Cou

Time: 12:10 PM

User: DCANO
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Case: CV-2010-0002724-0C Current Judge: Mitchell Brown
Pocatello Hospital, LLC vs. Quail Ridge Medical Investors, Lie, etal.

Pocatello Hospital, LLC
Date

Code

VS.

Quail Ridge Medical Investors, Lie, Century Park Associates, Lie
User

5/2/2012

DCANO

3rd Amended Notice of Telephonic Deposition of Mitchell Brown
Guy P. Kroesche, Dave R. Gallafent, Attorney for
Plntfs.

5/3/2012

BRANDY

Plaintiffs reply in support of its motion to enforce Mitchell Brown
jury waiver clause in 2001 Landlord Consent and
Estoppel Certificate; pltf aty

AFFD

BRANDY

Affidavit of counsel in support of its motion to
enforce jury waiver clause in 2001 Landlord
Consent and Estoppel Certificate; pltf aty

Mitchell Brown

NOTC

BRANDY

Defendants Notice of non opposition to Plaintiffs
motion to amend complaint; dfdt aty

Mitchell Brown

HRHD

BRANDY

Hearing result for Motion scheduled on
05/04/2012 01:30PM: Hearing Held

Mitchell Brown

MEOR

BRANDY

Minute Entry and Order; hearing held 4-30-12 in
Caribou; under advisement; J Brown 4-30-12

Mitchell Brown

NOTC

BRANDY

Notice to vacate deposition of Brent Thompson;
pltf aty

Mitchell Brown

NOTC

BRANDY

Notice to vacate deposition of Greg Kelley; pltf aty Mitchell Brown

CAMILLE

Plaintiffs Brief in support of its oral motion for a
judicial determination of the 2001 landlord
consent and estoppel certificate : atyWilliam
Hancock

Mitchell Brown

BRANDY

Plaintiffs Exhibit List; pltf aty

Mitchell Brown

AMCO

BRANDY

Amended Complaint Filed; pltf aty

Mitchell Brown

NOTC

BRANDY

2nd Amended Notice of telephonic deposition of
Everett Goodwin; pltf aty

Mitchell Brown

ANSW

BRANDY

Answer to Amended Complaint and Jury
Demand; dfdt aty

Mitchell Brown

5/8/2012

NOTC

BRANDY

Notice of telephonic deposition of Earl Christison; Mitchell Brown
pltf aty

5/9/2012

MOTN

BRANDY

Motion to Dismiss Defendant's Demand for a Jury Mitchell Brown
Trial; pltf aty

MEMO

BRANDY

Defendants Memorandum RE: 2001 Landlort
Consent and Estoppel Certificate; dfdt aty

Mitchell Brown

AFFD

BRANDY

Affidavit of John Avondet; dfdt aty

Mitchell Brown

MEOR

BRANDY

Minute Entry and Order; hearing held 5-10-12 by
phone in Franklin County; demand for jury trial is
stricken; GRANTS motion for determination and
finds certificate clear and unambiguous; J Brown
5-10-12

Mitchell Brown

BRANDY

Defendants Supplemental Lay Witness
Disclosures; dfdt aty

Mitchell Brown

BRANDY

Hearing result for Court Trial scheduled on
05/14/2012 09:00AM: Court Trial Started

Mitchell Brown

5/4/2012

5/7/2012

5/10/2012

5/11/2012
5/14/2012

CTST

Date: 2/25/2013

icial District Court - Bannock Cou

Time: 12:10 PM
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Case: CV-2010-0002724-0C Current Judge: Mitchell Brown
Pocatello Hospital, LLC vs. Quail Ridge Medical Investors, Lie, etal.

Pocatello Hospital, LLC vs. Quail Ridge Medical Investors, Lie, Century Park Associates, Lie
Date

Code

User

5/14/2012

DCANO

Minute Entry and Order; The Court Granted Plntfs Mitchell Brown
Motn to Enforce Jury Waiver Clause in 2001
Landlord Consent and Estoppel Cert. and ordered
that this matter would proceed to trail before the
Court. The Court Denied Plntfs. Motion in Limine
on 2001 Landfor Consent and Estoppel Cert. and
Dfdts. First Motion in Limine. Finally the Courted
Denied Plntfs. Motion to Vacate the Trial again
stating the basis for decision on the record.
s/Judge Mitchell Brown on 5-11-12.

5/15/2012

CAMILLE

Defendants exhibit list; aty Michael Gaffney for
defs

Mitchell Brown

DCA NO

Plaintiffs Exhibit List

Mitchell Brown

5/17/2012

CAMILLE

Minute Entry and Order; (plaintiff shall have 14 Mitchell Brown
days to submit proposed Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law to the court) s/ Judge Brown
5-15-2012

6/5/2012

CAMILLE

that the parties shall have until
Mitchell Brown
Order;
6-11-2012 to remit payment to Rodney Felshaw
for the trial transcript: s/ Judge Brown 5-11-2012

6/27/2012

CAMILLE

Plaintiffs closing argument; aty Kent Hawkins for Mitchell Brown
plntf

CAMILLE

Plaintiffs objection to certain deposition testimony Mitchell Brown
admitted into evidence: aty Kent Hawkins for
plntf

CAMILLE

Plaintiffs proposed findings of fact and
conclusions of law; aty Kent Hawkins for plntf

Mitchell Brown

CAMILLE

Defendants Objection to deposition testimony;
aty Michael Gaffney

Mitchell Brown

CAMILLE

Defendants closing arguments; aty Michael
Gaffney for def

Mitchell Brown

CAMILLE

Defendants proposed findings of fact and
conclusions of law; aty Michael Gaffney

Mitchell Brown

7/18/2012

CAMILLE

Plaintiffs closing rebuttal argument;
Gallafent for plntf

Mitchell Brown

7/20/2012

CAMILLE

Minute Entry and Order; court took this matter
under advisement: s/ Judge Brown 7-20-2012

10/17/2012

CAMILLE

Findings of Fact, conclusions of law and
Mitchell Brown
memorandum decision and order;
Declaratory
Judgment consistent with the courts conclusion of
Law on this matter;: s/ Judge Brown 10-16-2012

10/22/2012

CAMILLE

Motion to correct clerical mistake in findings of
fact conclusions of law and Memorandum
Decision and Order; aty William Hancock for
plntf

Mitchell Brown

CAMILLE

Order correcting conclusions of law: s/ Judge
Brown 10-22-2012

Mitchell Brown

7/13/2012

aty Dave

Mitchell Brown

Date: 2/25/2013

udicial District Court - Bannock

Time: 12:10 PM

ROAReport
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User: DCANO

Case: CV-201 0-0002724-0C Current Judge: Mitchell Brown
Pocatello Hospital, LLC vs. Quail Ridge Medical Investors, Lie, etal.

Pocatello Hospital, LLC vs. Quail Ridge Medical Investors, Lie, Century Park Associates, Lie
Date

Code

User

11/7/2012

CAMILLE

Defendants Memorandum regarding form of
Judgment; aty Michael Gaffney for defs

11/8/2012

CAMILLE

Plaintiffs Memorandum of authorities in support of Mitchell Brown
its request for a money judgment; aty Kent
Hawkins

11/12/2012

CAMILLE

Order on form of Judgment; s/ Judge Brown
11-12-2012

Mitchell Brown

JDMT

CAMILLE

Declaratory Judgment; s/ Judge Brown
11-13-2012

Mitchell Brown

CSTS

CAMILLE

Case Status Changed: Closed

Mitchell Brown

11/26/2012

CAMILLE

***Amended Declaratory Judgment; aty Judge
Brown 11-26-2012

Mitchell Brown

11/27/2012

DCANO

Filing: L4 - Appeal, Civil appeal or cross-appeal to Mitchell Brown
Supreme Court Paid by: Michael D. Gaffney
Receipt number: 0041053 Dated: 11/27/2012
Amount: $109.00 (Check) For: Quail Ridge
Medical Investors, Lie, (defendant)

APSC

DCANO

Appealed To The Supreme Court

Mitchell Brown

NOTC

DCANO

Defendant's Notice of Appeal; Michael D.
Gaffney, Attorney for Quail Ridge Medical
Investors, LLC, Defendant/Appellant.

Mitchell Brown

DCANO

Received check #1 04296 in the amount of
$100.00 for deposit of Clerk's Record on
11-27-12.

Mitchell Brown

11/13/2012

Mitchell Brown

11/28/2012

MISC

DCANO

Defendant's Amended Notice of Appeal: Michael
D. Gaffney, Attorney for Quail Ridge Medical
Investors, LLC, Defendant/Appellant.

Mitchell Brown

12/3/2012

MISC

DCANO

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF APPEAL; Signed
and Mailed to SC and Counsel on 12-3-12.

Mitchell Brown

12/31/2012

MISC

DCANO

CORRECTED CLERK'S CERTIFI,CATE OF
APPEAL MAILED TO SUPREME COURT AND
COUNSEL ON 12-31-12.

Mitchell Brown

MISC

DCANO

IDAHO SUPREME COURT; Received Notice of Mitchell Brown
Appeal on 12-10-12. Docket Number
#40566-2012. Clerk's Record and Reporert's
Transcript must be filed by 3-20-13. (2-13-13 5
weeks prior to Counsel). The following transcripts
shall be lodged: Further Proceedings 3-26-12
4-30-12 (No Hearing on ROA)
Hearing 5-4-12
Hearing 5-1 0-12
Court Trial5-14-12 thru 5-15-12.

1/18/2013

MISC

DCANO

NOTICE OF LODGING: received by Rodney M.
Felshaw on 1-18-13.

1/22/2013

MISC

DCANO

IDAHO SUPREME COURT; Received Clerk's
Mitchell Brown
Cert. of Appeal. on 1-4-13. Carefully examine the
Title and the Cert. and advise the Dist. Court
Clerk of any corrections. The Title in the Cert.
must appear on all document filed in this court.

Mitchell Brown

s

Date: 2/25/2013
Time: 12:10 PM

udicial District Court - Bannock Cou

User: DCANO

ROA Report

Page 11 of 11

Case: CV-2010-0002724-0C Current Judge: Mitchell Brown
Pocatello Hospital, LLC vs. Quail Ridge Medical Investors, Lie, etal.

Pocatello Hospital, LLC vs. Quail Ridge Medical Investors, lie, Century Park Associates, Lie
Date

Code

User

1/22/2013

MISC

DCANO

REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPTS: Received in
Court Records:
Motion to Reconsider 3-26-12
Motions in Limine 4-30-12
Motion to Amend Complaint held 5-4-12
Ruling on Motion to Amend Complaint and
Pre-Trial held 5-10-12.
Bench Trial Vol1 held 5-14-12
Bench Trial, Vol. 2 held 5-15-12.
Motion to Amend Complaint 5-4-12

2/25/2013

MISC

DCA NO

CLERKS RECORD received in Court Records on Mitchell Brown
2-25-12.

Judge
Mitchell Brown

~~:t .=~l
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Dave R. Gallafent
R. William Hancock
MERRILL & MERRILL, CHARTERED
109 North Arthur - 5th Floor
P.O. Box 991
Pocatello, ID 83204-0991
(208) 232-2286
(208) 232-2499 Telefax
ISB # 1745, 7938
Attorneys for Plaintiff

,,....,

..

.,
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MITCHELL W. BROWN

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK

POCATELLO HOSPITAL, LLC d/b/a
PORTNEUF MEDICAL CENTER, LLC,

)
)

)
Plaintiff,
vs.
QUAIL RIDGE MEDICAL INVESTORS,
LLC and CENTURY PARK ASSOCIATES,
LLC,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No.CV 10- 2 724

OC

VERIFIED COMPLAINT
FEE CATEGORY
FEES$
~ 0 ~J

A

0

Defendants.
____________________________
)
COMES NOW the Plaintiff, Pocatello Hospital, LLC d/b/a Portneuf Medical Center,
LLC, by and through its attorneys, Merrill and Merrill, Chartered, and for its action against the
Defendants, Quail Ridge Medical Investors, LLC, and Century Park Associates, LLC, complains
and alleges as follows:
1.

Plaintiff, Pocatello Hospital, LLC d/b/a Portneuf Medical Center, LLC ("PMC"),

is a Delaware limited liability company authorized to do business in the State of Idaho, whose
principal place of business in the State of Idaho is 651 Memorial Drive, Pocatello, Bannock
County, Idaho 83201.
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2.

Defendant, Quail Ridge Medical Investors, LLC ("Quail Ridge"), is a Tennessee

limited liability company authorized to do business in the State of Idaho, whose principal place
ofbusiness is 3570 Keith Street NW, Cleveland, Tennessee 37312.
3.

Defendant, Century Park Associates, LLC ("Century Park"), is a Tennessee

limited liability company authorized to do business in the State of Idaho, whose principal place
ofbusiness is 3570 Keith Street NW, Cleveland, Tennessee 37312.
4.

This lawsuit arises from a certain Ground Lease Agreement dated January 27,

1983 ("Lease Agreement").

PMC's copy of this Lease Agreement is attached hereto as Exhibit

"1" and is incorporated herein by this reference.
5.

The Lease Agreement was originally entered into between Intermountain Health

Care, Inc. ("IHC"), as original lessor, and Sterling Development Co. ("Sterling"), as original
lessee.
6.

The Lease Agreement concerns real property located within the City of Pocatello,

Bannock County, Idaho ("Leased Land"). A true and correct copy of the legal description for the
Leased Land is attached hereto as Exhibit "2" and is incorporated herein by this reference.
7.

On or about January 1, 1996, Sterling subleased its interest in the Leased Land to

Pocatello Medical Investors Limited Partnership ("PMI"), a Tennessee limited partnership
authorized to do business in the State ofldaho, whose principal place ofbusiness is 3570 Keith
Street NW, Cleveland, Tennessee 37312.
8.

On or about January 3, 2001, Sterling and PMI assigned their respective interests

in the Leased Land and Lease Agreement to Quail Ridge and Quail Ridge thereby became the
successor lessee to the Lease Agreement
9.

On or about September 23, 2002, IHC assigned its interest in the Lease

Agreement to IHC Health Services, Inc. and IHC Health Services, Inc., thereby became the
successor lessor to the Lease Agreement.
10.

On or about October 1, 2002, IHC Health Services, Inc., assigned its interest in

the Lease Agreement to Bannock Regional Medical Center ("BRMC") and BRMC thereby
Complaint
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became the successor lessor to the Lease Agreement. Shortly thereafter, BRMC changed its
name to PortneufMedical Center.
11.

On or about February 1, 2009, BRMC (then known as Portneuf Medical Center),

assigned its interest in the Lease Agreement to PMC, whereby PMC became the successor lessor
to the Lease Agreement.
12.

To the best of PMC's knowledge and belief, Century Park is an affiliate of, or

related to, Quail Ridge and may claim a Lessee's interest in the Lease Agreement.
13.

Quail Ridge or Century Park or both operate a senior living facility by the name of

"Quail Ridge" which facility is situated on the Lease Land.
14.

When this Lease Agreement was first entered into on January 27, 1983, IHC and

Sterling, as original lessor and lessee respectively, agreed upon a basis for calculating the initial
annual rental. Specifically, in Article 1, Section 1.3(a) of the Lease Agreement, the original
lessor and lessee agreed as follows as the basis for calculating the initial annual rental:
An initial annual rental shall be calculated on the basis offifteen percent
(15%) ofthe value ofthe leased land. For purposes ofthefirst three (3)
years from the Commencement Date of this Lease, the leased land shall be
valued at the rate of Fifteen Thousand and No/100 Dollars ($15,000.00)
per acre.
15.

The Leased Land is 4.25 acres and, therefore, based upon the above clear and

unambiguous language, the original lessor and lessee set the initial annual rental for this Leased
Land as $9,562.50 ($15,000 x 4.25 = $63,750; $63,750 x 15% = $9,562.50).
16.

The annual rental rate is subject to adjustment on a periodic basis pursuant to the

Lease Agreement, Article 1, Section 1.3(b), which states in relevant part:
. . . The annual rental as set forth above shall be adjusted every three (3)
years beginning on the Commencement Date of this Lease, referred to
below as the rent adjustment date.
17.

The above language in Article 1 of the Lease Agreement concerning when each

rent adjustment date is to occur is clear and unambiguous. Thus, the first rent adjustment date
under this Lease Agreement was scheduled for January 27, 1986 and the rent was, and is, subject
Complaint
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to adjustment every three years thereafter until the termination of this Lease Agreement.
18.

Pursuant to the foregoing schedule, the most recent rent adjustment date was

January 27, 2010.
19.

Although the Lease Agreement provides for period rent adjustment dates as

outlined above, this Lease Agreement also clearly and unambiguously allows for retroactive
adjustment of the annual rental rate when such adjustment did not occur on or before the
specified rent adjustment date.
20.

Specifically, Article 1, Section 1.3(b) states in relevant part:

If the determination of adjusted rent is made after the applicable rent
adjustment date, lessee shall continue to pay rent at the rate applicable to
the preceding period until the adjusted rate is determined. The party
indebted shall, promptly after the determination, pay any difference for the
period affected by the adjustment.
21.

To the best of PMC's knowledge and belief, prior to PMC becoming a successor

lessor to the Lease Agreement, neither IHC, IHC Health Services, Inc., nor BRMC exercised its
right as lessor under this Lease Agreement to adjust the annual rental rate pursuant to Article 1 of
the Lease Agreement.
22.

Sometime in the summer of 2009, PMC became aware of the fact that the annual

rental rate for the Leased Land had not been previously adjusted as outlined in Article 1 of the
Lease Agreement.
23.

Specifically, Article 1, Section 1.3(b) of the Lease Agreement provides the

following clear and unambiguous formula for calculating the adjusted annual rental rate for the
Leased Land:

The rent as adjusted shall be equal to fifteen percent (15%) of the fair
market value of the leased land, exclusive of the improvements on the
premises. Determination of fair market value shall be based on the
highest and best use of the land on the applicable rent adjustment date
without taking the leasehold into account. ...
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24.

In September of 2009, PMC retained Bowman Appraisal and Valuation

("Bowman") to determine the fair market value of the Leased Land on the prior three rent
adjustment dates.
25.

On or about October 5, 2009, Bowman provided its appraisal report to PMC,

which states that the fair market values of the leased land for each of the 2001, 2004, and 2007
rent adjustment dates was $1,297,371, $1,371,507, and $1,464,176, respectively.
26.

On or about October 26, 2009, PMC notified the Defendants of PMC's intention

to adjust the annual rental rate pursuant to Article 1 of this Lease Agreement.
27.

As evidence in support ofPMC's request for an adjustment of the annual rent rate

pursuant to Article 1 of the Lease Agreement, PMC provided the Defendants at that same time
with a copy of Bowman's appraisal report stating the fair market value of the Leased Land for the
prior three rent adjustment periods.
28.

Although PMC gave Defendants proper notice of its intent to adjust the annual

rental rate pursuant to Article 1 of the Lease Agreement, Defendants have refused, and continue
to refuse, to pay an adjusted annual rent for the Leased Land.
29.

Defendants are in breach of the Lease Agreement

30.

Based upon Bowman's valuation of the Leased Land for the 2007 rent adjustment

period, Defendants should have paid a total of $658,879.20 in annual rents for the 2007 rent
adjustment period. Instead, Defendants paid a total of $28,686.00 in annual rents during the
2007 rent adjustment period. As such, Defendants owe PMC a sum of not less than $630,193.20
for unpaid adjusted annual rents for the 2007 rent adjustment period.
31.

Although Bowman has not yet determined the fair market value of the Leased

Land for the 2010 rent adjustment period, to the best ofPMC's knowledge and belief, the current
fair market value of the Leased Land is not less than the fair market value of the Leased Land for
the 2007 rent adjustment period. Therefore, in January of 2010, Defendants should have paid
annual rent in an amount of not less than $219,626.40. Instead, Defendants paid $9,562.00 in
annual rent. As such, Defendants owe PMC a sum of not less than $210,064.60 for unpaid
current adjusted annual rent for the 2010 rent adjustment period.
Complaint
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32.

Furthermore, the adjusted annual rental rate for the remaining years of the 2010

rent adjustment period should not be in an amount less than $219,626.40 per year.
33.

To bring this suit, Plaintiff has retained the services of Merrill & Merrill,

Chartered, and is entitled to an award of attorneys' fees and costs pursuant to Idaho Code §§
12-120(3) and 12-123, and Rule 54 ofthe Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.
WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff prays that judgment be entered in Plaintiffs favor and
against the Defendants as follows:
1.

That Defendants be ordered to pay back rents to the Plaintiff for the 2007 rent

adjustment period in a sum of not less than $630,193 .20;
n.

That Defendants be ordered to pay unpaid current annual rent for the 2010 rent

adjustment period in a sum of not less than $210,064.40;
111.

That Defendants be ordered to pay an annual rental rate for the remaining years of

the 201 0 rent adjustment period in an amount not less than $219,626.40 per year.
IV.

That Defendants be ordered to pay Plaintiffs attorneys' fees and costs associated

with bringing this action; and
v.

For such other and further relief this Court deems just and equitable under the

circumstances of this case.

·f--.DATED this2YdayofJune, 2010.
MERRILL & MERRILL, CHTD.

.

~

...,

.

-

-

By __________~~==~~~-----

DaVeR.Gallilfei

Attorneys for Plaintiff, PMC
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GROUND LEASE AGREEMENT

DESCRIPTION:. TERM AND RENT~;t..;-_,;... .... ...,:-- .... ------.-----.:.· Prope-rty Leased-:.;.;.;.:.;____________________________
Term._ ______ .,.. _________________
..,..----·...,---..,...,._,___ .;.. _ _:_ ·.
Rent·-~'d :Pa~ellt 'ther.eof--~---:~-.:~·.:.. ........ :..:.:.._.:... _______ _, ___ .
Ne·gcft.ion of Partnership---------...... '7'------:.;.;,....:...;,.. ............ -..:•.....
Place· of. Rental ·Payments-----:-'---;... ____ .,..,;..:...,... ... -·~..;..---·F~e Mortgacg,es----.;.;-.....; ______ .:._ __ ;;:______________________

ARTICLE 1..

1.1

1.2
1.3
1.4

1.5
1.6

1
l
2
~- /

Re~l

_,_,...~

4 ·.

4
4

ARTICLE 2. U$;e Q.F ·LEASEJ:))~:.AND T!Tt:E ~O~·:~MPltOVEMENTs--~:.... 5
2.1 ... t'ls ~ cf :Le;;sed Land.;.; ... .:.;. __ :;:.;_ __________ .,.._...,......... -~-"'"'"'"_.. __ ,_.- 5
2·2
Architectural eomp·atibili'ty------,...-----. .... -,--------- · 6
2·3
Require.d -Parking----;... ___ .;_...:;._______________________ 6
2·4
Title to Buildings----.,;.----..-:---------.--...;;._.... -. ____ .;.. _ _. ·~
2·5
Deed a.t Termination_....:..:... ... ...;;.; ...'··... __ .,;._.-,~ __ ._ _____ _. .... .,. ___ ..;._ 7
2.6
Adc::!itional Real Property--..::--------...,-------·.;.. ___ ,::_ 7
2 • 7 .. G;-ant of Cest. of Utilities .and. f:jlse·ments,...---=-----'-- 8

(

'

. ·· ..

ARTICLE 3. CONSTRUCTION, ALTERATIONS AND MAl~T~NANCE---...;~--;· .8
General Mai:ntena:nce--.i.:.;..:... .... ~.~-:_~~~..:.;..:.;~.;..~~.;;.~~---;_,..__. ____. 8
3.1
3.2
R~lief fo.r Substantial Loss o,f A~ea--------------- 9
3.3
Major a.nd Minor Distinguished.rr---.~----:---.;.,'--,-.------ 10
3.4
Go•JP..rnmental 1\uthoriti.e·~.;..-------- ----::-- ~----""' ... - --- l 0
3.5
Darl'l.~ge or Destruction During
··
Final Years of·Term.-.:..--.:..~------------------------- ll
3.6
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GROUND LEASE AGREEMENT

This p;ound Lease Agreement is made and entered into. thi. s
. day

(j{'-"1t.f~,

of

a · ~h

ii}6".,

CARE,

business

in

Regic;mal

the

and bet,.een INTERMOUNTAIN HEALTH

non-profit

State

Medical

by

1983,

of

d.Z

corporation,

Idaho · under

Center ·(hereinafter

the

authorized
name

called

of

to

do

Po<;:atello

.. Les$c.or"},

and

a Washington partnership au.t}1priz~.d to

STERLING DEVELOPMENT CO. ,

do business in the State of Idaho,

(hereinafter called "'Less-.e~}.

R E C I T A L S
\'lHEREAS, Lessor owns certain real property located within the
City of Pocatello, Bannock County,
WHEREAS,

Lessor

wishes

to

Idaho; and

lease

to

Les~ee

approximately

4

..-.,'

(

acres,

more

or

Psychiatric

less;

of ·said

Hospital

property

buildi'ng

(the

for

construct~on

"hospital"')

and

to

of

a

impose

ce;r-tain restrictions on the use of such parcel. of real property
and·· Lessee wishes to 1-t!ase said parcel of real property for such
purpose, subject to Lessor's restrictions; and
WHEREAS,

Lessor

·and

ground lease

agre·ement

restrictions

under which

Lessee

setting

wish
forth

to
the

enter
terms,

into

a

written

conditions·· and

said parcel of real property is to be

leased:
NOW,
covenants,

THEREFORE,
conditions

for

and

in

consideration

of

the

and promises contained 'herein,

mutual

Lessor and

Lessee agree as follows:
ARTICLE 1
DESCRIPTION, TERM AND RENTAL
1.1.

Real ~rooert~ Leased.

Lesso:- hereby leases

to Lessee

and Lessee hereby leases from Lessor the real property described

G.ROUND LEASE AGREEMENT - 1
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.
in Exhibit "A" attached hereto and hereby r:'lade a part hereof,
cluding all easements,

right-of-way interests

with whether granted or by prescript ion,

in-

associated there-

and

any and a 11 . other

interests or rights appurtenant to the property and _in adjoining
and adjacent land,
public

or

highways 1

private,

roads,

which

streets

are

lanes,

an!tl

whether

required

reasonably

for

instailation, maintenance,
gas,

sewer,

telephone I

operation and service of electricity,
.
.
water and other utility lines and. for

driveways and approaches to and from abutting ways for
• and

o~

benefl t.

improvements
"1 eas·ed

the

to be

land"),

above

described

erected

situated

real

thereon

in

the

prope;-ty,

the

including

(hereinafter· called

County

of

Bannock,

use

State

the
of

Idaho.
1.2
thirty

term of this
-Term.yearsThe (hereinafter

Lease shall be for a period of

( 30)

commencing

on

the

lst

day

referred

to

~/~,-~,

of

as

the

1983,

"Term••),
or

before thirty (30) days after a buildi:g;/perrnit i·s
whichever is iater, (the "Conunencernent Date ••), with one

on

or

issued, (
( l) ten

(10) year option to extend such term to be exercised as provided
in Article 14, Paragraph 14. 1, hereof.

Such option to ext-end the

term is personal to Lessee and may not be.assigned or conveyed in
any manner whatsoever to another party.

Lessee shall be entitled

to possession of the leased land on the Commencement Date.
1.3

Rent and Pavment Thereof.
(a)

Lessee

Rental.

shall

pay

the

following

annual

rental amount:
~alculated

An initial annual rental shall be
on the basis of fifteen percent
value of the

leased

the first three
ment
shall

Date
be

of

(3)

this

valued

GROUND LEASE AGREEMENT - 2

land.

( 15%) of the

For purposes

years from the
Lease,
at

the

the
rate

co~~ence

leased
of

of

land

Fifteen

.. ,,,,,...... ,......

HOC:! !'.')lit' WT!'."li:(.II.Ct.:SON&. SlOL:MR(

11

t:.:'f\ ....1..-n .,urn liCI'
1'0 lilt\.....
, . .,,~Otll'\"fl' \\c&\Nt-..oC10"" .........

-

.,. .•- .,
•
•

Thot.lsand and No/100 Dollars J~:~-~).900.00) ·per
- ,_ ................. ... -··-:c: ......,
~

acre.•
Adjustments

(b)

net rental . as.

se~

·Jaase.d~ .. ~::m:

Property

Vahl~·

The

annual

forth above shall be adjusted every three

( 3.) years beginning on the Commencemen~t Date of this Lease,
b.~low

referred to

as the rent. aojustr:tent date.

The pa,rtie.s' written ag.ree·ment within ninety

before

the

applicable

conclusive

determination
~or

market v..a.lue

between

the

adjustl'l\ent date,

not

-rent

shall

parties

s,o agreed .by·. the

the deteJ:"mination

A~bitration in.~ticle

paragraph on

date

of

be · a

the

fair

the period tq :zwhieh the adjustment applies.

If the parties have

The

rent c adjustment

(90) days

sha~ll

applicable

ient

be·. made as in the

1.3.

as adjusted shall be· equal to fifteen percent

(15%) percent of the fair market value of· the

leased ·land,

ex.clusive of the improvements on the 'premises.

D·etermina-

tion of fair market. value sha·l.l be based on· the highest and

(

best use of the land· on the applicable rent adjustment date
'Without taking the leasehold .
tion shall take into account

~ntc;:>

t~e·

ac~o.unt.

The determina-

part:.ie•s • agreement that the

initial minimum rent is the above-stated percentage applied
to

a

fair

Dollars
account

market . value

($15,000.00)

per

o~

Fifteen

acre

and

nousano.
shall

and

also

No/100

take

int_o

any determinations of .market value made under this

lease for

the purpose of adjustments for periods preceding

the applicable rent adj,qstrnent d.ate.
If the determination of adjusted rent is
applicable
pay

rent

until
shall,

rent
at

the

adjustment. date,
rate

applicable

lessee
to

shall

the

the adjusted rate is determined.

mad~

a£ter the

continue to

preceding

period

The party indebted

promptly after the determination,

pay any difference

for the period affected by the adjustment.

(
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(c)

Lea_~~

Definition of

a

calendar year or

l~e:se

Yea·r. A

year is either a

fiscal year, as selected by Lessee.

NeQation of Partner$hip. · · ~othing in this Lease shall

1.4

wa:y·

be construed to render the Lessor in any
partner 1

purpose a

or associate in any relationship wit?

joint venturer,

Lessee· other than that

~ny

or for

of

landlord · and

tena'ht,

nor shall this

Lease be construed to authorize either to act as ig.ent for
other,

c;~.s

except

expressly

to

provided

t:he

contrary

in

the
this

.Lease.
Pla~e

1. 5

...

..

All

of Rental Payments.

·,

p·ayments

of

Rental

required to be paid to Lessor under the terms of this'lease shall
be rnade in lawful money of the United' States which at time of
such payment shall be legal tender for the'paYJnent of public and
private .... debts,
abatements,

free

from

all

.

elaims 1

.

d·emands,

deductions,

set-offs, prior notices or count·erelaims of any kind

or character against Lessor and shall be payable at'the following
address or at such other place or places· as may be from time to
time designated by Lessor by written n~·fi:ce given to Lessee:

(

Pocatello Regional t-iedical Center
777 Hospital Wa·y
PocatellO, Idaho 83201
1.6

T;-ust

Fee, Mortqages •

or

s. e cur i t y

o.t h e r

subordination agreement·,
Deed.s of Trust

or

grant

Lessor may
in t ere s t s

in

mortgages 1
the

provided, however,

security

leased

Deeds

of

land

by

that such mortgages,

interests. shall· be

subject to this

lease and further provided that Lessee deliver a copy of any such
proposed mortga.ge,
related

note

provided,

to

however,

Deed of Trust or other security interest and
Le,ssor
that

for

prior

examination

and

approval;

such examination and approval

accomplished by Lessor in a

dili~ent

shall be

manner.

(_
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ARTICLE 2
USE OF ·LEASE:O 'l~A.Nt( AND '''tiTLE TO IMPROVEMENTS.

(-2.1

Use of Leased Land.

Lessee shall. use

the

leased

land

solely for the purpose of constructing, maintaining a_nd operating
the hqspital for psychiatric· care and substance abuse· tre·atment:
provided that Lessee may at any time use the leased land:: for ·any
lawful . purpose.

Lessee

shall

conunence . construction

o~

the

(45) days after ~~'he commencement date

hospital within forty-fiv-e

:t.·f Lessee

of· this Lease and the issuance of: a building .permit..

is delayed in conunencing ·construction or rec~iving t..~e per·mit· by
any

cause

incl\lqing

or

causes

but

not

beyond.·. Lessee • s

necessaril;f ·being

control.,

limited

to

s,uc'h
Acts

causes
of

.God;·;,

strikes, war, insurrections, and the li~e, said forty-five (45)
.
day period to commence cons·truction shall be e>:tended for a

.

'

period equivalent to the time lost by reason of. any such ca\.lse or
cause~:

provided,

however,

that

no extensions

s.)lall be

granted

for any
such delay which commences more than ten (10) days before
.
.

~

(

Lessee notifies Lessor of· such delay. and the reasons t.heref.Qr.:
Once constru~c.tion is begun, Lessee shall, with reasonable
diligence,
ments,

prosecute to completion all construction of i,mpro've-

additions,

or

alterations

and

shall

completed construction of the hospital within
after date of

this

lease.

have

suhsta:ntia·lly

·tf'2ic£. { J _} years

compl~tion"

"Substantial

shall mean

that. the . hospital is ready for occupancy and use as a hospital as
.

evidence~

by a

C~ti.ficate

issued by .an appropriate

of Occupancy or other

governmental

authority.

lik.e. d9c:urnent
If Lessee is

delayed in subs"tantial completion of the hospital by any c~use or
causes beyond
necessarily
insurrections,

Lessee's
being

control,

limited

to

such

causes

Acts

of

including

God,

but

strikes,

not
"''ar,

and the like, said date for substant~~l completion

of the hospi ta~ shall be extended for a period eq~ivalent to the
tirne

lost

however,

by

that

reason

of

any

such

no e>:tensions will

GROUND LEASE AGREEMENT -

be

cause

or

c;:-anted

causes:
for

any

5
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provided,
such delay
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which COlM\ences

more t.han ten

(10)

days

before ;Le·ssee notifies(··

Lessor of such delay· and the reasons therefor..
performed in a
comply

good and workmanlike manner,

with plans

required by this
permits,
bring,

-

la'-ls,

a·nd

specifications

lease,

and

cause to be brought,

ordinance,

rule,

subm.itted

regulations.

.

.

to

Lessor

as

wil~

shall

not

in any way ·conflict with any

or regulation,

• cor:unitted any waste upon

Less:ee

or permit to be brought or· kept on

the leased land anything which
law,

shall substantially

and shall comply with all governmental

ordinances
.

All work shall be

or commit or suffer to be

the leased land,. or use or a·:tlow the

leased land or hospital to be used for any immoral ·or· unlawful
purpose.
2.2

Architectural Compati'bility..

It is understood and

agreed that the nospi tal will be architecturally compatible with
the

l-ied

Center

accomplished,

hospital.

In

order

to

insure

that

this

be

Lessee shall submit its site plall,.elevations, and

architectural plans and specifications for the hospital to the (
Board of Directors of the ~~ed Center hospital for approval be fore
corn.rn.encing construction.
The approval of the Board of Directors
shall· not be unreason-ably withheld and response shall be given
within forty-five

(45) days

Le~s~e's

following the submission of

plan's and specifications.
2. 3 · · Regu.ired Parking.

Lessee agrees that in designing the .

site plans and.· the plans and specifications for construction of
the

hospital,

ft

will

include

sufficient

off-street

parl:ing

spaces to accommodate the minimum required by.local codes.
2.4

Title to Buileinqs.

appurtenances

thereto

and

all

Title
other

to

the

h6spital

improvements

and

and

fixtures

located on the leased land or constructe<! or placed on the ieased
land by Lessee or its -tenants shall be and reoain in Lessee
during the Term.
Lessee shall have the right to rnake
al te.rations, changes and repairs as provided herein.
in any buileings, perwanent improvements,

GROUND LEASE AGREEMENT - 6

No

interest

or fixtures shall pass
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to

,
Lessor

unti 1

exp,,~r~tiOI'l

the

of

the

T,erm. cOr

the

prior

termination of this lease by default of Lessee giving Lessor the
right

to

terminate

Lessee covenants
wi 11

this

lease

and

deliver

buildings, permanent

Lessor.

In

upon

the

the

improvements,
cle~r.

land at such time free and
and

to

krticle

10

hereof.

and agrees that upon expiration of. the Term i t

yield up

any 'kind,

pursuant

such

event

1 eased
and

with

any

such

fixtures upon the leased

of all liens and encumbrances of

expiration
of

land

title

earlier

therein

shall

t.ermination· of· thi's

be

in

lease,

• Lessee covenants and agrees that it will yield up and deliver the
leased land with any such buildings,

permanent improvements,

and

fixtures upon the leased .land at .such time. free and clear of all
liens and indebtedness of any kind.

Provided, hcw,ever, tha·t such

obligation to deliver the leasec;l land and improvements free and
clear

of

all

liens

and

indebtedness

shall

not

apply

to

the

or:iginal lien of first encumbrance repr.esented by· the mar·t-sage or
Deed of Trust or other security interest referred to in Artiele 6

(

hereof given to secure the· financing fer the construction of the
ori'ginal buildings, permanent improver:1ents 1 and fixtures upon the
leased

land.

buildings 1

Upon

permanent

such

terminatic~m,

earlier

improvements

and

fixtures

title
upon

in

·the

the

leased

termination of this

lease,

land shall be in Lessor.
2.5
Lessee

Deed at Termination.
shall·,

satisfactory in
title

to

~ny

Upon

subject

to

form

content.

and

buildings,

the

foregoing,
to

permanent

Lessor

confirming

improvements,

Lesser's

and

fixtures

therein, upon.the leased land at the time of termination.
2.6
require
hospital,

Additional Real Property.
additional

real

property

At such time
for

the

;,iS

Lessee shall

expansion

of

the

Lessee shall so notify Lessor and Lessor shall in good

faith consider the leasing of acditional real property to Lessee
for such purpose.
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2.7, Grant ,.of Cost of Utilities and Easements.

requests

being

other public:
only the
property

made,

service

property,
for

Lessor

grant

to public

for

the ·-purpose

corporations,

rights

poles

electricity, water,

shall

of

or

way or

conduits

sanitary

or

easements

or

both,

entities or
serving

on .or over
for

storm sewers

of

the

telephone,

or both,

and

for

other utilities and municipal or special district services.
The cost of utilities,

their installation and maintenance,

are to be assumed, fully paid and satisfied by Lessee •

..
ARTICLE 3
CONSTRUCTION, ALTERATIONS
3.1

MAINTENANCE

Throughou~

General Maintenance.

shall, at Lessee • s

AND

sole. cost and expense,

the

Term,

Lessee

maintain the premises

and all improvements in good condition and repair, ordinary wear
and tear

excepted,

rules, ordinances,
county,
having

and in accordance with all
orders and

r~gu1ations

applicable laws,

of ( 1) federal, state,

municipal, and other governmental agencies
or claiming jurisdiction and all their

departments,

bureaus,

underwriting board· or

and

officials:

insurance

companies

(2)

and bodies
respective

the

insuring

(

ins\)rance
all

or

any

part of the premises or improvements or both; and (3) Lessor, as
shall be in effect from time to time.

Lessee shall r:tanage and

operate the hospital and the surrounding grounds in a
and professional -manner.

competent

Lessee shall maintain the sidewalks and

roadways giving access to the. hospital free and clear of ice and
snow.
Except

as

provided

below,

Lessee

shall

promptly

and

diligently repair, restore and replace as required to maintain or
comply as above, or to remedy all dar:lage to or destruction of all
or any part of the improvements resulting \o."holly or in part from
causes required by this lease to be covered by fire or extended
coverage insurance,

GROUl~D

if the cost of the '":ork so required does not
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exceed seventy-five percent (75\) o.f ttre tf!placement.· v"alue of aoll
of

the

improvements.

If. the

cost

Lessee may nevertheless repair,

does

exceed

restore and

percen~,

that

replace as above or

may by notice elect inst.oead to raze the improvements damaged or
Within thirty (30) days aftel:' such not.iee I Lessor m~y

destroyed.
by

notice

Lessee

elect to repair,

shall

Lessor • s
furnish

not

raz.e

restore · and

until

the

notice of election.
any

services ·or

replacfe

e.xpiration

·Lessor

facilities

shall

or

to

of
not

perform

Lessee's

any

obligation

failure

or

of

rc;fusal

Lessee

to

do

0

under

so

above,

and

time

for

the

be required to

make

alterations of any kind in or on the premises..
to

as

any repairs

or

Lessor's election
this

shall

provision

on

c~nsti tute

not

a
••

waiver o~ ~ny _right. or remedy for Less~e • s . de.f'aul t,
shall

promptly reimburse,

defend,

and

0

and Lessee,
agains~

indemnify Lessor

all liability, loss, cost, an4 expense •r~sing fro~ it.
In

determining

whether

Le.ssee

has

acted

promptly

as

req•uired under the foregoing paragraph, one of the criteria to be,,
(

cons·idered
proceeds.

is

the availability
this

of

provision

Nothing
mainteriance shall

in
be

e 1 sewhere in this

lea.se to alter,

replace

any

construed

improvement,

any

or as

as

applicable

defining

limiting

modify·,

insurance

the

any

duty

right

demolish,

limiting provisions

of

given

remove,

or

relating to

condemnation or to damage or destruction during the final year or
years of the Term-.
0

use

resulting

fror.t

paragraph

shall

reduction
Term.

in

No deprivation,
any

entitle

rent

nor

event
Lessee

to

any

or

it;lpairin~nt•

work

to

any

or limitation on

cO:ntemplated
offset,

te.rlt!ination

or

by

abatecent,

·ext~e·nsion

this
or

of the

lf any damage to
3.2 Relief for Substantial.Lcss of Area.
or destruction of the premises or the improvements is such that
75% of the floor area is rendered unusable for purposes stated in
the

Lease,

GROUND

Lessee

may,

at
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Lessee's

election,

cielay

HOC:t

the

....-ork

,s 111~ ""-.:""r ·' r•c.~·sollo;' s10\ "'~;;.:
"unr,, '~ 41 1 •"

.

..

required

above

contained
modify

in

for ·not

this

-to

exce'ed

paragraph

any provision

of

shall

this

be

'lease

~onths.

'(6-)

s'l:x

No.thing

construed

to

nega't,e

or

relating

to

darnaoe
...

or

approval

is
or

r

destruction during the final year(s) of the term.
3. 3
not

Major and Minor Dist.inc;ui s·hed.

required

additions.

for

Less~e's

minor

Lessor's

repairs,

alterations,

"f1inor" means a construction cost not exceeding Five

Thousand and No/100 Dollars ($S,OOO.OO), none of which is derived
from funds
• leasehold

advanced on
or

t.ll.e

the

security

property.

of

an

"Construction

encumbrance on

the

cost."

all

inclu4es

costs that would constitute the basis of ·a valid claim or claims
under the mechanics' lien laws in effect at the time the wor'k is
commenced for_ an.y demolition and aqy r!!moval of e:d.sting
improvements or parts of improvements as well as for preparation,
construction and . completion of all new improvements or parts of
improvements.

The dol;Lar amount stated above shall be adjusted

(

by the percentage change in the index k:tovn as the United St;at•s
Department of Corrunerce Composite Construction Cost Index as
published

in

Department of
discontinued

the

Survey

Commerce, . or
and

there

is

of

Current

successor
no

Business
index. ·•

successor

by

If

index,

the
the

the

·-

U.S.

index

is

reference

figure shall be determined by the senior officer in the closest
office of the U.S. Department of Commerce or successor departm.E7nt
"M a JOr
•
.. repal.rs,
.
Or ag e n c Y .
alterations, or additions are those
For major repairs,

not defined as mi-nor above.
additions,

alterations,

or

Lessee shall receive ·Lessor's approvals of the plans

as set forth .above in Paragraph 2. 2.
3. 4

Go.verivnental Authorities.

with all applicable

laws,

Lessee shall promptly comply

regulations,

ordinances,

requirements

and orders of governrnental authorities, inciucing, but not
limited to, the making,. at its sole expense, of any insta~l.ation,
alteration,

1":\odificat.ion,

otherwise: provided,

ho~·ever,

GROUND LEASE AGREEl-1ENT -

10

change

or

repair,

structural

or

Lessee has the right to cont. est by
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.

or

expense to

ordinance,

Lessor,

order:,

' ·:...- -:~ ··f'i;.. ~.~;~,::p. : . . ...... ~ ,:-·. .- .,

admini~trati-ve

appropriate judicial or

the

rule,

·-~-

proc:·ered'ings, 'Wl. thout cost

validity or application of any

regulations or :req.uirement

la"",

(hereinafter

called "Law .. ) that Lessee repair, maintain, alter or.' replace the

or

improvements in whole
default

for

following

fairing

final

notice

bond.,

satisfactory

indemnifying

to

do

such

determination

gives

• guara·nteeing

in part,

of

request,
to

and

Lessee

wor.k

until

of Lessee • s

Less;.ee

sn•ll

Lessor . i'n

a

not
If

first 'furnish

fo.rm1

be

re·asonable

contest.
amount.

compliance by Less•e .with the

Le~sor,· agains~'· all

shall

in

time

Lessor

Lessor

and

a

insurer,

cor1t.ested

law I

'-

and,

sus~·ain

liability that Lessor. may

by reason of Lessee's failure or delay in complying with the Law.
Lessor

may 1

but

is

not

required

independently of Lessee.
request shall,
3. 5

(

to,_

Lessor may,

join in Lessee's

contest

any

such

Law

and on Lessee • s notice of

~ontes~.

Oal':\age or Destruction Ou~ing Final· Ye·ars of Term~

In

the event of substantial damage or dest•.ruction to the hospi ta 1 or
any pa.rt thereof during the last five. (S·) years of the Term,
exe~cisable

Lessor shall have the right,
days

follo-wing

terminate

this

delivering
termination,

to

the

date

lease.

su.ch

Lessor

Lessee

which

of

-written

date

shall

durins the ninety ( 90)

damage

shall

destruction,

exerci·se

notice

not be

or

of

the

earlier

such

tight

date

than

to

of

by

such

thirty

{30)

days following the dat~ of Lessor • s notice of termination.· · Upon
exercise of such ...right,· Lessor shall be entitled tiO reeover the
full proceeds of any policy of insurance coverin9 any s'uc:h damage
or des·truction
Lessee's

loss'

such

proce~ds.

as

may

be

attributable

to

personal

property

and/or

to

interruption

of

except
of

Lessee's business.
If

Lessor

does

not

elect

to

te.rminate

this

lease,

sball be responsible for the repair, rebuilding or
replacement of the hospital or any part thereof so damaged or
destroyed as the case r:-.a y be.
All such repairs, rebuilding or

Lessee

GROUND LEASE AGREEMENT - 11
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replacements shall rest-o-re thtf

to the condition it was

(-

in immediately prior to the event giving rise to the worK ..
3. 6

Last Y 4aar of Term.

notwithstanding,

Anything

herein

to

the

contrary

Lessee shall not have the right during the last

365 days of the Term to alter, remove or demolish, in. whole or in
part, any buildings, structures or other improvements which exist
upon

the

leased

land

365

days

prior

to

the

except with the written consent of Lessor.
not impair. the

end

of the

Term,

This provision shall

right of Lessee to· remove any moveable i terns of

• personal prQperty .. from the leased land as proviqeq i.n, A,rticl·e 3
hereof.

··4.1

....

ARTICLE 4
LE]).SEHOLD LIENS

Riaht to Grant Lien ·on Leasehold Estate.

Lessee shall

not be in de.fault under the

So

long

terms of this

as

lease,

Lessee shall have the right to grant a lien upon or a security
interest in its leasehold estate under this l.ease; provided,
however,

that notwithstanding any such instrucent gra-nting such

lien

secur.ity

or

obligat;ons and
forth

in

this

interest,

enjoys
lease.

all

Lessor

rights

is

privile~es

and

Any mortgage

bound. only

or

Deed of

(

by_ those

which

are set

Trust or other

security interest executed by Lessee pursuant to this authority
is

hereinafter

designated

and

referred

to

as

the

";leasehold

mortgage" and thenolder or owner of such leasehold mort.gage upon
the

leasehold

Deed of Trust,
or

other

estate of Lessee,

including

the beneficiary .of a

if such mortgage be in the form .of a Deed of Trust

s e cured

party ,

"leasehold mortgagee".

is

h ere i n a f t e r

des i gnat e d

as

the

Any leasehold rnortsage shall not be for a

period exceeding the Term.
Lessor agrees, at any time and from
time to timei upon receipt of not less than ten (10) cays prior
written request therefor by Lessee or by the leasehold mortgagee,
to

execute,

acknowledge

GROUND LEASE AGREEMENT -
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deliver

to Lessee

or

to

lease'hold
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..
mortgagee
case,

a statement. in

that this

writing,

if

certifying,

such

is

the

lease is then unmodified and unamended, ... that i t

is not in default,

and that it is in full

force and effect.

If

there have been modifications and amendments to this· lease, said
statement shall,

if such, is t:he 'Case,

not then in default· and ·is
forth

further

in

state

full
the

full

force

and

the

same is

effect

as

then

Said modifications and a~endments ·shall .be

modified and amended.
set

in

certify that

in

said

dates

statement.

to

which

Said

the

basic

statement
rental

or

shall
other

.

·-

• charges have been paid, and \llhether or not there is any existing
default

by

Lessee

agreement on the
~his

lea~e~

and

with

respect

to

a-ny

covenant,

promise

of

part of Lessee provided t6 be performed under
also whether a

served by Lessor.

~f

any

notice of such default.· h.a!. been

such

statement

contains

non-performance, · insofar as actually known ·by
summarized in said

state~ent.

a

claim of

~essor,

shall

be

Lessee shall make pal~ent when due.

arid before delinquency of all principal,
charges for which Lessee may be or become

interest and other
obligated under any

leasehold mortgage upon tbe leasehold estate.
4.2

Foreclosure of LJen.

foreclose a

P::-ior to

leasehold mortgage,

assigns of such mortgage,

com.~encirig

any action to

the leasehold mortgagee.

or any

shal.l notify Lessor in writing of the

default by Lessee with .a statement· of the

amount

then

due and

offer to withhold any accelerat.io.n of maturity of the promissory
note, payment of which is secured by the leasehold

r.~ortgage.

In

the event Lessor shall, within thirty ( 30) days of the receipt of
said notice, pay to said mortgagee all amounts then in arrears on
said mortgage,

then upon said payment said mortgagee shall rein-

state the mortgage in all respects as if no default had occurred.
Lessor may,

at

its option, ·make such payr:tents on sa.id mortgage,

and the amounts of
rental due Lessor

such payments

shall be considered additional

from Lessee under this lease.

successive defaults by

L~ssee

in making

pay~ents

·s u"os equ ent and
required by any

..

GROUND
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leasehold mortgage shall be subject to the

foregoing provisions
s~all

each time any such default occurs.

Lessee

provisions contained --in this

requiring ·action by parties

lease

insure that all

not a party hereto shal.l be inco·rporated into docur:le·nts to whi.ch
such parties are a party and that executed copies
documents be delivered to Lessor· within ten (10)

of such
days of

execution thereof.
ARTICLE S
•

PROTECTION OF MORTGAGEE
Lessee shall give notice to Lessor of any leasehold morta_ge
which Lessee grants as provided for in Article 4 hereof ~nd shall
d eliv.er along with said notice a copy of· the .~ortgage instrument.
So long as

any

sum remains

O\•.ring on any obligation secured by

such a leasehold ·mortsage, Lessor and Lessee agree:
(a)

That

no modification

or termination of this

lease o.r

surrender of the leased la!ld r.tay be made by· tne Lessor or Less.ee

(

without the prior written consent of the mortgagee:
(b)

That the Lessor will give to the mortgasee al.l

notice

of default simultaneously with any notice given to· the Lessee;
(c)

That

the

mortgagee

will

have

thi=t:r

( 30)

days

a!ter

notice of default delivered to. it vdthin which to cure Lessee's .
default: provided, however 1 that said period in which default may·
be corrected may be extended to no more than ninety (90) days in
the event the mortgagee requires such
granting

a

loan

notice of

to Lessee

default

the

anc

a

period as a condition for

if .....·it:.hin forty

r:lOrtgag ee

gives

notice

{40)
to

days after

Lessor

if

it

intends to cure Lessee's default within saic extended period:
(d)

That

the

Lessor

will

accept

performance

by

the

mortgagee in lieu of performance by the Lessee:
(e) That the Lessor will not terminate the lease for those
defaults 1

the

possession

cure

of which

provided

that

requires
the

said

that

the

mortgasee be in

mortsagee

( i)

promptly

(

..
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(

commences

foreclosure

diligence,

and

charges

(ii)

required

(f)

continues

continues

to be

which become due
proceeding is

and
paid

payment

by

Lessee

and payable during

its
of

action
rent

with

and

wl\ich have

all

due
other

accrued

and

the period· the. foreclosure

pen~ing:

That the Lessor shall not have the right to

ter~inate

this lease solely on account of any of the events antic.i.pa!:,ed by
subdi vi·sion (d) of paragraph 1 of Article 10 without the wri ~ten
consent of the 1 ease'hold mortgagee, pro;v;i:ded 'that suc;h mortg~gee
· promptl'y commences forec::losure if it. has 'the' right to·· do so and
', ..~ '

thereafter continues its action with due diligence:·
(g)

That

in

the

lease shall
...
... be_ sold,

event

the

Lessee's

intere.st

under

this

assigneg. or othervise .transferred FUrsuant
'

'

'

to the exercise of any right, power or remedy of any mortgagee or
pursuant to judicial proceedings or pursuant to paragra'pn 1 of
Article 10, and if no rent or other c'harges shall then ·be due an
·,.

(

pay;able under this lease,
arrancged to the reasonable
curi·ng of any default
si<.xty (60) days

and if such mortgagee shall have
satisfaction of the Lessor for the

susceptible ·of being cured,

Lessor within

after receiving a written request

upon

receiving

fees,

incident thereto, will execute and deliver such instrument

or

instruments

assignment
lease; or
{h)
mortgage

or

payment
as

may

other

That

in

shall

have

of

its

be.

transf~r

the

event

occured,

expenses,

therefor and

required
of
a

incl•Jding

to

confirm

Lessee's
default

the

such

interest

under

mortg.agee

any

may

attorneys.
sale,

under

the

leasehold

exercise

any

right, po..,.,er or remedy of the mortgag.ee under the mortgage which
is not in conflict with the provisions of the lease.
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ARTlci.E 6suaoRDINATION
6.1

SuQordination.

The Lessor- shall,

promptly after

the

notice of request of Lessee, execute and deliver a mortgage, Deed
of Trust or other security

instrument

sufficient to

to the

suboroinate,

represented by the mortgage,
considered to

include

fee

lien of a

fi_rst

Lessor's fee title

title

in

the

part or parts of the lf:}ased premises,
• appurtenances)

cal,~ed

(herein

mortgage)

encumbrance

(which shall be

leased premis~s or -any
J;"ig~ts

including all,

and

to any mortgage lender who is prepared to make a

mortgage loan· to Le.ssee to be secured by a first mortgage or Deed
of

Trust

covering

.
that

sai.d

Lessc)r • ·s

fee

interest

pe

premises (or s_?ch part thereof as may
·~

provided

in

the

demised

d!!signated, by Lessee)

said mortgage is on terms not more onerous tha.n the

following:
Principal:

Not more than seventy-five pf:!.rcent (.75\l
of

the

value

mortgaged

of

the

loan,

if

the

lender

bank,

by

(

any

propos;L.ng -:t.o

make

independently appraised
a.n
than
other
lender
be
or

. institution.
a

apprai~ed

as

institutional

property · to. be

the

as

An insti tution;al lender is

insurance

company,

charital.ol.e

institution, college or other institution
of

learning,

f~nd,

or

retirement

any

institution
foregoing.

other

similar
The

welfare

organization
to

any

of

principal

self-liquidating by
Maturity:

system,

over the term of the rnort;age;
Not more than thirty ( 30)

the

must

periodic

or
be

payments
years

or

alternatively not more than the period of
the

unexpired

the

mortgage

GROUND LEASE AGREEMENT - 16
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whichever

(~-··

means

\

is

the

exerc.ise

the

shorter.

original

of

the

The

term

renewal

"term"

herein

options

or

herein

provided for.
Expenses.
All expenses in connection with the making
of said mortgage or Deed of Trust shall be borne by Lessee, and
6. 2

Lessor will execute any and all

documents that may be required

with respect thereto.

Lessor shall assume no personal

However,

liability for the underlying indebtedness~ but the mortgage note
s~lely

• or other evidence of indebtedness shal.l be executed
Lessee.

by the

The foregoing pr.ovisions of this Artic·le shall extend to

any c6nstructiol) mortgage loan applied for by Lessee, as well as
any
in

perma~H~o.t

rraortgage loan, and any mortgages in substitution or

replacement

thereof,

and

as

often

as

during

the

term .such

loans are applied for by the Lessee.
6.3

(

Non-Mortgage by Les.sor.

Lessor agrees not to place any

m"ortgage on the premises, .~r .permit the same to be encumbered in
any manner, without the prior written consent of the Lessee.

6.4

Limitation on Subordination.

subordinate

any

given

portion

of

Lessor's

th~

fee

agreement

title

to

a

to

first

mortgage is limited to one such mortgage on the given pcrtion of
the

fee

title

for

the

purpose

of

enabling

Lessee

to

:

-

...

obtain

financing for the impro.vements as contemplated herein and located
on the 9iven portion of the leased land; provided that,

for this

purpose, mortgages securing separate construction and take-out or
permanent

loans

for

the

same

considered to be one mortgage.
securing

it

s h a 11

ex pre s s 1 y

extension of the due date,

work

of

improvement

Both the note
provide

that

and
the r e

shall

be

the mortgage
can

be

no

addition to the balance of the loan,

alteration of any provision in the d·ocur.\ents, release of any
obligor, or any refinancing of the unpaid principal balance
without Lessor • s

prior "•ri.tten approval.

graph shall orohibi t

mortgagee

Nothing in this para-

from paying oelinquent

taxes or

.. ,........,,, ..,. ....
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•.

assessments or

providi~g

insurance

coverage

if Lessor fails

to

cure such de faults of Lessee.

Lessor shall not be required to

subordinate Lessor • s

to

securing

a

fee

title

construction

or

the

interim

lien
loan

of

an

(

encumbrance

except ·on

Lessee's

presentation of evidence, delivered as provided for giving
notices, of a firm .-and- enforceable commitment for a take-out or
permanent loan.
6.5

Curing of Defaults.

the mortgagee or trustee
• balance

outstanding

on

~ay

any

The

mortgage

shall

provide

that

not accelerate the dQe date of the
l.oan by

reason

of

any

default

by

Lessee without having first given Lessor vrit.ten notice of such
default and without having permitted Les:sor thirty

days in

(30)

~ays

which to...........
cure such default or, if more .than. -t:.hirty (30)
necessary

to

adequate time

cure

such

to cure

default,

without.

such default.

having

given

is

Lessor

The mortgage and related

documents shall further provide that the per-formance of any and
all obligations _of
tendered by Lessor-.

Lessee thereunder shall be accepted if.
Nei the:z; Lessor • s right:. to cure any default

nor any exercise of such a right shall constitute an assumption

-

-

of liability under- the note or mortgage.
6. 6

Indemnifica:tion.

On request by Lessor,

indemnify Lessor from any and all

Le·ssee u}!all

liability and expense caused

Lessor as a result of any action of Lessee in connection with the
mortgage or Deed of Trust.
ART.ICLE 7
7.1

INSURANCE
Liability. and Property Damaoe.

From the time when the

Lessee commences construction on the demised premises or any part.
thereof, the Lessee 'Will cause to be written a policy or policies
of insurance in the form and contents generally Jo:.no""·n as public
liability and/or owner's, landlord and tenant policies anc boiler
insurance policies and elevat.or insurance policies, .,.,.hen there be
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boilers and elevators i?c:l·uded in any improvements located on the
demised premises,

insuring the Lessee against any an4 all claims

and demands made by any person or ·persons whomsoever for ·injuries
received in connection with the operation and rnainte·nance of the
premises, improvements, and buildings located on the demised
premises or for any other risk insured against by such policies,
each

class

of

which

policies

shall

have

been

written· within

limits of not less than Five Hundre'd Thousand and No/100 Dollars
( $500,000. 00) for damages incurred or c:la;meq by a.ny o.ne person
·for bodily injury,

or other-."ise,

No/100 Dollars

($100, 000 .. 00)

less

Million

than

~arnages

One

~n~~trred

or

Dollars

($100, 000.00)
name

·Otherwise,
the

damages
No/'100

to property,

Dollars

and· for

not

($1,000,000.00)

for

or claimed by more .than one

injury,
shall

and

plus One Hundred. 'l}lousand and

per~on

plus

Orie

Hundred

Thousand

dai.\ages

to

property.

All

Lessee

and

the

Lessor I

as

for '::>odily
and

No/100

such policies

their

respective

interests may appear 1 as !-he persons assured by such policies:
and the original or c;Iuplicate original of each of .such policy or
policies shall be delivered by the Lessee to the Lessor promptly
upon

the

writing

of

such

policies,

together

with

adequate

·-

evidence of the fact that the prel"'!.iums are. paid.
7.2

Fire and Wind Damaoe
{ 1)

agrees
lease

Insuran~e.

The

Lessee's Obliaation.

Lessee

with Lessor that from and after
commen~s

buildings

and

all

or

loss

1

the Lessee will

imp.rovements
damage

generally

termed

coverage",

which

by

in
said

upon

fire

the

the

and

time when the

keep insured any and all
the

and

said premises

'Windstorm,

insurance

insurance

covenants

,.,.ill

trade
be

and
as

against
'What

is

.. extended

maintained

in

an

amount which will be sufficient to prevent any party in
interest £rom being or becoming a co-insurer on any part of
the risk,

which amount shall not be less than eighty percent

(80%) of the full insurable value, and all of such policies
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of insurance shall include the ·name ·of ·the ·Lessor as one of(.:
the parties insured thereby and shall fully protect both the
Lessor

and

appear.

the

Lessee

as

respective

interest

may

In the event of destruction of the said buildings

or improvements by fire,
which

their

insurance

shall

windstorm,

be

payable

or

other

and

as

casualty

often

for

as

such

insurance moriey shall have been paid to the Lessor and the
Lessee,

said

sums

so paid

shall be

deposited

account of the Lessor and the Lessee in a

in

a

joint

bank located

Bannock County 1 Idaho, and shall be ma.de
. - .·
Lessee for the construetion or repair I as

in

available to the
the case may be I

of a:ny building or building,s damaged or destroyed by fire,
wh~ch

windstorm, or other casualty for

b~ pa~iab~~
Lessee

and

from

shall

said

be paid

insurance money shall

out by

joint account

from

the

Lessor

time

to

and

the

on

the

time

estimate of any reliable architect licensed in the State of
Idaho having jurisdiction of such reconstruction and repair,
certifying that the amount of such estimate is being applied
to the

payment of

reasonable

the

reconstruction

or

repair

cost therefor: provided, however,

and

at.

(_

a

that it. f.irst

be made to appear to the satisfaction of the Lessor that the
total

amount

of

reconstruction

money

or

necessary

repair

destroyed or injured,

of

any

as aforesaid,

to

provide

buiic!ing

or

for

the

buildings

according to the plans

adopted ther.efor, has been provided by the Lessee for such
purpose

and

the Lessee

its

application

covenants

for

and agrees

such purpose assured; and
that in the event of the

destruction or damage of the buildings and
any

part

thereof,

and

as

often

as

improvements or

any

or

buildinc;

improvement on said prer:tises shall be destroyed or damaged
by fire, windstorm, or other casualty, the Lessee shall
rebuild and repair the same in such manner that the building
or

irnprovernent

so
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property upon the . demised premises prior to such damage or
destruction,

and shall have the same rebuilt and ready for

occupancy within fifte,en (15) months from the time when the
loss or destruction

oc~ur:red.

( 15) ·month period

The fifteen

for reconstruction shall be enlarged.· by delays caused
without fault or neglect on the part of the Lessee by act of~
God,

strikes,

lockouts~

other '~conditions

or

beyond

the

Lesse~ 1 s c6ntrol.
(2)

Deli very Qf .Policies;.

policies

shall

~elivered

be

The originals Qf all such

t(:)

the

Lessor

by. the

Lessee

along with the receipted ~ills evidencibg the fact ~hat the
premiums

~re

therefore

paid: but nothing herein contained

shall .be construed as prohibiting the Lessee from fi.nancing
the premiums where the terms of the policies are for three
( 3)

years

or

more

a~d

in

such

event

the

recei~t~

evidence it to be the fact t,hat the iristallmEmt

shall

prer.l~~m

pay-

ment or payments are. paid at or before their respective
maturities.
Where, however, ·there is a mortgage on the
premises

created

pursuant

this lease and if,
obligatory upon

t.o

the

provisions

contained

under the terms of such mortgage,

the Lessee

to

cause

the

originals

--

policies to be delivered to the rnortciaoee,

it is
of

the

then the Lessee
. .
.

'

shall deliver to the Lessor duplicate certificates of.
policies.

in

~uch

The policies or duplicate certificates thereof,

as the case may be, shall be delivered by. the Lessee to the
Lessor at 'least ten {lO).days prior to the. effective date of
the policies.
(3)

Effect of Mo;-tcaae.Subordination.

All of the pro-

visions herein contained relative to the disposition of payments from insurance companies are subject to the fact t,hat
if any mortgagees holding a mortgage created pursuant to the
provisions of this lease 'hereof elects,

in accordance ,_.i th

the terms of such mortgage, to require that the proceeds of
(~
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the insurance be paid to the mortgagee

on account. of such

mortgage,

made,

event,

then

it

su.ch

shall~

create the

payment

still

complete

be

f.und

shall

be

obligatory
in the

but

in

such

upon· -the····Lessee

manner

set

to

forth. in this

section to assure and c:or:tplete the payment for the work of
reconstruction and r.epair.
Damaoes: lnsqranc:e Proceeds: Joint Bank ~~<:ount.

(4)

it is agreed that any excess. of money received . from insurance remaining in the

joint bank account after the recon-

struction or repair of such building

br buildi_ngs, if there

be no default on t'he part of the Lessee in the performance
of the covenants herein, shall 'be paid to the Lessee; and in
case_ of the Le£see not .entering. into the reconstruction or
repair of the building or buildings within a pex-iod ·of six
( 6)

months

damage

or

from

the,

date

destruction

of· payment

occasioned

by

of

the

fire,

lqss., . after

windstorm,

or

other cause for which .. insurance money shall be payable, and
prosecutipg the same thereafter with such dispatch. asr.aay be
necessary to complete the same within
after
OCCc

the

sioned

occurrence
aforesaid i

aS

of

such

then the

damage
amount

the balance thereof remaining in the
case may be,

fifteen
or
S(;)

( 15)

(

months

destruction
COllecte:d 1

joint account,

Or

as the

shall be paid. to the Lessor and it will be at

the Lessor's option to terrlinate the lease and retain such
amount as liquidated and a·greed upon damages resul tins . from
the failure

o~

the Lessee to promptly, within the time spec-

ified, complete such work of reconstruction and repair.
fift.een

The

( 15) month periop herein provided for reconstruction

shall be enlarged by delays caused without fault or neglect
on the part of th~ Lessee by act of God, strikes, lockout,
or other condi.t.ions (other than matters of finance) beyond
the control of Lessee.
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( 5)

Repayn~ent •

Di:t:ect

The foregoing notwi ths.tanding,

in the event the insurance proceeds are the sum of Twenty
Five Thous~nd and No/100 Dollars

($25,000.00) or l~tss,

then

such proceeds shall be paid directly to the Lessee without
the necessity of creating the joint bank account
hereinabove set forth,. and Lessee shall use such funds

as
to

make the replacements or repairs as required hereunder.
Lessee • s <;qvenant t,:Q Pay Insurance Premiu.rns ~

7.3

The

Lessee covenants and agrees wit.h Lessor that the Lessee will pay
• premiur.as for all
obligated
·deliver

to

to

of the .insurance policies which the Lessee is

carry
the

under

Lessor

the ··terms

evidence

of

this

of ·such

lease,

payments

payment ......of .... any_ such
premiums become .i.n. default,
.

and

will

be.fore

the

and the Lessee

will cause renewals of expirin,g policies to be written and the
policies

or

copies

thereof,

as

the

lease

may

require,

to

be

delivered to Lessor at. least ten (10) days before the expiration
date

(

of

such expiring policies.
.
7.4 Indemnification.
(a}
Defense a.nd Pavrnent of Claims.

Lessee agrees

to

defend, indemnif.y and hold Lessor harmless together with all
of its servants
liability or

~

_ag,ents, or employees, from and against all

l()~S

for injuries

to or deatbs of persons or

damages to property caused by Lessee • s acts or omissions to
act,

use

result of

of,

occupancy of the

r;essee' s. operations

party hereto
ti~ely

or

shall give

tO

leased

land,

on said leased

the

other parties

or

land.

as

the
Each

prompt and

notice of any claim or suit instituted corning to its

knowledge

which

in

any

contingently_ or otberwise,

way,

directly

or

affects or might

indirectly,

affect

another

party, and all parties shall have the right to participate
in the defense of the .same to the extent of each parties.
own interest.
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Mechanic's Liens.

(b)

other liens
filed

or

orders

against

improvements

ln tbe event any mechanic • s or (

f,or

the

l~ased

the

thereon

by

payment

land

reason

of

or

of

money

any

or

s.ball

be

building

arising· out

or

of

any

labor, material furnished or alleged to have been furnished,
or to be furnished to or for Lessee on the leased land, or
for or by reason of any change,

alteration,

the

or

cost

thereto-~

or
or

expense
against

the

Lessor

any

as

contract

owner

relating

thereof,

Lessee

(30) days after i t receives notice or

shall, within thirty
knowledge thereof,

thereQf,

.

or addition of

either pay or bond

the same or provi.de

for the discharge thereof in such manner as may b.e provide-d

-

by law.
..

-Lessee shall

also defend- on -'behalf of Lessor at

Lessee's sole expense,

any action, suit or proceeding which

may

be

liens,

brought
or

thereon,

orders,

and

or

fo:t

Lessee

the

enforcement

shall

L

any

pay

of

such

dama9e

and

discharge any judgme~t entered therein and save harmless
Lessor from any and all claims or damages resulting

(

,..;,·

therefrom.
to

direct

Lessee

Lessor res.erves the right, however, to defend or
the

shall

defense

pay

attorney's fees,

all

of

any

expenses

such
of

suit

such

or

proceedings.

cafense,

ipclucling

and shall pay any damage and discharge any

judgment entered therein and save Lessor harmless from any
and all claims or damages resulting therefrom.
(c)

Resistin~

Claims.

ln

the

event

Lessee

shall

desire to resist any mechanic's or r:laterialmen's lieps,

or

any other claim against the hereinabove described premises
on account of building,
tion

or

other'lodse

rebuilding,

improving the

repairing,

leased

land,

reconstrucLessee shall

have the right to do so. provided Lessee shall first place
funds into escrow in an amount sufficient to pay saie claio
or lien,

~ith

said escrow directed to pay such clairn or lien

in the event of a result adverse to Lessee.
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7. 5

Insurer Qualified·

Thf! insurer shall be C!ualified and

authorized through the. Department of

\.

Insurance of the State of

Idaho.
ARTI~LE.

-TAXES, :ASSESSMENTS,

6

LIE~S. ~0

ENCUMBRANCES

Lessee shall be responsible to pay and discha;rge all existing and

future taxes and assessments which are or may become a

lien upon or which may be
other

tax

levying

body

levied by the

upon

thereon· or property ·located
also

be

respo·nsible

associated· ·vitll
le~sed

land

or

fees,

land

leased

insurance

but

to

the

not

Coun·ty or

or

land.

Lessee
and

shall

for

all

liens .and encumbrances

existence

limited

to,

a-nd

use

all

of

the

assessment

installments due or payable after the date of this lease.
(

any

improvements

premiums,

obligatio.ns,

relating

including,

leased

on the

for ·'all

liabilities, .cbarges,

the

State,

All

payments of taxes or assessments or both,
exc::ept permitted
installment .,. payments, shall_ be _._p_r_o.z:a:t:_.e~-~-ic:rr·nased
year and for the year in which the lease terminates.

Lessee may,

in its own name, or to the extent necessary under Lessor's name,
proceeCii~·gs

contest in :good fai t.h by all appropri,a te
applicability

or

validity

of

any

tax,

,· the amount,

assessment

pertaining to the leased land, or to any building,

or

fine

structure or

improvement upon the leased land, and in the event Les-see does in
good

faith

·assessment

conte..S.t
or

the

fine,

applicabiU,.ty

Lessor

will

or

cooper..ate

whenever possible with Lessee: provided
not subject any par·t of the
except that,

validity
that

in

of
such

any

tax,

contest

such contest ·will

leased land to forfeiture or loss,

if at any time payment of the 'Whole or any part of

such tax, assessment or fine shall become necessary in order to
prevent any such forfeiture or loss, Lessee shall pay the same or
cause the same to be paid in tir.:te to prevent such forfeiture or
loss.
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ARTICLE 9
CONDEMNATION
9. 1

Priority.

In the event of the taking or condemnation

by any competent authority for any public or quasi-public use or

purpose of the whole or materially all of the. demised premises at
any time during the term and -after any outstanding first mortgage
indebtedness ha-s

been

paid

and

satisfied,

then

the

rights

of

Lessor and ~essee to share in the net proceeds o:f any awards for
land, buildings,

improvements ana· damages upon ally. such taking,

• shall be as follows and in the followin~ oraer of priority:
(a) Lessor, at all times, regardless of when the taking
occurs, shall be entitled to receive; with iaterest thereon,
that
of the a\o"ard as
......... . portion
. .
.

shall

represent

compensation

for the value of the demised premises,. cc;msidered as vacant
and unimproved land,

such value _being herei.nafter referred

to as the "land value".
Lessor shall also be entitled to
costs awarded :in the condemnation proceed,ing.proportionately
attributable to such
(b)

(1)

-larid

(

value.

During all the term herein demised, e·xcept the

last five years of the term, Lessee shall be entitled to the
entire balance of the award,

which balance is hereir:a!:ter

referred to as "award balance".
( 2)

If

the

taking or condemnation as

above

set

forth shall occur at any time during the last five years of
the term,

Lessee

shall be

entitled to

award, with i.nt erest thereon,
by twenty percent
year

{and

.in

receive out

of the

the a-..:ard balance., diminished

( 20%) of such award b.a lance for each full

proportion

for

a

fraction

of

a

year)

that

elapses from the first day of said five year period to the
date of the vesting of title in

~he

condemnor: the remaining

award balance and iftterest thereon, as well as the
l~nd

a~ard

for

value and intere•t thereon, shall belong to the Lessor.

l.
GROUND LEASE AGREEMENT -

26

HORfN'SlC IK \\"YN'Nt. fJRCUSON l ST()UA.t8!

"'unro:tn"""".
1!::ol'l ... , ... ,, • ' U i f l .,. n 81'\a a..cu

'

.

..
(,3)

For. the

years of the
and

(2)

purpose

of

computing

the

last

five

term within the meaning of subparagraphs

above,- .j_ t

-~i-s

agreed

that

said· "last

five

( 1)

years"

shall mean the last five ye.ar:s of the original ·term, or if,
at or prio-r to the date that the award or the first partial
payment thereof (if there be such partiaf payments) becomes
payable,

the parties

term of this

shall, have duly ·agreed to extend the

lt!,ase pursuant to the options to ·renew herein

contained or by a written instrument executed 'in the manner
required for

r~c:ording,

then said last five years shall be

deemed to mean the last five

(5} years of the term as so

extended •

... (_c;) U

the values of the

re~pective

interests of Lessor

and Lessee shall be determined according to the provisions
of

subdivisions

{a)

ceeding pursuant

and.

(b)

to which

of

this

Section

in

the . pro-

the detnl:sed P.remises shall )\ave

been taken or condemned, the· valJJes ·so determined shall be
conclusive upon Lessor a.nd Le:s.see.
If such values shall not

(

have been thus separately determined,

...

such values shall be

·-

fixed by agreement be,tween the Lessor and Lessee or if they
are unable to agree,

then the controver!;'y · shall be resolved

by arbitration under the procedure to govern

in

A.r);itration

as set forth in this lease hereof under. Article 13.
(d) In the event. of the ta'kir1g in con·demnation of less
than the whole of tbe demised premises but materially all of
said premises

as

premises

remains

that WaS

that

taken 1

then

improvement only
shall

endeavor

hereinbelow defined

1

to

but

includes
aS

tO

not

agree

the

any

on

a

anc

part

the

of

Untaken

remaining
then

the part
the

I

the

improvement

rer.iainder
Hmd

of
of

the

the parties

fair ciarket value of

such remainder of the improvement 1 and if the-y fai 1 to agree
then the

controversy shall be resolved by arbitration.

The

value so agreed upon as the then fair market value of such

..
HORf ~STf '"'· \\"''!<."N'(.

GROUND LEASE AGREEMENT - 27

A!ft'll: ..

36

rr llCt.!SOS
lt,

1!.!'n ........: "

&. STOUMIII

AHA"''

• '""" )110

" " 100& ....

.

.

.
remainder

of the improvement or

as

determined in arbi tra-

tion, but

diminished, in the same manner as provided for in

"(b)" above relative to an "award balance", shall be paid by
Lessor to

Lessee,

and until paid shall be a

charge on the

shca,re of the award for land value to which Lessor shall be
entitled in the condemnation proceeding.
(e) I£

title

to

demised . premises

the

shall

whole

be

or · mat.rially

taken ·or

all ·of

condemned,

this

the

lease

shall cease and terminate as to the provision so taken and
•

shall

terminate

as

to

the

entire

parcel

if

in

Lessee's

judgment the taking materially and substantially affects the
use and value of the
'·~

re~ainder

of the demised premises.

.......

ARTICLE 10
ATTOR..~EY'

DEFAULT PRQVISIONS: REMEDIES:

10.1

Defaul.t. by Lessee...

Each

of

the

S FEES.

following

shall

be

deemed an event of default by Less'ee and il breach of this lease:
(a)

Rent

o~

Other

Payl'n!nts.

(

If Lessee shall default

in the payment of rent or other payments hereunder when due
according
correct

to

the

the
same

terms

of

within

this

lease

thirty

( 30)

and

does

days

not

after

fully

wri "':.t.en

notice thereof to Lessee.
(b)

default

in

the

performance

covenant

o r co-ndition

mortgage,

Deed of Trust,

financing

of

Lessee,

If Lessee shall

Other Cove,nants or Conditions.

or

not

and does

not

days after notice

the~eof

this

observance
lease

or

of

any

other

of

any

note,

or other document relating to the

the hospital

whether

documents,

of

or

to be performed
Lessor

is

a

fully correct

or

party
the

observed by
to

same

any

such

within

30

to the Lessee.

(c)

Abandonment.

Abandonment of the premises.

(d)

Bankrpotcy Proceedings.

If

during

the

Term of

this lease, Lessee shall:
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( i)

Appointment of Receiver.

Apply

for

or consent in writing, signed on behalf of Lessee
or

its

duly

authorized

attorney,

appointment of a receiver,

to

the

trustee or liquidator

of the Lessee or of all or a substantial part of
Lessee's assets: or
(ii)

Voluntary Banlcruptc:y.

voluntary ,petition

in

~r

bankruptcy

writing its· ina·bility ·to pay its

File

. a

admit

in

debts

as they

become due: or
(iii)

Assignment for Creditors.

Make

a

general assignment for· the benefit of creditors;

·-

.

or
(iv)

File

Reoraanization or Arranoement ..

a reorganization or arrangement with creditors to
take advantageof any insolvency law; or
(v}

(

Admit Insolvency.

File

an

answer

admitting the material allegations of a petition
filed

against.

reorganization

Lessee
or

in

any

insolvency

bankruptcy,

proceeding,

or

during the Term of this lease, an order, judgment
or

decree

shall

be

entered

competent jurisdiction,
creditor,
ins.ol v-ent

approving

reorganization

o£

any

court

of

on the application of a

adjudicating
or

by

Lessee
a

Lessee

bankrupt

or

petition. seeking
or

appointing

a
a

receiver, trustee or liquidator of Lessee, or of
all or a substantial part of its assets.
10.2

this

Remedies.

lease

re-entry may

by

In the event of any breach or default of

Lessee,

then

Lessor,

continue professional

besides

services

other

rights

of

to the patients of

the hospital and use of the property upon the premises for these
purposes.
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Should Lessor elect to re-enter as herein provided, or
should Le·ssor take possession pursuant to legal proceedings,
pursuant to any
terminate this

notice provided

for

by law,

lease or Lessor may

or

Lessor may either

from time

to t'ime,

without

terminating this lease, relet said premises or any part thereof
for such term or terms and at such rental or rentals and upon
such

other

terms

and

conditions
wit~

discretion may deem advisable,
reletting

shall

be

Lessor

in

Lessor's

sole

the right to make alterations

Rentals received by Lessor

and repa.irs to the premises.
such

as

applied:

first,

to

payment

from

of

any

indebtedness, other than rent, due Lessor hereunder from Lessee:
second,

to the payment of rent due'and unpaid hereunder: third,

to the payment- of -any costs of such
payment

of

the

cost

of

any

relett"in'g;

alterations

and

fourtrt,
repairs

to the
to

the

premises made necessary by Lessee • s breach o-f the provisions of
this lease; and the residue,

if any, shall be held by Lessor and

(

applied in payment of future rent as the same may become due and
payable hereunder.
Should such rental received from such
reletting be less than the rental agreed to be paid that month by
Lessee

hereunder,

Lessor.
l~o

then

Lessee

shall

pay

such

deficiency

to

Such deficiency shall be calculated. and paid monthly.

such re-entry or taking possession of the premises by Lessor

shall be construed as an election on Lessor's part to terminate
this lease unless a written notice of such intention is given to
Lessee or unless the termination thereof be decreed by a court of
competent

jurisdiction.

J:;otwithstanding any

such reletting

without termination, Lessor may at any time thereafter elect to
terminate this lease for such previous breach.
Should Lessor at any time terminate this lease for any
breach, in addition to any other remedy Lessor may have, Lessor
may recover from Lessee all carnages Lessor may incur by reason of
such breach,
including

including the costs of recovering the premises, and

the

worth

at

the
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excess,

if any,

of

charges

equivalent

the
to

amount
rent

of

rent,

reserved

'in

additional
this

premise~,. for

the remainder of the Term.

and

for

the

lease

remainder of the Term over the then reasonable
the

ren.t

rental va.l.ue of

The remedies herein

given to Lessor shall be cumulative, and the exercise of any;:-:one
remedy by Lessor shall not be to the exclusion of •ny ot;h·er
...
remedy. With previous written notice or demand, separate actions
may be maintaineq by. Lessor again.st Lessee from tinie to time . ~o
recover any rent or damages which,

at the

commencemen't:, of a·ny

such action, ha,s be.come :dQe and payable· to Lessor without waiting
until the end
10.3

o~

thf! Term of this lease.

At.torney's Fees.

In · the event suit shall ,be

.for an unl_awfu'i detainer of the said premise.s,

bro~wlit

for the recove:ry

of anY. rent due under .the provisions of this lease, OJ;",:because··O£

th~ br~ach o£ a.ny o:ther covenant herein contained to b~ k~pt ·Or
performed, the prevailing party shall be paid a reasona'ble
attorney's fee by the other party, and such attorney's fee shall
be deemed to bave accl;"ued at the commencement of such a.cticm and
shall be paid whether or not such action is prosecuted to
judgment.

:

....

ACTICLE 11
COVENANTS ~D WARRANTIES
·.

Except as otherwise expressly provided l.n this lease, lessee
agrees

to

take

condition,

posses;sion

of

provided ho'Wever,

the
that

leased
Lessor

land

in

covenants I

an

"as

is"

represents

and warrants as follows:
11 . 1

the

Tit l. e .

leased

land

That Lessor has good and marketable title to
and

said

title

is

free

and

unencul'tlber,e..d ·

Lessor's right, title and interest in and to the leased land,
except for this lease and for any lien or indebtedness incui;"red
pursuant to Arti.cle 4,

.shall

not ·be subordinated to any other

clait:l or interest of Lessee or to any other claim or interest of
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any mortgagee or other.creditor in connection with the financing
of the improvements to be constructed on the leased premises.
11.2-- Riaht···tO Execute.

That· Lessor

has

full

right

and

power to execute and perform this lease and to gran·t the estate
leased

berein

and

tile

rights,

easements,

privileges,.

appurtenances and hereditaments belonging or pertaining

ther.~to,

including air-rights.
11.3
herein

Peaceful Enjozyent.

reserved

and

That Lessee,

performing

the

on paying the .. refit

covenants

and

provisions

hereof on its p·art to be per:formed, shall peacefully and quietly
have ·and enjoy the leased land, and all such existing or ,future
required

rights,

easements,

~eredit(\m.e.nt.S- belonging

or

pri yile·ges,
pertaining

appurtenances
·thereto,

air-rights, during the Term: provided, however,

and

including

that Lessor does

not warrant t'hat governmental authority tnay not at some time
during the Term,· without the consent. or permi-ssion of·.·. Lessor,
pass ordinances or perform acts which may be prejudicial to
Lessee through no fault of Lessor: provided; however, that Lessor
agrees

to

join with

ordinances or acts,

Lessee

in

protest

or

opposition

to

(

such

t'he expenses of such opposition to be borne

by Lessee.
..

12

~RTIC.LE

ASSIGNMENT, SUBLETTINGAND SALE
12.1

Assicnment,

S~blettin~

and Sale.

Lessee

may

f!Ot

assign or sublet this lease agreement "'d thout the ·prior written
consent of Lessor, which consent shall not be unreasonably
withheld: provided, however,

that

in the event Lessor gives its

consent for the assignment or subletting .of this lease, Lessor is
boun<3 only by such obligations and enjoys
privileges as are set forth in this leas·e.
ag··reed that Lessor may require,

such rights and
It is expresssly

as a condition of such consent,

that the officers of the Lessee corporation agree to be person-
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ally liable for the performance of all obligations and covenants
of Lessee's assignee ( s} or subtenant ( s) under this Lease.

In the

eve·nt Lessee shall determine to sell all or any portion of the
hospital, and/or any additi.ons or expansions thereto or thereof,
· .

granted first right of refusal.

Lessor shall be ~~c4/ t.o purchase tne hospital as the fair
market value which, unless agreed upon by the parties, shall be
determined by an M.A. I. real. estate appraiser appointed and paid
If Lessee is not satisfied with the fair market value

by Less·or.

appraisal submitted by the· appraiser selected·. by
may,

at

its

expense

own

receipt of the appraisal,

and

within

twenty

select an M.A.l.

Lessor~

days

(20)

Lessee
of

the

real estate appraiser

who, together wi tb the appraiser selected by Lessor, shall choose
_a third .... s~c:::h

appraiser whose

Lessar and Lessee.

fees

shaal be

shared

lf Lessee fails to select· a

e·.:tually by

second appraiser

within· the time allowed, the single appraiser appointed shall be
the sole appraiser and

shall set the fair market

value of the

hospital. lf Lessee does timely act, and a majority cannot agree
as to the fai.r market value of the hospital, the three (3)
appraisals shall
three (3).

be

added together and

their

total

divided by

The resulting quotient shall be the fair market value

of the hospital for the purpose of this purchase option.
ARTICLE 13

ARI3ITRAT:t:ON: APPOINTMENT
13.1

Arbitr~ion.

of any matter

arising

Either party may require the arbitration
under

or

in connection with this

lease.

Arbitration is initiated and required by giving notice specifying
the matter to be arbitrated.
matter

C::oncerni.ng

ineffective

unless

which

the

If action is already pending ·on any
notice

given before

the

is

given,

expiration

t.he
of

notice

is

thirty. (30)

days after service of process on the person g·iving the notice·
Except
arbitration,

as

provided. to the contrary in these

the arbitration shall be
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to applicable

rules

Association.

and

The

of the American Arbitration

procedures

arbitrators

shall

be

bound

by

this

lease.

Pleadings in any action pending on the same matter shall, if the
arbitration is

required

or

consented to,

be

deemed

amended

to

l~mit

the issues to those ·contemplated by the rules prescribed
above.
Each party shall pay half the cost of a.rbitration
including arbitrator's fees.
i~

separately provided
required

thi:s lease.

A~pointment.

13.2

for

the

provided to the

Attorneys' fees shall be awarded as

Appointment shall be made in the manner

appointment
contrary

of

arbitrators

in the applicable

unless

expressly

provi·sions

of this

lease.
The...re shall be three (3) arbitrator:s appointed as f.ollows':
(a)

Within

twenty

{20)

days

after

notice

requiring

arbitration, each party shall appoint one (l) arbitrator and
give notice of the appointment to the other party.
(b)
The two (2) arbitrators shall choose a thira
arbitrator within thirty (30) days after appointment of the

(

second.
{c)

If either party fails to appoint an arbitrator,

or if the two

(2)

arbitrators

fail to cheese a

third,

the

appointment shall be made by the then presiding judge of the
Superior

Court

for

the

county

in

which

located,

acting in his individual and

the premises

nonoffic_ial

are

capacity

on the appli'"cation of either party and on (30} days' notice
to

the

other

party:

provided

that

either

party

l&lay,

by

notice given before cor.unencement of the arbitration hearing,
consent
other

to arbitration- by the

party.

arbitrator

In
shall

that
be

event,
.made

arbitrator
no

-and

further
any

appointed

by the

appoint.r:lents

other

of

arbitrators

previously appointed shall be dismissed.
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ARTICLE 14
PROVISIONS

MISCELLM~EOUS

14.1

Exercise_ of. Renewal Oction. ___Less_eEt

~~y

exercise

its

option to extend the Term granted under Article I, paragraph 1.2,
h~reof,

by giving Lessor written notice

thereof not later than
Any option so

120 days prior to the expiration date of the Term.
exercised

shall

extend

the

lease

on

the

same

terms

as

effect at the time of the exercise of such options;

are

in

subject. to

adjustment and notification in accordance ~erewith.

14.2

Inspectioh by Lessor.

leased land at

any reasonable

Lessor

time

for

may

enter

any purpose

upon

the

necessary,

incidental to or connected with verifications of the performance
.

of Lessee's
hereunder,
but
subject
to any provisions
"""""'
. . obligations
..
.
.
.
.
with respect thereto otherwise contained herein.
14.3

Negation of Partnership.

Nothing in this lease shall

be construed to render the Lessor in any way or for any purpose a
partner,

(

joint venturer,

Lessee other than

or associate

that of

landlord

lease be construed to authorize

a~y

in

and

relationship with

tenant,

nor shall this

either to act as

agent

for

the

other except as expressly provided to the contrary in this lease.

14.4

Controllinq Law.

This

1 ease

shall

be

deemed

+;.o

be

made and shall be construed in accordance with. the laws of the
State of Idaho.

14.5
deliver

Surrender of Possession.
to

LeS""Sor

termination of

this

good

and

condition

provided herein,
shall

execute

possession
lease
in

Lessee

of

or as

the

demised

otherwise

accordance

with

agrees

to yield

and

land

the

provided

the

herein,

express

deliver

to

Lessor

a

good

in

obligations

except for reasonable wear and tear,
and

at

and

and Lessee
sufficient

document of relinquishment, if and when requested.
14.6

Successors.

This

lease

shall bind and

inure to the

benefit of any successor or assignee of Lessor and any successors
or

assignees

of

Lessee

whether

resulting

from

any

merger,
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consolidation,

reorg.aniza tion,

assignment,

foreclosure

or

otherwise.
14.7

Head.inqs.

contained herein are

The

Notices.

and

paragraph

headings

for convenience and reference· and are

itnended to define or lind t
lease.
14.8

article

not

the scope of any provision of this

All notices required to be .given t.o Lessee

under the terms of the lease shall be given by certified mail,
return receipt requested, postage prepaid, aadressed to Lessee as
follows:

·- · ·

STERLING DEVELOPMENT CO. , a
Washington partnership
1906 Broad-way
Vancouver, Washington ·98663

with copy to:

WYNNE, FERGUSON & STOUMBOS
1220 Main Street, Suite 300
P. o. Box 694
Vancouver, Washington 98666

HOREN~TEIN,

or at such other addresses
delivered to Lessor.
as follows: ·

as

(

Lessee may designate in writing

Similar notice shall be addressed to Lessor

INTERMOUNTAIN HEALTH CARE, INC.
Suite 2200, 36 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

·-·

with c;opy to:

POCATELLO REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER
777 Hospital Way
Pocatello, Idaho 83201
Attention:

Chris Anton, Administrator

or at such other address .as Lessor may designate . in· writing
delivered to Lessee.
Notices shall be sent in a similar manner
to any oortgagee of Lessee at such address as may be designated

(

in writing •.

'-·
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14.9

(

Amen«ament Qf .Lease .. ·' Le·ssor and Lessee shall cooperate

and include in this lea:se by suitable amendment from time to time
any provision that ma¥ reasonably be requested by any proposed
Leasehold Mortgagee for the purpose of implementing
protection provisi9ns contained in this

~he

Mortgagee

lease and allowing such

mortgagee reasonable ~eans to protect or preserve the lien o£ a
Leasehold Mortgage on the occurrence of a default on the terms of
this lease.
and

to

Lessor and Lessee ecich agree .to execute and deliver

if

acknowledge

necessary

for

recording

purposes,

agreement necessary to effect such amendment: provided,

any

how~ver,·

such amendment shall not in any way affect the term or rent under
this

lease

nor

otherwise

in

any

respe:Qt .adversel)' .affect

the

rights of the Lessor in this lease.
14. ~0 "Recording.

have

acknowledged,

Lessor

and

Lessee

and

Lessee

agrees

to

agree

to

deliver

execute
to

and

Lessor,

a

memorandum of this lease in the form attached hereto as Exhibit
.. B ..

(

for the purpose of recording such memorandum with the County

Recorder of Bannock County.

IN

WITNESS WHEREOF,

the P.arties ·have set their ha:nds

the day and year first above written.
LESSOR:
INTEP.J-,!OUNTAIN HEALTH CARE, INC., a
Utah non-p:t:pfi t cq~p.oration
authoriz~d to do business in Idaho,
dba Pocatello Regional Medical
Center

By------------------------------------
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STERLING

DtVELOPHENT

co •

1

a

Washington partnership

~~·-·-·-M-.-L-.--~---C-E_LO_S_l____~--~~--~-

By__

By ·.
y
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.

·.

.

·.· .. ·
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¥~ut£/~
I .
7

···~

.

..

STATE OF

.~1

)
£) .
: ss.
-~
.

County of

On this

2Z;~ay

.

'known to me

INTERMOUNTAIN
au.t'!:i.:..:..·ized
Medical

c;Z__,, ,~ .

, ·190:

, before me, the

pUlf?ii(; in~·· for said State, personally
Cltfa;A (/ fJz.::t;;;;: .:~
. . .
.
to be t}«' P~esiden~~~~?; I:=esp~y, of

undersigned,' a
appeared

of

. .

(

Notary

HEALTH CARE,

to

Center,

de..

business
the

INC. ,
in

corporation

a

Utah

idaho,
that

non-profit
dl::.a

corporation

Pocatello

executed

the

Regional
foregoing

instrument, and acknowledged to me that such corporation executed
the same.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF,

I have hereunto set my band and affixed

my official seal the day and year in this certificate first above
written.

/NOTARY PUBLIC in and for the State
of
Idaho
, residing at Pocatello
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STATE OF

)

IDAHO

County of

:Bannock

: ss.
)

On this ..2.'!Ehday of ___J_a_n_u_a_r_y____________ , 19_!!, before me, the
Notary Public in and for said State,

undersigned, a

appeared M. L. CANCELOSI
General Partners of
par~nership,

the

personally

and .nt1 R.. \"ll)!'I'SK\' , known to me to be the
STERLING DEVELOPMENT CO., a Washington

partnership

that

executed

the

foregoing

instrument, and acknowledged to rne that such corporation executed
the same.
IN

WI~NESS

·WHEREOF, I have hereunto set rny hand and affixed

my official seal the day and year in this certificate first above
written. ··
..

- ............

NOTARY PUBLIC in and for the S~ate
of Idaho
residing at Pocat:ello

.Jo

.....
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•
EXHIBIT A
LEGAL DESCRlPTJON

A parcel ofland in the St:lle ofldaho, County ofBannock, }ocated in the NE Y.. of Sec. 25 T. 65.,
R. 34 E., B.M., more pankuJarJy described as fo1lows:
Beginning at the NE Y.. of Sec. 25. Thence South 0 degrees 01' 58" East along the East line of
Sec. 25, J 461.67 feet, thence West 509.89 to the True Pojnt ofBeginmng. Said point on the
Wester]y right-of-way of the hospital.
Thence, South 0 degrees OJ '50" along Westerly right-of-way] 60.64 feet to the Point of curvature
of a 488.37 foot radius curve having a centra] angle of 33 degrees 43'35"
Thence, Southeasterly along said curve to the left 287.47 feet
Thence, South 88 degrees 42'58" West 488.91 feet
Thence, North 442.14 feet
Thence East 406.35 feet to the True Point ofBegjnning.
Contains 4.25. acres ·

li1
--? '['! ;:';
' .._ p~,l
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Michael D. Gaffney, ISB No. 3558
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY PA
2105 Coronado Street
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404
Telephone: (208) 523-5171
Facsimile: (208) 529-9732

''V
:;

~--

.

~-<--'~''

DE

'

-

iY CL'>

Attorney for Defendants

DISTRICT COURT SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
BANNOCK COUNTY IDAHO
POCATELLO HOSPITAL, LLC d/b/a
PORTNEUF MEDICAL CENTERS, LLC,

Case No.: CV-10-2724 OC

Plaintiff,
DEFENDANTS' NOTICE OF
APPEARANCE

vs.
QUAIL RIDGE MEDICAL INVESTORS,
LLC and CENTURY PARK
ASSOCIATES, LLC,
Defendants.

..a::k •

Category: I.
Filin Fee: $~.00

All parties will please take notice that Michael D. Gaffney of the law firm, Beard
St. Clair Gaffney PA, now appear as counsel of record for Defendants, Quail Ridge
Medical Investors, LLC and Century Park Associates, LLC, in the above captioned
matter. Please serve all papers and pleadings on the office located at 2105 Coronado
1

Defendants' Notice of Appearance Page 1

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certifY I am a licensed attorney in the state of Idaho and on June 30, 2010, I
served a true and correct copy of the DEFENDANTS' NOTICE OF APPEARANCE on
the following by the method of delivery designated below:
Dave R. Gallafent
R. William Hancock
Merrill & Merrill
PO Box 991
Pocatello, ID 83204-0991
Fax: 232-2499

D

U.S. Mail

D

Hand-delivered

U.S. Mail

D

Hand-delivered

Facsimile

D

Facsimile

I

Defendants' Notice of Appearance Page 2
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Michael D. Gaffney, ISB No. 3558
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY PA
2105 Coronado Street
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404
Telephone: (208) 523-5171
Facsimile: (208) 529-9732
Email: gaffney@beardstclair.com
Attorney for Defendants

DISTRICT COURT SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
BANNOCK COUNTY IDAHO
POCATELLO HOSPITAL, LLC d/b/a
PORTNEUF MEDICAL CENTERS, LLC,

Case No.: CV-10-2724 OC

Plaintiff,
ANSWER AND JURY DEMAND

QUAIL RIDGE MEDICAL INVESTORS,
LLC and CENTURY PARK
ASSOCIATES, LLC,
Defendants.

The defendants, Quail Ridge Medical Investors, LLC and Century Park Associates,
LLC (Quail Ridge, collectively), through counsel of record, Beard St. Clair Gatfney PA,
respectfully answer the plaintiffs' complaint as follows:
1. Admit paragraph 1, 2, 3, 6 and 7.

2. The answering defendants have insufficient information to admit or deny
paragraphs 4 and 5. It is admitted that PMC has attached a Lease Agreement to
the Verified Complaint; however, the answering defendant cannot authenticate or
otherwise admit the specifics of the Lease Agreement. The answering defendant
does admit that a Lease Agreement was entered into a lease dated January 27,
Answer and Jury Demand Page 1

54

20c...i299732

'"'t"'""

1983 between Intermountain Healthcare, Inc. (fHC) and Sterling Development
Co.
3. Deny paragraphs 8 through 33, inclusive.

AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES
1. The plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

2. The plaintiff's claims are barred by its unclean hands.
3. The plaintiff's claims are barred by the doctrine of res judicata.

4. The plaintiff's claims are barred by the doctrine of estoppel.
5. The plaintiffs claims are barred from recovery by the doctrine of laches.

6. The plaintiffhas failed to mitigate its alleged damages, if any.
7. The plaintiffs claims, some or all of them, are barred by the applicable statute of

limitations
8. The plaintiff's claims are barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel.
9. The plaintiff's claims are barred on the basis that they lack a legal basis.

10. The plaintiffs claims are barred because they are not based in fact.
11. The plaintiff has failed to join necessary or indispensible parties.
12. The defendants are excused from performance by virtue ofbreach ofthe lease

agreement on the part of the plaintiff.
13. The plaintiff has waived, through its conduct or course of dealing, any retroactive
or prospective claims for rent adjustments.
14. The plaintiff is not the real party in interest.

15. The plaintiff has failed to give required contractual or statutory notices to the
defendants for alleged rents due.

Answer and Jury Demand Page 2
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16. The plaintiff has failed to perfonn a condition precedent to enforcement or
imposition of any rental adjustment, including, but not limited to, compliance with
section 1.3(b).
17. Any detennination of fair market value must exclude consideration of
improvements and the lease. Improvements include roads, utilities, buildings and
improvements to surrounding lands that affect the value of the land in question.
18. Any detennination of fair market value must include consideration that the initial
value was an agreed $15,000 per acre, and all detenninations ofvalue were made,
accepted, agreed to, or relied upon by the parties at each adjustment date since the
inception of the lease. Thus, adjustments, if any, are limited to changes in value during
the period since last acceptance or acquiescence of fair value by the parties.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, the defendants pray for the following relief from this Court:
1. Dismissal of the plaintiffs Complaint in its entirety;
2. Awarding the defendants their full, reasonable attorney tees and costs pursuant to
Idaho Code§ 12-120 and 12-121 and Rule 54 ofthe Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure;
3. Granting such other relief as the court deems just and proper.

JURY DEMAND

~aei p. o/fue~

I

Be~~:~tSt. 9<lir GatTney PA ,.//
Attorney for Defendants
I

\_

/
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
f certify I am a licensed attorney in the state ofldaho and on August 2, 2010, I

served a true and correct copy of the ANSWER AND JURY DEMAND on the following
by the method of delivery designated below:
Dave R. Gallafent
R. William Hancock
Merrill & Merrill
PO Box 991
Pocatello, ID 83204~0991
Fax: 232-2499

EJ

/

U.S. Mail

0'
·.·

rriand-delt'vered
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Facsimile

~I

gt

U.S. Mail

~I" Hand-delivered ~ Facsimile
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT (}F..T;.,~;~1f,AlfR:ff,(
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK uc1
)
)
)
)

POCATELLO HOSPITAL, LLC
PLAINTIFF,

vs

""' • ,

Case No: CV-2010-0002724-0C

)

)
)
QUAIL RIDGE MEDICAL INVESTORS, LLC )
CENTURY PARK ASSOCIATES, LLC
)
)
DEFENDANT
)

MINUTE ENTRY AND ORDER

______________________________ )
The above entitled matter came before the Court on Friday, April15, 2011 for a hearing
on Plaintiffs Motion to Vacate Trial Setting. Plaintiff appeared by and through counsel, Kent
Hawkins. Defendant appeared telephonically by and through counsel, Michael Gaffney. No
court reporter was available for this matter due to the retirement of the court reporter.
Administrative Order 11-01 was issued on January 5, 2011, wherein the application ofldaho
Administrative Rule 27, as it applies to having a certified court reporter attend all district court
proceedings, shall be suspended until further notice.
Hearing proceeded before the Court on the record. Counsel for Defendant will not
stipulate to the continuance, however does not have a major objection to using the currently set
second trial date of October 25, 2011.
After hearing comment from counsel, the Court GRANTED the Motion to Vacate Trial
Setting. Jury Trial in this matter is now set for Tuesday, October 25, 2011 at 9:00 a.m. as a
primary setting and all cutoff dates shall be controlled by that date.

MfNUTE ENTRY AND ORDER -I
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IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: May 5th, 2011.

MITCHELL BROWN
District Judge

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING/SERVICE

The undersigned certifies that on the{__p day of May, 2011, she caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing Minute Entry and Order to be served upon the following persons in the
following manner:
PLAINTIFF ATTORNEY:
Kent Hawkins
P.O. Box 991
Pocatello, Idaho 83204-0991
DEFENDANT ATTORNEY:
Michael Gaffuey
2105 Coronado State
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK
)
)
)
)

POCATELLO HOSPITAL, LLC
PLAINTIFF,

vs

Case No: CV-2010-0002724-0C

)
)

MINUTE ENTRY AND ORDER

)

QUAIL RIDGE MEDICAL INVESTORS, LLC )
)
CENTURY PARK ASSOCIATES, LLC
)

DEFENDANT

)

________________________________ )
The above entitled matter came before the Court on Friday, August 5, 2011 for a hearing
on Plaintiff's Motion to Summary Judgment. At the outset, the Court advised that an Order to
Shorten Time had been issued on the Defendant's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment and that
both Motions would be heard for Argument today. Plaintiff appeared by and through counsel,
Kent Hawkins. Defendant appeared by and through counsel, Michael Gaffney. No court reporter
was available for this matter due to the retirement of the court reporter. Administrative Order 11-01
was issued on January 5, 2011, wherein the application ofldaho Administrative Rule 27, as it
applies to having a certified court reporter attend all district court proceedings, shall be suspended
until further notice.
Hearing proceeded before the Court on the record. The Plaintiff additionally offered
argument on their Motion to Strike. The Court heard argument from the parties and upon
consideration thereof,
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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that this matter is taken under advisement and the Court
shall render written Memorandum Decision and Order on Summary Judgment in due course.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Jury Trial scheduled for Tuesday, October 25,
2011, is hereby VACATED, pending the Court's decision. Counsel shall forthwith submit dates
for trial available in the first quarter of2012 for Jury Trial.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED:

A""~.
1

s-

'2011.

f?J_~a/~
MITCHELL BROWN
District Judge

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING/SERVICE
The undersigned certifies that on

the~y of August, 2011, she caused a true and

correct copy of the foregoing Minute Entry and Order to be served upon the following persons in
the following manner:

PLAINTIFF ATTORNEY:
Kent Hawkins
P.O. Box 991
Pocatello, Idaho 83204-0991
DEFENDANT ATTORNEY:
Michael Gaffney
2105 Coronado State
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404
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Mailed
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Hand Delivered
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Mailed

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK

POCATELLO HOSPITAL, LLC
PLAINTIFF,

vs

)
)
)
)

Case No: CV-2010-0002724-0C

)

)
)
QUAIL RIDGE MEDICAL INVESTORS, LLC )
)
CENTURY PARK ASSOCIATES, LLC
)
DEFENDANT
)

MINUTE ENTRY AND ORDER

_______________________________ )
The above entitled matter came before the Court on Tuesday, December 20, 2011 for oral
announcement of the Court's decision on pending cross motions for summary. Plaintiff appeared
telephonically by and through counsel, Dave R. Gallafent. Defendant appeared telephonically by
and through counsel, Michael D. Gaffney. No court reporter was available for this matter due to
the retirement of the court reporter. Administrative Order 11-01 was issued on January 5, 2011,
wherein the application ofldaho Administrative Rule 27, as it applies to having a certified court
reporter attend all district cowi proceedings, shall be suspended until further notice.
Hearing proceeded before the Court on the record. The Court announced its decision
orally with respect to the parties cross motions for summary judgment. The Court DENIED both
parties motions for summary judgment stating that there were genuine issues of material fact that
precluded the entry of summary judgment in this action. The basis for the Court's denial of these
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summary judgments was set forth in detail on the record. The Court ordered that this matter will
remain on the Court's active trial calendar as presently scheduled.
Further, the Court ordered the parties to mediation in this matter. Counsel shall select a
mediator by the end of January 2012 and complete mediation by March 1, 2012.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: January 7th, 2012.

MITCHELL BROWN
District Judge

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING/SERVICE

The undersigned certifies that on the

J1 day of January, 2012, she caused a true and

correct copy of the foregoing Minute Entry and Order to be served upon the following persons in
the following manner:
PLAINTIFF ATTORNEY:
Kent L. Hawkins
P.O. Box 991
Pocatello, Idaho 83204-0991

0

Faxed

0

Hand Delivered

•

Mailed

DEFENDANT ATTORNEY:
Michael D. Gaffney
2105 Coronado State
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404

0

Faxed

0

Hand Delivered

•

Mailed

DALE HATCH, Clerk
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK
)

POCATELLO HOSPITAL, LLC
PLAINTIFF,

vs

)
)
)

Case No: CV-2010-0002724-0C

)

MINUTE ENTRY AND ORDER

)
)

QUAIL RIDGE MEDICAL INVESTORS, LLC )
CENTURY PARK ASSOCIATES, LLC
)
)
DEFENDANT
)

________________________________ )
The above entitled matter came before the Court on the

3rd

day of February, 2012 for

hearing on Plaintiff's Motion to Reconsider. Plaintiff appeared by and through counsel, Dave R.
Gallafent, Kent L. Hawkins, R. William Hancock and. Defendant appeared by and through
counsel, John M. A vondet. No court reporter was available for this matter due to the retirement of
the court reporter. Administrative Order 11-01 was issued on January 5, 2011, wherein the
application ofldaho Administrative Rule 27, as it applies to having a certified court reporter attend
all district court proceedings, shall be suspended until further notice.
Hearing proceeded before the Court on the record. At the outset, the Court inquired of
counsel as to the status of mediation in this matter. The Court then ORDERED the parties to
choose between 2 proposed mediators, retired Judge Daniel C. Hurlbutt or attorney Kevin E.
Donohue within ten (10) days ofthis hearing. If the parties have not selected one ofthese two
(2) individuals to conduct the mediation within ten ( 10) days and notified the Court of their

MINUTE ENTRY AND ORDER- I

selection, the Court will appoint one (1) of the two (1) to act as mediator over this matter. It is
further ORDERED that Mediation shall be completed by March 1, 2012. The mediator shall
immediately notify the Court concerning the result of said mediation.
The Court then heard argument from counsel with respect to Plaintiffs Motion to
Reconsider. At the conclusion of argument, the Court encouraged the parties that this dispute
should be resolved in the context of mediation. The Court also advised the parties that each had
a great deal at risk and that they should mediate with a strong desire to reach a resolution of this
matter. The Court advised that it would not take this matter under advisement until notified
regarding the resolution of the mediation process. If mediation is unsuccessful, the Court will
then take the matter under advisement.
Further, the trial in this matter is hereby VACATED. Counsel shall submit new stipulated
trial dates within two (2) weeks of this hearing. Said dates shall be approximately 60 to 90 days
from the mediation cut-off date of March 1, 2012.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: February lOth, 2012.

MITCHELL BROWN
District Judge

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING/SERVICE

MINUTE ENTRY AND ORDER- 2
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The undersigned certifies that on

thJ

day of February, 2012, she caused a true and

correct copy of the foregoing Minute Entry and Order to be served upon the following persons in
the following manner:

PLAINTIFF ATTORNEY:
Kent L. Hawkins
P.O. Box 991
Pocatello, Idaho 83204-0991
DEFENDANT ATTORNEY:
Michael D. Gaffn;!y
2105 Coronado State
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL

DISTRI~ \~~ S;~
:,

OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK:'': .

POCATELLO HOSPITAL, LLC
PLAINTIFF,

vs

)
)
)
)

.

Case No: CV-2010-0002724-0C

)

)
)
QUAIL RIDGE MEDICAL INVESTORS, LLC )
CENTURY PARK ASSOCIATES, LLC
)
)
DEFENDANT
)

MINUTE ENTRY AND ORDER AND
ORDER SCHEDULING TRIAL

_________________________________ )
Pursuant to the Court's Minute Entry and Order dated February 10, 2012, the Court having
vacated the trial in the foregoing matter and having ordered the parties to mediation; the Court also
ordered that the parties submit available trial dates approximately sixty (60) to ninety (90) from the
date of the February 10, 2012 hearing. The parties having complied with the Court's order in this
respect contacted the Court's clerk with a stipulated trial date of May 14, 2012 through May 18,
2012. Therefore, the Court will schedule this matter for jury trial to commence on Monday, May
14, 2012 at 9:00a.m. through May 18, 2012. Deadlines for filing trial briefs, jury instruction,
motions in limine will be covered by the time lines imposed in the Court's previous Scheduling
Order triggered from the new trial date.
In addition, the Court's Minute Entry and Order dated February 10, 2012 required that
the parties complete mediation on or before March 1, 2012. On February 24, 2012, the parties
and initiated an informal status conference with the Court. This conference was conducted off
the record. The parties advised the Court of difficulties which prevented them from completing

MINUTE ENTRY AND ORDER- I

mediation by the Court's deadline of March 1, 2012. They requested and the Court determined
that good cause existed that the deadline be extended by fifteen (15) days. Therefore, the Court
GRANTED the parties and extension of fifteen (15) days to complete mediation or until March
15,2012.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: March 13th, 2012.

MITCHELL BROWN
District Judge

MINUTE ENTRY AND ORDER- 2

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING/SERVICE

The undersigned certifies that on the

0

day of March, 2012, she caused a true and

correct copy of the foregoing Minute Entry and Order to be served upon the following persons in
the following manner:
PLAINTIFF ATTORNEY:
Kent Hawkins
P.O. Box 991
Pocatello, Idaho 83204-0991

0

Faxed

0

Hand Delivered

~ailed

DEFENDANT ATTORNEY:
Michael Gaffney
2105 Coronado State
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404

0

Faxed

0

Hand Delivered

~Mailed
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DISTRICT 1

!DISTRICT COURT SIXTH JUDICIAL
BANNOCK COUNTY ID~tf).R \6 ~'to: 34
POCATELLO HOSPTIAL, LLC d/b/a
)
PORTNEUF MEDICAL CENTERS, LLC, ) Case No.: CV-10-2724 OC
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
vs.
) REPORTOFMEDIATOR
QUAIL RIDGE MEDICAL INVESTORS,
LLC and CENTURY PARK
ASSOCIATES, LLC,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)

Court ordered mediation took place on March 12,2012 at the offices of Merrill
and Merrill, Pocatello, Idaho.
Pocatello Hospital, LLC appeared through Norman Stephens, President/CEO and
Don Wadle, Vice President and were represented by Dave. R. Gallafent.
Quail Ridge Medical Investors, LLC appeared through Rick McAftee, Chairman's
Office, Life Care Centers of America, and were represented by Winston V. Beard.
Both parties negotiated in good faith toward resolution of the issues presented in
the instant case. Discussion centered on reaching an agreement of a leasehold rate to
govern the leased ground which serves as the subject matter of their 1983 lease of 4.25
acres of property in Pocatello, Idaho.
Additional discussions were held to explore other avenues to resolve the parties'
lawsuit.
REPORT OF MEDIATOR PAGE 1
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Following these discussions and the exchange of offers to settle, a final agreement
could not be concluded. Therefore, the mediation was terminated without settlement.

Dated: March 14, 2012
Daniel C. Hurlbutt, Jr.
Mediator

REPORT OF MEDIATOR PAGE 2

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on March 14,2012, I caused to be
served a true copy of the foregoing REPORT OF MEDIATOR by the method indicated
below, and addressed to each of the following:

David R. Gallafent
Merrill & Merrill, Chtd.
PO Box 991
Pocatello, ID 83204-0991

WinstonV. Beard
Beard, St. Clair, Gaffuey
2105 Coronado Street
Idaho Falls, ID 83404

Clerk of the Court
624 East Center, Room 211
Pocatello, ID 83201

Honorable Mitchell W. Brown
PO Box 775
Soda Springs, ID 83276

(><) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid

(
(
(
(

)
)
)
)

09
(
(
(
(

)
)
)
)

Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
E-mail
Fax
U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
E-Mail
Fax

()0 U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
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)
)
)
)
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Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
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Fax

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK

POCATELLO HOSPITAL, LLC, D/B/A
PORTNEUF MEDICAL CENTER, LLC,
PLAINTIFF,

vs
QUAIL RIDGE MEDICAL INVESTORS,
LLC AND CENTURY PARK
ASSOCIATES, LLC,
DEFENDANT.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No:

MINUTE ENTRY AND ORDER

_____________________________ )
COURT REPORTER: Rodney Felshaw
DATE:

Friday, March 23, 2012

02:30PM

TELEPHONIC APPEARANCES: Dave R. Gallafent, Plaintiffs Attorney
Kent L. Hawkins, Plaintiffs Attorney
Michael D. Gaffney, Defendants' Attorney
MATTER BEFORE THE COURT: Civil Hearing
PROCEEDINGS:

The above-entitled matter came before the Court as regularly scheduled for

hearing for the Court's Decision on the Plaintiffs Motion to Reconsider. Dave R. Gallafent and
Kent L. Hawkins appeared telephonically on behalf of Pocatello Hospital, LLC, Plaintiff. Michael
D. Gaffney appeared telephonically on behalf of Quail Ridge Medical Investors, LLC. The basis
for the Court's Decision and Order was set forth in detail on the record.
DISPOSITION: The Court DENIED the Plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration.

Dist-CVME&O-Minute Entry and Order
Revised 01/08
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IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: this 11th day of April, 2012.

MITCHELL W BROWN
District Judge

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING/SERVICE
I hereby certifY that on April 12, 2012, I mailed/served a true copy of the Minute Entry and
Order on the attorney( s)/person( s) listed below by mail with correct postage thereon or causing the
same to be hand delivered.

PLAINTIFF ATTORNEY:
Dave R. Gallafent
Kent Hawkins
PO Box 991
Pocatello, ID 83204

D U.S. Mail
DE-Mail
D Courthouse Box
[gl Fax: (208) 232-2499

DEFENDANT ATTORNEY:
Michael D. Gaffney
2105 Coronado Street
Idaho Falls, ID 83404

D U.S. Mail
DE-Mail
D Courthouse Box
[gl Fax: (208) 529-9732

2
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK

POCATELLO HOSPITAL, LLC
PLAINTIFF,

vs

)
)
)
)

Case No: CV-2010-0002724-0C

)
)

MINUTE ENTRY AND ORDER

)

QUAIL RIDGE MEDICAL INVESTORS, LLC )
CE'·JTURY PARK ASSOCIATES, LLC
)
)

DEFENDANT

)

________________________________ )
The above entitled matter came before the Court on the 181h day of April, 2012 for
hearing on Defendants' Objection to Telephonic Trial Deposition. Plaintiff appeared
telephonically by and through counsel, Kent L. Hawkins. Defendants appeared telephonically by
and through counsel, Michael D. Gaffney. The Court appeared by telephone from chambers in
Soda Springs.
Hearing proceeded before the Court on the record. The Court heard argument and
discussion from all counsel. At the conclusion of argument, the Court ordered the deposition to
proceed as scheduled The Court further ordered that it would be a deposition for purposes of
preserving the testimony the deponent for trial purposes. Therefore, objections shall be made
and preserved so the Court can rule on the same. Further the Court shall be provided with a copy
of the deposition as soon as possible to allow the Court an opportunity to review and consider the
objections prior to trial.
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IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: April 25th, 2012.

MITCHELL BROWN
District Judge

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING/SERVICE

The undersigned certifies that on the?i.{aay of April, 2012, she caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing Minute Entry and Order to be served upon the following persons in the
following manner:
PLAINTIFF ATTORNEY:
Kent L. Hawkins
P.O. Box 991
Pocatello, Idaho 83204-0991

0

Faxed

0

Hand Delivered

•

Mailed

DEFENDANT ATTORNEY:
Michael D. Gaffney
21 05 Coronado State
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404

0

Faxed

0

Hand Delivered

•

Mailed
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Dave R. OaUa&nt (ISB I l74S}
Kent L. H.wkins (ISB # 3791)

R., Winiam Huc:ock (ISS ii 7938)
M'EIUUU. 4 MRRRD.J., CBARTD.ED
109 North Arthur- Sth Ptoor
P.O. Be¥ 991
Pocsrello, lO 13204..0991
{201) 232·2286

(lOR) 232·2499 Telofax
Attorneys for Plaintiff

lN THE DISTRICT COURT OF TilE SIA'ni .JUOICIAL orsmer OF 'l'lm
POCAll!U.O HOSPlTAL. LLc dJbla
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Plaintiff,
V$,

QUAIL RIDOB MEDICAL INVESTORS,

LLC and CiNTURY PAlllt ASSOCtATHS,
LLC,

Defendants.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK
POCATELLO HOSPITAL, LLC d/b/a
PORTNEUF MEDICAL CENTER, LLC,
Plaintiff,
vs.
QUAIL RIDGE MEDICAL INVESTORS,
LLC and CENTURY PARK ASSOCIATES,
LLC,

)
)

Case No. CV-10-2724 OC

)
)
)

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

MOTION TO AMEND COMPLAINT
and NOTICE OF HEARING

Defendants.
______________________________
)
COMES NOW the Plaintiff, Pocatello Hospital, LLC d/b/a PortneufMedical Center,
LLC ("PMC"), by and through its counsel of record, Merrill & Merrill, Chartered, and, pursuant
to I.R.C.P. 15(a) and I.R.C.P. 15(b), seeks leave of this Court to amend its Complaint to: (1)
amend its allegation of damages based upon the Integra appraisal report that was received after
this litigation commenced and that Plaintiff relied upon to support its rent adjustment
calculations in Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment; and (2) to add an alternative count for
Declaratory Judgment to conform the Complaint to the Plaintiff's request for this Court to
interpret the rent adjustment language of Section 1.3(b) of the 1983 Ground Lease Agreement
("1983 Ground Lease"). Attached hereto is a true and correct copy ofPMC's proposed
Amended Complaint.

PlaintifPs Motion to Amend Complaint
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Argument

I.R.C.P. 15(a) provides that leave to amend "shall be freely given when justice so
requires." See I.R.C.P. 15(a). In interpreting this rule, the Idaho Supreme Court has found that
"the twin purposes behind this rule are to allow claims to be determined on the merits rather than
technicalities, and to make pleadings serve the limited role of providing notice of the nature of
the claim and the facts at issue." Carl H Christensen Family Trust v. Christensen, 133 Idaho
866, 871,993 P.3d 1197, 1201 (1999) (citing Clark v. Olsen, 110 Idaho 323, 326, 715 P.2d 993,
996 (1986)). In the present case, freely allowing Plaintiffto amend its Complaint as requested
will serve these twin purposes. First, this case will be able to proceed on the merits of the
dispute between the parties instead ofbeing hampered by technicalities. Secondly, because the
alternative declaratory judgment count now being raised by the Plaintiff is based upon the same
basic facts, documents, and claim that has already been at issue in this case and argued
extensively by the parties over many months, the Plaintiff's amended complaint will be
consistent with the direction that this case has taken, including the relief the Plaintiff wants this
court to provide.
The issue of leave to amend in the present case is similar to the case considered by the
Idaho Supreme Court in Smith v. Great Basin Grain Co., 98 Idaho 266, 561 P.2d 1299 (1977).
In Smith, the plaintiffs sought leave to amend their complaints after the defendants moved for
summary judgment. The district court granted summary judgment to one of the defendants on
the pleadings alone; however, the district court also allowed the plaintiffs to amend their
complaints against the defendants including the defendant who had been granted summary
judgment. The district court found that while the amended complaint raised a new legal theory
of recovery- even as against the defendant granted summary judgment - there was no problem
with such amendment "since the basic facts giving rise to a right of recovery remained
unaltered." Such statement is true with the Plaintiff's proposed amendments to its complaint in
the present case.
In affirming the district court's decision to allow the plaintiffs' amendments to their
complaints, the Idaho Supreme Court in Smith cited with approval the following language from·
the United States Supreme Court interpreting the comparable federal rule of civil procedure:

Plaintiff's Motion to Amend Complaint
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If the underlying facts or circumstances relied upon by a plaintiff may be a proper
subject of relief, he ought to be afforded the opportunity to test his claim on the
merits. In the absence of any apparent or declared reason-such as undue delay,
bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure
deficiencies by amendment previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing
party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, futility of amendment, etc.-the
leave sought should, as the rules require, be "freely given."
Smith, 98 Idaho at 272, 561 P.2d at 1306 (citing Forman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182, 83 S.Ct.

227, 230,9 L.Ed.2d 222 (1962) ..
In the present case, none of the factors that cut against allowing leave to amend exist.
The Plaintiff did not request declaratory judgment initially in this case because it was proceeding
under the impression that the 1983 Ground Lease was unambiguous and, therefore, that
declaratory judgment was unnecessary. Indeed, both parties to this action ultimately filed cross
motions for summary judgment alleging that Section 1.3(b) of the Ground Lease was
unambiguous and requesting the Court to grant summary judgment in their respective favor
based upon the unambiguous language of such ground lease. This Court did not rule on the
parties cross motions for summary judgment until December of2011. It was only at that point
that the Court notified the parties of its determination that the "taking into account" language in
Section 1.3 (b) was ambiguous. After that ruling, the Plaintiff timely filed a Motion to
Reconsider with the Court. The Court withheld ruling on the Plaintiff's motion to reconsider
until after the parties had participated in a Court ordered mediation. After such mediation was
unsuccessful, on March 26, 2012, the Court entered its ruling denying the Plaintiff's Motion to
Reconsider and reaffirming its determination that the "taking into account" language of Section
1.3(b) of the Ground Lease was ambiguous. Based upon the procedural history of this case, the
Plaintiff was not dilatory in failing to earlier amend its Complaint to add an alternative count for
declaratory judgment.
Because the parties cannot agree on how fair market value for the Leased Land is to be
determined under Section 1.3(b) of the 1983 Ground Lease Agreement and because an actual
controversy presently exists on how such is to be determined under this lease agreement, a
declaratory judgment action is appropriate in this case. The Defendants are not prejudiced by
the addition of this alternative count for declaratory judgment at this point in the case because
such count is based upon the same basic facts, documents, and arguments that have been

Plaintiff's Motion to Amend Complaint
5975RWH042412

Page 3

82

extensively argued by all parties to this action in previous briefings to this court.
Similarly, the Defendants are not prejudiced by the Plaintiff amending its damages
allegations in its complaint to be consistent with the Integra appraisal since such numbers were
used by Plaintiff in its Motion for Summary Judgment. Indeed, the Plaintiff's proposed
damages averments in its Amended Complaint under the Integra appraisal are less than the
Plaintiffs original damages averments in its original Complaint under the Bowman appraisal. It
is difficult to fathom any prejudice the Defendants can suffer from this Court allowing Plaintiff
leave to amend its complaint to reduce the amount of damages it is seeking in this matter.
I.R.C.P. 15(b) also allows for amendments to pleadings when such is necessary to
conform to the evidence developed in the case. Under that rule, "the court may allow the
pleadings to be amended and shall do so freely when the presentation ofthe merits ofthe action
will be subserved thereby and the objecting party fails to satisfy the court that the admission of
such evidence would prejudice the party in maintaining the party's action or defense upon the
merits." See I.R.C.P. 15(b). For the same reasons outlined in the section immediately above,
this Court can find that Plaintiff should also be freely allowed to amend its Complaint pursuant
to Rule 15(b) because allowing such amendments will not prejudice the Defendants' ability to
defend this action on the merits.
For these reasons, the Plaintiff respectfully requests this Court to grant its Motion for
Leave to Amend and, in so doing, that the Court file the Plaintiffs Amended Complaint attached
hereto.

NOTICE OF HEARING
You are hereby notified that on the 4th day of May, 2012, at 1:30 p.m., or as soon
thereafter as counsel can be heard, Plaintiff will come before the Court for oral argument and
disposition of its Motion to Amend its Complaint in the above-referenced matter.
s,1

DATED this_\_ day of May, 2012.
MERRILL & MERRILL, CHARTERED

R. William Hancock, Jr.
Attorneys for Plaintiff

Plaintiff's Motion to Amend Complaint
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, R. William Hancock, Jr., the undersigned, one of the attorneys for the Plaintiff. in the
above-referenced matter, do hereby certify that a true, full and correct copy of the foregoing
document was this

1£1

day of May, 2012, served upon the following in the manner indicated

below:
[~U.S.

Michael D. Gaffney
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY PA
2105 Coronado Street
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404

Mail
[_J Hand Delivery
[_j Overnight Mail
rxJ Facsimile

Judge Mitchell Brown
P.O. Box 4165
Soda Springs, ID 83276
(Chambers Copy)

[~U.S. Mail
[_j Hand Delivery
[_j Overnight Delivery
00 Telefax 547-2147 (IN~+- :n+.~::h'MeJ\T)
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Dave R. Gallafent (ISB # 1745)
Kent L. Hawkins (ISB # 3 791)
R. William Hancock (ISB # 7938)
MERRILL & MERRILL, CHARTERED
109 North Arthur- 5th Floor
P.O. Box 991
Pocatello, ID 83204-0991
(208) 232-2286
(208) 232-2499 Telefax
Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK

POCATELLO HOSPITAL, LLC d/b/a
PORTNEUF MEDICAL CENTER, LLC,
Plaintiff,
vs.
QUAIL RIDGE MEDICAL INVESTORS,
LLC and CENTURY PARK ASSOCIATES,
LLC,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-10-2724

AMENDED COMPLAINT

Defendants.
____________________________
)
COMES NOW the Plaintiff, Pocatello Hospital, LLC d/b/a Portneuf Medical Center,
LLC, by and through its attorneys, Merrill and Merrill, Chartered, and for its action against the
Defendants, Quail Ridge Medical Investors, LLC, and Century Park Associates, LLC, complains
and alleges as follows:
1.

Plaintiff, Pocatello Hospital, LLC d/b/a Portneuf Medical Center, LLC ("PMC"),

is a Delaware limited liability company authorized to do business in the State of Idaho, whose
principal place of business in the State of Idaho is 651 Memorial Drive, Pocatello, Bannock
County, Idaho 83201.
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2.

Defendant, Quail Ridge Medical.Investors, LLC ("Quail Ridge"), is a Tennessee

limited liability company authorized to do business in the State of Idaho, whose principal place
ofbusiness is 3570 Keith Street NW, Cleveland, Tennessee 37312.
3.

Defendant, Century Park Associates, LLC ("Century Park"), 1s a Tennessee

limited liability company authorized to do business in the State of Idaho, whose principal place
ofbusiness is 3570 Keith Street NW, Cleveland, Tennessee 37312.
4.

This lawsuit arises from a certain Ground Lease Agreement dated January 27,

1983 ("Lease Agreement").

PMC's copy of this Lease Agreement is attached to Plaintiffs

original Complaint as Exhibit "1" and is incorporated herein by this reference.
5.

The Lease Agreement was originally entered into between Intermountain Health

Care, Inc. ("IHC"), as original lessor, and Sterling Development Co. ("Sterling"), as original
lessee.
6.

The Lease Agreement concerns real property located within the City of Pocatello,

Bannock County, Idaho ("Leased Land"). A true and correct copy of the legal description for the
Leased Land is attached to Plaintiffs Original Complaint as Exhibit "2" and is incorporated
herein by this reference.
7.

On or about January 1, 1996, Sterling subleased its interest in the Leased Land to

Pocatello Medical Investors Limited Partnership ("PMI"), a Tennessee limit<;:d partnership
authorized to do business in the State of Idaho, whose principal place of business is 3570 Keith
Street NW, Cleveland, Tennessee 37312.
8.

On or about January 3, 2001, Sterling and PMI assigned their respective interests

in the Leased Land and Lease Agreement to Quail Ridge and Quail Ridge thereby became the
successor lessee to the Lease Agreement
9.

On or about September 23, 2002, IHC assigned its interest in the Lease

Agreement to IHC Health Services, Inc. and IHC Health Services, Inc., thereby became the
successor lessor to the Lease Agreement.
10.

On or about October 1, 2002, IHC Health Services, Inc., assigned its interest in

the Lease Agreement to Bannock Regional Medical Center ("BRMC") and BRMC thereby
became the successor lessor to the Lease Agreement. Shortly thereafter, BRMC changed its
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name to Portneuf Medical Center.
11.

On or about February 1, 2009, BRMC (then known as PortneufMedical Center),

assigned its interest in the Lease Agreement to PMC, whereby PMC became the successor lessor
to the Lease Agreement.
12.

To the best of PMC's knowledge and belief, Century Park is an affiliate of, or

related to, Quail Ridge and may claim a Lessee's interest in the Lease Agreement.
13.

Quail Ridge or Century Park or both operate a senior living facility by the name of

"Quail Ridge" which facility is situated on the Lease Land.
COUNT I
BREACH OF CONTRACT
14.

PMC realleges and incorporates the allegations in Paragraph 1 through 13 above

as if they had been set forth fully herein.
15.

When this Lease Agreement was first entered into on January 27, 1983, IHC and

Sterling, as original lessor and lessee respectively, agreed upon a basis for calculating the initial
annual rental. Specifically, in Article 1, Section 1.3(a) of the Lease Agreement, the original
lessor and lessee agreed as follows as the basis for calculating the initial annual rental:
An initial annual rental shall be calculated on the basis offifteen percent
(15%) of the value of the leased land. For purposes of the first three (3)
years from the Commencement Date of this Lease, the leased land shall be
valued at the rate of Fifteen Thousand and No/100 Dollars ($15,000.00)
per acre.
16.

The Leased Land is 4.25 acres and, therefore, based upon the above clear and

unambiguous language, the original lessor and lessee set the initial annual rental for this Leased
Land as $9,562.50 ($15,000 x 4.25
17.

= $63,750; $63,750 x 15% =

$9,562.50).

The annual rental rate is subject to adjustment on a periodic basis pursuant to the

Lease Agreement, Article 1, Section 1.3(b), which states in relevant part:
. . . The annual rental as set forth above shall be adjusted every three (3)
years beginning on the Commencement Date of this Lease, referred to
below as the rent adjustment date.
18.

The above language in Article 1 of the Lease Agreement concerning when each
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rent adjustment date is to occur is clear and unambiguous. Thus, the first rent adjustment date
under this Lease Agreement was scheduled for January 27, 1986 and the rent was, and is, subject
to adjustment every three years thereafter until the termination of this Lease Agreement.
19.

Pursuant to the foregoing schedule, the most recent rent adjustment date was

January 27, 2010.
20.

Although the Lease Agreement provides for period rent adjustment dates as

outlined above, this Lease Agreement also clearly and unambiguously allows for retroactive
adjustment of the annual rental rate when such adjustment did not occur on or before the
specified rent adjustment date.
21.

Specifically, Article 1, Section 1.3(b) states in relevant part:

If the determination of adjusted rent is made after the applicable rent
adjustment date, lessee shall continue to pay rent at the rate applicable to
the preceding period until the adjusted rate is determined. The party
indebted shall, promptly after the determination, pay any difference for the ·
period affected by the adjustment.
22.

To the best of PMC's knowledge and belief, prior to PMC becoming a successor

lessor to the Lease Agreement, neither IHC, IHC Health Services, Inc., nor BRMC exercised its
right as lessor under this Lease Agreement to adjust the annual rental rate pursuant to Article 1 of
the Lease Agreement.
23.

Sometime in the summer of2009, PMC became aware ofthe fact that the annual

rental rate for the Leased Land had not been previously adjusted as outlined in Article 1 of the
Lease Agreement.
24.

Specifically, Article 1, Section 1.3(b) of the Lease Agreement provides the

following clear and unambiguous formula for calculating the adjusted annual rental rate for the
Leased Land:

The rent as adjusted shall be equal to fifteen percent (1 5%) of the fair
market value of the leased land, exclusive of the improvements on the
premises. Determination of fair market value shall be based on the
highest and best use of the land on the applicable rent adjustment date
without taking the leasehold into account. ...
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25.

In September of 2009, PMC retained Bowman Appraisal and Valuation

("Bowman") to determine the fair market value of the Leased Land on the prior three rent
adjustment dates.
26.

On or about October 5, 2009, Bowman provided its appraisal report to PMC,

which states that the fair market values of the leased land for each of the 2001, 2004, and 2007
rent adjustment dates was $1 ,297 ,3 71, $1 ,3 71 ,507, and $1 ,464,17 6, respectively.
27.

On or about October 26, 2009, PMC notified the Defendants ofPMC's intention

to adjust the annual rental rate pursuant to Article 1 of this Lease Agreement.
28.

As evidence in support of PMC's request for an adjustment of the annual rent rate

pursuant to Article 1 of the Lease Agreement, PMC provided the Defendants at that same time
with a copy of Bowman's appraisal report stating the fair market value of the Leased Land for the
prior three rent adjustment periods.
29.

Although PMC gave Defendants proper notice of its intent to adjust the annual

rental rate pursuant to Article 1 of the Lease Agreement, Defendants have refused, and continue
to refuse, to pay an adjusted annual rent for the Leased Land.
30.

Defendants are in breach of the Lease Agreement

31.

After this litigation had commenced, PMC retained Integra Realty. Resources

("Integra") to determine the fair market value of the Leased Land for the January 23, 2007 rent
adjustment period and the January 23,2010 rent adjustment period.
32.

On or about December 15, 2010, Integra provided its appraisal report, which

states that the fair market value of the leased land for the January 23, 2007 rent adjustmentperiod
is $1,080,000.00 and that the fair market value of the leased land for the January 23, 2010 rent
adjustment period is $990,000.00.
33.

Based upon Integra's valuation of the Leased Land for the 2007 rent adjustment

period, Defendants should have paid a total of $486,000.00 in annual rents for the 2007 rent
adjustment period. Instead, Defendants paid a total of $28,687.50 in annual rents during the
2007 rent adjustment period. As such, Defendants owe PMC a sum of not less than $457,312.50
for unpaid adjusted annual rents for the 2007 rent adjustment period. The 2007 rent adjustment
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period includes the years 2007, 2008, and 2009.
34.

Based upon Integra's valuation of the Leased Land for the 2010 rent adjustment

period, Defendants should have paid a total of $445,500.00 in annual rents for the 2010 rent
adjustment period. Instead, Defendants paid a total of $28,687.50 in annual rents during the
2010 rent adjustment period. As such, Defendants owe PMC a sum of not less than $416,812.50
for unpaid adjusted rents for the 2010 rent adjustment period. The 2010 rent adjustment period
includes the years 2010,2011, and 2012.
COUNT II
IN THE ALTERNATIVE, DECLARATORY JUDGMENT
35.

PMC realleges and incorporates the allegations in Paragraph 1 through 34 above

as if they had been set forth fully herein.
36.

Defendants deny that they are obligated to pay additional rent for the 2007 and

2010 rent adjustment periods; claiming that Plaintiff failed to apply the following language from
Section 1.3(b) of the Lease Agreement when Plaintiff calculated its proposed rent adjustments:

The determination shall take into account the parties' agreement that the initial
minimum rent is the above-stated percentage applied to a fair market value of
Fifteen Thousand and No/100 Dollars ($15,000.00 per acre and shall also take
into account any determinations of market value made under this lease for the
purpose of adjustments for periods preceding the applicable rent adjustment date.
37.

The court has found that the above-identified language in Section 1.3(b) of the

Lease Agreement does create an ambiguity in the formula to adjust the rent and, therefore, a
dispute has arose between the parties over the interpretation and construction of the rent
adjustment language contained in Section 1.3(b) of the Lease Agreement.
38.

Section 1.3(b) of the Lease Agreement provides that if a dispute arises between

the parties as to the determination of fair market value of the Leased Land for the period to which
any rent adjustment applies, then "the determination shall be made as in the paragraph on
Arbitration in Article 13."
39.

Although multiple attempts have been made, the parties to this action have been

unable to reach an agreement for determining the fair market value of the Leased Land for the
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2007 and 201 0 rent adjustment periods.
40.

Instead of arbitrating this controversy over the determination of fair market value

under Section 1.3(b) of the Lease Agreement, the parties have instead proceeded with this civil
action in the District Court for Bannock County, Idaho.
4I.

An interpretation of the rent adjustment language in Section 1.3(b) of the Lease

Agreement is necessary to deciding the relative rights and obligations of the parties to this action
under this 1983 Ground Lease Agreement.
42.

Until a determination of fair market value under Section 1.3(b) of the Lease

Agreement is made, it is impossible for the parties to calculate an adjusted rental rate for the
2007 and 2010 rent adjustment periods.
43.

Pursuant to Idaho Code Title 10, Chapter 12, this Court is authorized and has

power to enter a declaratory judgment on the construction of this written contract.
44.

An actual controversy exists between the parties to this action over the

interpretation of the rent adjustment language in Section 1.3(b) of the Lease Agreement.
45.

Entry of a declaratory judgment by the Court on how fair market value is to be

determined under Section 1.3(b) of Lease Agreement is consistent with the original contracting
parties' agreement that such disputes over a determination of fair market value would be
arbitrated.
46.

Once this Court has adjudged and declared how fair market value is to be

determined under Section 1.3(b) of the Lease Agreement, this Court should further enter a
judgment declaring the fair market value of the Leased Land for the 2007 and 201 0 rent
adjustment periods and the appropriate adjusted rent for each such period based upon the Court's
fair market value determinations.
47.

Finally, the last paragraph of Section 1.3(b) of the Lease Agreement requires the

Defendants to "promptly after the determination [of adjusted rent], pay any difference for the
period affected by the adjustment."
48.

PMC has not been paid an appropriate adjusted rent for the 2007 and 2010 rent

adjustment periods and, as such, the Defendants are obligated under Section 1.3(b) of the 1983
Ground Lease Agreement to promptly pay PMC any difference between the actual rent owed and
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the actual rental paid for the 2007 and 2010 rent adjustment periods after this Court has
determined the adjusted rent for these periods.
ATTORNEYS FEES
49.

To bring this suit, Plaintiff has retained the services of Merrill & Merrill,

Chartered, and is entitled to an award of attorneys' fees and costs pursuant to Idaho· Code §§
12-120(3) and 12-123, and Rule 54 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.
WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff prays that judgment· be entered in Plaintiff's favor and
against the Defendants as follows:
1.

That Defendants be ordered to pay back rents to the Plaintiff for the 2007 rent

adjustment period in a sum of not less than $457 ,312.50;
n.

That Defendants be ordered to pay unpaid current annual rent for the 2010 rent

adjustment period in a sum of not less than $416,812.50;
111.

In the alternative, that the Court enter a declaratory judgment on the. fair market

value ofthe leased for the 2007 and 2010 rent adjustment periods;
1v.

That after the fair market value of the leased land for the 2007 and 2010 rent

adjustment periods has been determined by the court, that the Court adjust the rent for each such
period and enter an order directing Defendants to promptly pay any difference in the .actual rent
owed and the actual rent paid for the 2007 and 2010 rent adjustment periods.
v.

That Defendants be ordered to pay Plaintiff's attorneys' fees and costs associated

with bringing this action; and
vi.

For such other and further relief this Court deems just and equitable under the

circumstances of this case.
DATED this_ day of May, 2012.
MERRILL & MERRILL, CHTD.

By ___________________________
R. William Hancock, Jr.
Attorneys for Plaintiff, PMC
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK

POCATELLO HOSPITAL, LLC, D/B/A
PORTNEUF MEDICAL CENTER, LLC,
PLAINTIFF,

vs
QUAIL RIDGE MEDICAL INVESTORS,
LLC AND CENTURY PARK
ASSOCIATES, LLC,
DEFENDANT.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No: CV-2011-0000108

MINUTE ENTRY AND ORDER

______________________________ )
COURT REPORTER: Rodney M. Felshaw
DATE:

Monday, April30, 2012

APPEARANCES:

09:00AM

Kent L. Hawkins, Plaintiffs Attorney
William R. Hancock, Plaintiffs Attorney
John M. Avondet, Defendant Attorney

MATTER BEFORE THE COURT: Civil Hearings/Pretrial Motions
PROCEEDINGS:

The above-entitled matter came before the Court as regularly scheduled for

hearing on Plaintiffs Motion to Enforce Jury Waiver Clause in 2001 Landlord Consent and
Estoppel Certificate, Motion in Limine on 2001 Landlord Consent and Estoppel Certificate, Motion
in Limine on Defendants' Experts, Motion in Limine on Presentation of Irrelevant Extrinsic
Evidence, Motion in Limine on Speculation and Opinion Testimony, and Motion to Vacate Trial.
The Court also heard argument on Defendants' First Motion in Limine. Kent L. Hawkins and
William R. Hancock appeared on behalf of Pocatello Hospital, LLC, Plaintiff. John M. Avondet
Dist-CVME&O-Minute Entry and Order
Revised 01/08

93

appeared on behalf of Quail Ridge Medical Investors, LLC and Century Park Associaties. The
parties stated their respective positions relative to each of the motions. .
DISPOSITION: The Court will take these motions under advisement and issue an oral decision

on Friday, May 4, 2012 at 1:30 p.m. at the Bannock County Courthouse. The Plaintiff will have
until Tuesday, May 1, 2012 to file a Motion to Amend Complaint with Proposed Amended
Complaint attached. The Defendant will have until Thursday, May 3, 2012 by 5:00p.m. to file a
response. The Plaintiff's reply, if any shall be provided to the Court on May 4, 2012 prior to
hearing. This motion will be set for oral argument on Motion to Amend on Friday, May 4, 2012
at 1:30 p.m.
Additionally, the Court allowed, Defendants until Wednesday, May 2, 2012 at 5:00p.m.
to file a Brief in Opposition to the Plaintiff's Motion to Enforce Jury Waiver Clause in the 2001
Estoppel Agreement. Plaintiff will submit written reply by Thursday, May 3, 2012 at noon.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: this 30th day of April, 2012.

MITCHELL W BROWN
District Judge

Dist-CVME&O-Minute Entry and Order
Revised 01/08

2

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING/SERVICE
I hereby certifY that on Friday, March 23, 2012, I mailed/served a true copy of the Minute
Entry and Order on the attorney(s)/person(s) listed below by mail with correct postage thereon or
causing the same to be hand delivered.

PLAINTIFF ATTORNEY:

D U.S. Mail
DE-Mail
D Courthouse Box
rgj Fax: (208) 232-2499

Dave R. Gallafent
Kent Hawkins
PO Box 991
Pocatello, ID 83204

DEFENDANT ATTORNEY:

D U.S. Mail
DE-Mail
D Courthouse Box
rgj Fax: (208) 529-9732

Michael D. Gaffney
21 05 Coronado Street
Idaho Falls, ID 83404

By:

Sharon J UJef~
For Brandi Peck
Deputy Clerk

Dist-CVME&O-Minute Entry and Order
Revised 01/08
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FAX NO.

.:r:~L
Dave R. GaUaf-ent (ISB # 1745)
Kent L. Hnwkins (lSB # 3791)
R. William Haneook (JSB # 7938)
MERRfLL & MUUULL, CHARTERED
109 North Arthur - Sth Floor
P.O. Box 991
Pocarelto. ID 832.0+0991
(208) 232·2286

(208) 232~2499 Telefa."(
Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH ICDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF lDAHO, IN A"I\TD FOR THE COL'NTY OF BANNOCI{
POCATELLO HOSP'ITAL, LLC dlb/a
PORTNEUF MEDICAl CE.,'TER. LLC,
Plaintiff;

)
)

)
)

Cast No. CV·H)-2724

)

)
)
QUAIL RIDGE MEDICAL il\'VESTORS,
LLC and CENTURY PARK ASSOCIATES.

uc,

AMENOED COMPLAINT

)

)
)

_________________

)
))

COMES NOW the Plaintiff. Pocatello Hospital. U.C dlb/a Portneuf Medical C'...enter,
LLC, by and through its attorneys, Merrill and Merrill. Ch.artc:n:d. and for its action apinst the

Defendant<;, Quail Ridge Medical Investors, LLC, and Century Park Associates. LLC, complain$
and allegei as follows:

1.

Plaintiff, Pocatello Hospital, LLC dlbla Portneuf Medical Center. LLC ("PMC"),

is a Delaware limiltd liability company ~ to do business in the State of Idaho. whose
principal place of business in the State of Idaho is 651 Memorial Drive, Pocatdlo. Bannock
County. Idaho 83201.
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Defendant, Quail Ridge Medical investors, LLC ("Quail Ridge"), is a Tennessee

limited liability company aut.hori.ud to do business in the State of Idaho. whose principal pla.ce
of business is 3570 Keith Street NW, Cleveland. Tennessee 37312.

3.

Defendant, Cenwry Park Assuciale&, LLC ("Century Park"'), Ui a Tennessee

limited liability company aumorized to do business in the State of Idaho, whose principal piac.o
ofbus.iness i~> 3570 Keith
4.

Stroot~W.

Cleveland. Tennessee 37312.

This lawsuit arises from a certain Ground Lease

19&3 (~r...eue Agreement").

PMC's oopy of this

Agr~m

dated Jammry 27.

Lca$c A~oot is~ to Plaintiff"s

ori.@.inal Complaint as E.lhibit "1" and is incorporated herein by this refcrmcc.
5.

The Lease

A~ent

was oripll)' entered into between Intermountain Health

c.a.re. Inc. ("lHC"). as original lessor. and Sterling Development Co. {"Sterling"), as origin.U
lessee.
6.

Tbe Lease Agreement concerns real property~ within the City of Pocatello.

Bannoa::k County, idaho ("Lased Land"). A trUe and correct copy of the legal description fO'f the

Leased Land is atw:hed to Plaintiff's Original Complaint as Exhibit ··2•· and is inC{)tpOJ'llted
herein by lhls reference..
7.

On or about January 1. 1996, Sterling subleased its inten:st in the lAascd Land to

Pocatello Medical Investors Limited 'Partnenhip ("PMiu}, a Tennessee limited partuenhip
a.udwriz~d to

do business in the State ofldabo, whose principal place ofb~ is 3570 Keith

Street l'li'W, Cleveland, Temessee 37312.
&.

On or about January 3, 2001, Sterling and PMl assigned their ~tive interests

in the Leased Land and l..eae Agreement hl Quail Ridge and Quail Ridge ti:tereby bccmne the

successor lessee to the Lease Agreement
9.

On or about September 23, 2002, IHC assigned its interest in the Lease

Agreement to tHe Health Services, Inc. and IHC Health Ser\.ica, Inc.• thereby bee.ame the

successor lessor to the Lease Agreement.

tO.

On or about October 1, 2002, lHC Health Services, t~.• assigned its interest in

the Least Agreement to Bannock Re&ional Medieai Center eBDfC') and BR.\'lC thereby

became the sueeessor lessor tiJ the Lease Agreement. Shortly thereafter, BRMC
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name to Portneuf Med:ieal Center.
ll.

On or about February 1, 2009, BRMC {men known as Portncuf Medical Center),

assisncd its interest in the Lease Agreement to PMC, whereby PMC became the NtX:CSsor t~r
to the Lease Agretment.
12.

To the best of PMC's knowledse aru:i belief. Century Parle is an affiliate of, or

related to, Quail Ridge and may claim a Lessee's interest in the I....case ~ent.
13.

Quail Ridge or Centuly Park or ooth operate a senior living mcility by the name of

"Quail Ridge'" which facility is sit'Wlred on the L~e Land..
COUNT I
BUACll OF CONTRACT

14.

PMC reallr:gcs and incorpon.tcs the allegations in Paragraph 1 thfo:~ lJ a.oove

as. if they bad been set forth fully herein.
15.

When this Lease Agreement was fU"St entered into on January 27. l9S3. IHC and

Ste.rHng.liiS original lessor and lessee respectively, agrt:ed upon a ba$is: fur cakulating the initial
annual rental. Speci;fi¢ally, in Article 1, Sectiot• Ll(a) of the

~

Agreement the original

lessor and lessee agreed as follows u the bais !of calculating the initial annual rental:
An initial annual rental slwll be c.alcukzted on the basis a/fifteen percent
(1 5%) of the value of the leased land_ For pw"'JJJ&# of the first thrMt {3)
years from the Colll11'Umcement Da~e oflhis [AWe, the Jea.wl lam:i sllaJJ be
valued at the rate o:f Fifteen 11umsand and Noli()() Dolhlrs ($15,000.00)
par acre.

16.

The leased Larld is 4.25 acrti

w,

therefore, based upon the above clear and

unambipu$ langwge, the original ieuat and lessee set the initial mnual rental fur this Leased

Land as $9,$62.50 (SIS,OOO x 4.25 = S63,7SO; S63,750 x
17.

l5'Yt~""

$9,562.50).

The annual rental rate is subject to adjustment on a periodic ~ pursuant to the

LeMe A~t, Article 1, Section l.l{b), which st:ntes in relevant part:

. . • 1'118 annual rental as set forth above shall be adjusted every three (3)
years beginning em the Commenc:i!:ment Dati! of this I...eose. re/m"6d to
below as the rent adjustment date.

0.1

I.

0
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rent adjt1stmMt date is to occur is clear and unambiguous. Thus, the first rent adjustment date

1.111der this lease Agreement was scheduled for January 21. 1986 and the rem was, and is. subject
to adjU!Itmetlt evet}' three years thcmaftcr until the termination of this Leue Agreement.
19.

Pursuant to the foregoing schedule~ the most recent nmt adjustment date was

January 27, 2010.
20.

Although the !..ease Agreement provides tbr period rent adjustment dates as

outlined above, this

!..ease

A~ent

also clearly and unambiguously allows fur :retroactive

adjustment of the annual rental rate when such adjustment did not occur on or before the
s:pecified rent adjustment clute.
21.

Specifically, Article 1, Section 1.3(b) states in relevant pan:

if the

determination qf o.cjjusted rent ts matk <ifter the applicabitl rent
adj:otme:nt diM, lessee shall continue Ia pay nm at the rate appltt:abie to
the preceding period rmrU the tuljusted rate is derermined. ~ party
indebted shall, promptly after the determination, 'fJlJY any di/forence for the
pertod affected hy the adjustment.
22.

To the best of PMC's knowleda,e and beUcf. prior to PMC beooming a S\1CCeSSar

lessor to the 1Aase Asreement. neither IHC, IHC Health SctvlC$, lru::., nor BRM.C exercised its
right as le$SOr under this Lease Agreement to !ldjust the annual rental ratt:: pui'SI.IM' to Article l of
the Lease Agreement
23.

Sometime in the snmmer of 2009, PMC became aware of the

fa.::.t thtt !he annWll

rental rate for the leased Land bad not been previously adjusted as outlillOO In Article 1 of the
Lease Agreement.
24.

Sp«:ifically, Article I, Section L3(b} of the Lease Agreement provid:es the

following clear and Ul'lambiguous fomuda fur e.alculating the adjll.St.Cd w:mual rental tate for the
Leased Lan<i:
The rent ra atljusttld shall be etpUil to fifteen pt!I'Cmt (1 5~ of tlut fatr
markel value of the leased land, exclusive of the impro~nts on the
pre.ntis'ts. DetermiMii.on of fair tm:rk:et value shall be based .on the
highest and best use of tile l4nd em she applicable rem atfjtl$tment date
without taking the kasehold into accmmt. . . .

0
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In September of 2009, PMC retained Bowman Appraisal and Valuation

("Bowman") to determine the fair

m~t

value of the Leased Land on the prior three rem

adjustment dates.
26.

On or about October 5, 2009, Bo~man provided its appraisal report to P!YIC,

which states that the fair market values of the icaJed land fur each of the 200 l, 2004, and 2001
rent adjustment dates was $1.297,371, .$1,.371,507, and $1,464,116, ~vely.
27.

On or about October 26, 2009, PMC notified the Defen.dams ofPMC's intention

to adjust the annual rental mte pursuant to Article 1 of this tease Agreement.
2.8.

As evidence in support of PMC's request for.an adjustment of the annu:~d

rem rate

pursuant to Article ! of the Lease Agreement, PMC provided the Defendants at that same time
with a copy of Bowman's appraisal report stating the fair market v.Uue of tbe Le:ued Laud for the
prior three rent adjustment periods.
29.

A.lthou~

PMC gave Defendants proper notice of its intent to adjust the annual

rental rate pursuant to Article l of the Lease Agreement. Defendants have refused, and continue

to refust'!, ro pay an adjusted annual rent for the Leased Land.

30.

Defendants are in brcacll of the Lease Agreement

31.

After this litigation had commenced. PMC retained Intcara Realty ~

("Integra'') t<.l determine the fair market value of the

~

Land for the January 23, 2007 rent

adjustment period and tbe Janutuy 23, 2010 rent adjustment period.

32.

On or about December 1.5. 2010. Integra provided its

~

report, which

states that the fm market value of the leased hmd for the January 23. 2007 rent adjust:mMt period

is S:l,OSO,OOO.OO and dun the fair market value of the leased bmd for the Januazy 2.3, 2010 mn
adjustment period is $990,000.00.
.13.

Based upon .Intep's valuation. of the Lcasc:d Land for the 2007 rent adjustment

period, Defendants should have paid a total of $486,000.00 in annual rents for the 2007 rent

adjustment period. Instead. Defendants paid a total of $28,687.50 in annual rents during the

2007 rent adjustment period. As such, Defendants owe PMC a sum of not Jess than $451.312.50
for unpaid adjusted annuat rents for the 2007 rent adjustment period. The 2007 rent adjustment
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period includes the years 2007,2008. and 2009.

34.

Based upon integra's va!Wlrion of tile~ Land tb:r the 2010 rent adjustment

period, Defendants should haw paid a ootal of $445,500.00 in annual rents fur the 2010 renl
adjustment period. Instead, Defendants paid a total of $28,687.$0 in annual rents during the
2010 rent adjustment period. As such, Defendants n'W-e PMC a sum of not less than $416,812.51}
for unpaid adjusted rents for th¢ 20 l 0 rent adjustment period. The 201 0 rent adjustment period

includes the years 20Hl, 2011, and 2012.
COUJ\III

IN THE ALTER.'\iATJ'VE, DECLARATORY JUDGMENT
35.

PMC realleges !Uld incorporates the allegations in Paragraph l through 34 above

as if they had been set forth fully herein.
36.

Ddcudmts dct:l)' that they arc: obligated to pay additional rent for the 2007 and

20 l 0 rent adjustment periods; cl.aimin~ that Plaintiff thlled to apply the fotrowms llmguag:e from

Section l .3(b) of the Lease Agreement when Plaintiff calculated its proposed rent adjustments:
The determino:rton shall take tntc accoW'tt the parties ' agr;umumt that the inttial
minimum rent is the above-stated percentage applied to a fair 1'1'141'/ret vt~lue of
Fifteen. Thomcmd and NolJOO Dollars ($15,()(J().()()_per acre and slu:dl also rake
into accounl tmy de.termmations of market value rnatk nm'l4r tAis lease for rAe
purpose ofadjustmentsfor periods preceding the «ppitc4ble relll adjustment dat~t.
37.

The court bas found that the above-identified langooge in Section i .J(b) of the

Lease Agrccment docs create an ambiguity in the: fmmubt to adjust the rem and, therefore, a
dispute has arose between the parties over the intcrp:(ltation and coMtruction or the rent
adju~l':m.Ont

38.

language contained in Section 1.3(b) of the Lease A~ooment.
Section l.3(b) of tbe Leue Agreement provides thai if a dispute arises between

the parties as to the determinalion of fhlt mark« value of the Leased Land far the period to whiclt
any rent adjustment applies, then ';the determination shall be made

as

in the paragraph on

Arbitration in Article 13."
39.

Although multiple a.tternpts halr'e boon ntadc, the patties to this action ha..-e been

unable to reach an agreement for determining the fair market value of the Leaso.i Land for the
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2007 and 2010 rent adjustment periods.

40.

Instead of arbitrating this controversy over the deter:mination of fair market value

under Section 1.3{b) of the Lease Agreement, the parties have instead proceeded with this civil
action in the District Court tor Bannock C'.ounty, Idaho.
4!.

An interpretation of the rent adjlllltment language in Section 1.3(0) of the Lease

Agreement is nccc:mlry to deciding the relative rights and obligations of the partie.$ to this action

under tl1is 198.3 Ground l..ease Agreement.
42.

Until a der:ermin.ation of fail' market value under Seetion 1.3(b) of the Leue

Agreement is made, it is impossible fo;r the parties to

cal~tdate

an adjusted rental rate fur the

2007 and 20 I 0 rent adjustment periods.
43.

Pursuant to tdabo Code Title 10. Chapter 12, this Collrt is authori2:ed and has

power tl) enter It declaratory judgment on the construction of this written cont:ract.

44.

An actual

controversy exists between the partie& to this action over the

interpretation of the rent adjustrnent ianguage in Section l.3{b) of the Lease ~ment.
45.

Entry of a declaratory jw:lgment by the Court on how mr market value is to be

determined under Section J.3(b) of t.ease ~ is consistent with the orip! cont.t'OOt.ing

parties'

n~ent

that

.~uch

disputes over a determination of fair rmn'ket value would be

arbitrated.
46,

Once dris Court has adjudged and declared bow fair

market value is to be

detemlined under Section L3(b) of the Lease Agreement, this Court should further enter a
judgment declaring the fair market value of the Leased Land tbr the 2007 and 2010 rent
adjustment periods and the appropriate adjusted nmt for each such period based upon the Court•s

fair market nlue detmninatioll$,
47,

Finally, the last ~ph of Section i.l(b) of the Lease Agreement tequitell the

Defendants to ''promptly after tht: dctcrmiMtion [of adjusted rent]. pay any difference fur the
period affected by the adjustment!'
48.

PMC has not been paid an appropriate adjusted rent far the 2007 and 2010 rent

adjustment periods and, as such, the Defendants. are obligated onder Section l.J(b) of the 1983
Ground ~ Agreement to promptly pay PMC any dift~ between the actual rent owed and

Page7

http://10.100.51.87:3080/pub/up.cgi?crnd=uinBoxEr102&Rec=rOOOOOd4f&nrint=1

S/7/?01?

2 FR 04:46 F'M MERRILL &I'!ERRlLL

P.

the actual rental paid for the 2007 and 2010 rent adjustment peri_{lds after this Court

0

h~

determined the adjusted rent for these periods.
ATIORNEYS FEES

49.

To bring this suit, Plitintiff has retained the services of Merrill & Merrill,

Chartered. and is entitled to an award of attorneys' fee6 and costs pursuant to tdalto Code §§

12-120(3) and

12~123,

and Rule 54 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.

WHEREfORE. the Plaintiff prays. that judgment be entered in Plaintiff's favor and

against the Defendants as follows;
'·

ThM Defendants be ordered to pay b$ck rents to the Plaintiff for the 2001 rent

adjustment period in a sum of not less than $451,312.50;
iL

That D~ be cm:tered to pay unpaid cum:nt annual rent fur the 2010 rent

adjl.lStment perioo in a $urn of not less than $416,812.50;

iii.

In the alternative, that the Court enter a declMatoty judtpnent on the fair market

value of the leased for tbe 2007 and 20 l 0 rent adjustment periods;
iv.

Tbar after the fair market value of the leased land for t.b1il 2007 and 2010 rent

adjustment periods has been determined by the oourt. that the Court adjust the rent for each sm:h
period and enter an order directing Defendants to promptly pay any difference in the actual root
owed and the actual rent paid fot the 2007 and 20 l 0 nmt adjustment periods.

v.

That Oefendam:s be ordered to pay Plaintiffs~· fees md oosts associated

with bringing this action; and

vi.

For sucll other and further relief this Court deems just and equitable under the

cin::umstancea of this

casr

DATED th1s ~}'of May, 2012.

MERRILL&. MElUULL, CHTO.

By~~'k
~.Yr:
Attorneys for Plaintiff, PMC

Amtmded Complaiat
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CEBJlFIC,A]J; OF SERVICE

/)d~~l~~r

J...~i~Jil Ja:., the undersigned, 0110 of me attorneys fur the Plaintiff, in the
abo\.'C'-reterenced maner~hereby certify that a tn.le, fuU and oonect copy of the foregoing
document was this

L

day of May, 2012, served upon the following in the manner indicated

below:
Michael 0. Gaffuey

U Overnight Mail

Judge Mitchell Brown
P.O. &x4165

U V~S. MJlil
U Hand Delivery
U Overnight Delivery

Soda Springs, ID 83276
(Chambers Copy)

http://1 0.1
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BEARO ST. CLAJR OAf'fNEY PA
21 OS C'..oronado Street
Idaho Fails, Idaho 8.HD4

Hand DeliV!ila)'

[,;(Facsimile 5!;..1- "J 13;J-.

~eSefax

547-2147
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Michael D. Claffney, ISB No. 3558
BEARD ST. CL.AJR GAFFNEY PA
2105 Coronado Street
ldaho F'alls. Idaho 83404
Telephone: {208) 52.3-Sni
Facsimile: (208) 529-97:32
Emaii: gaffney@beardstdai.r.com
A~tomey

for Defendants

DISTRICT COURT SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
BANNOCK COUNTY IDAHO
POCATELLO HOSPITAL, LLC dlhia
PORTNflJf MEDICAL CENtERS, LLC,

Case No.: CV-10-2724 0('

r>laintiff,
ANSWER TO AMENDED COMPLAINT
AND JURY DEMAND
vs.

QUA!L RIDGE MEDICAL INVESTORS,
LLC and CENTURY PARK
ASSOCIATES, LLC.
Defendants.

The d{lfendants. Quail Ridge Medical Investors. LLC and Centu.ry Park
Associates, LLC (Quail Ridge collectively). through counsel of rttOrd. Beard St. Clair

I . Admit p.am.gmph l, 2, 3. 6 and 7.
2. The answering defendants ha\•e insufficient infonnation to admit or deny

cannot authenticate or otherwise admit the specifics oft~ Lease Agreement. The
Answer to Amended Complain( and Jury l'kmand Page l

0.1
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answering defendants do admit that a Lease Agreement was entered into a lease
dated January 21, 1983 between h:uermounwn Uealthcare, Inc. (lHC) and
Sterling Oc:veiopmcnl Co.

3. Deny paragraphs & through 49. inclu..<o;ive.

AffiRMATIVE DEFtN~ES
t, The plaintiff taiis to state a claim upon whit:b relief can be granled.

2. The plaintiff's claims are barred by its own unclttan hands.
3. The plaintiff's claims are ba.rred by the doctrin~ of res judicata

4, The plaintiff's claims are barred by the doctrine of estoppel.
S. The plaintiff's claims are barred from recovery by the doctrine of laches,
6. 'I he plaintiff has failed to mitigate its alleged damages, if any.
7. The plaintiff's claims, some <"lt' all of them. are batted by the applicable statute of

limitations
8. The plaintitr s claims are barred by the doctrine of collateraJ estoppel
9. The plaintiff's: claims are barred on t~ basis that they lack a legal ba..<>is.
lO, The plaintiff's claims are barred becaU:Se they are not based in fact
II. The plaintiff has failed to join nt.>eC!SMrY or indispensibte parries.

l2. The defendants are exct~S~.-d from perthrmancc by virtue of breach of the tease

agreement on the part of the plaintifl:
13. The plaintiff has waivett throu!Jh its condud or course of dealing, any n."troa<:tive
tlr

prospective dllims tor n."llt adj~ments..
14. The plaintiff is oot the rem party in i.nterest
t 5. 1'he plaintiff has failed to give required cuntractual or statutory notice~ to the

defendants for alleged rents due.
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16. The plaintiff has t'IDJed to perform a oondition precedent to enforcemenr or

imposition of any rental adjustrnet1t, including, but not limited to,. compliance with
section U(b).
17. Any determination of fair market value must exclude consideration of

improvements and the lease. Improvements include roads. utilities, buildings and
improvements to surrounding lands that affect the value of the land in question.
Any detef1llifmtion of fair market value must include consideration lhat the initial 1t'ldue
\'VaS

an agreed $15,000 per acre. and aU determinatiom of value were made, accepted,

agreed to, or relied upoo by tbe parties at each adjustmc.'ftt date since the inception of the
lease. Thus. adjustments. if any, are limited to chauges in val.ue during the period since
lut accc.-pt.ancc or acquiescen>~.:e of fair value by the pwties.

llt The plaintiff's claims are bllm.'d because the contract was modified in a

subsequent trnnsaction in 2001 ami eliminated the abifity ofthe plaintitf to adjus.t rent
l9. The plaintiff's claims are barred by its cours¢ of &.•ling.

20. The plaintiffs claims are barred because there has been no breach of ctlntract
21. The plaintiff's claims are barn:d ~'CI1USC it lacks privity of~ with one or

both of the defimdants.
22.

Th~

pbit.inaitl'"'s claims are barred by its own subsequent c,onduct in 2002 affirming

that rent was to be a set amount and not a variable amount"
23. 11\e plaintiff's claims are barred because it has oo damages.

24. The plaintitf's clajms are barred bcc!Ul!ie the <kfendanl'l' conduct 'IAt't\SilOt the
proximate cause of the pl&nliff s harms, if any.

WHEREfORH, the defendants pray for the tbllowing relief from this CAurt:
Answer to Amended Complaint and Jury Demand Page J
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! . Dismissal of !he pi.Unmr s. complaint in its entirety with prejudice;

2. Awarding the defendants their attorney fees and costs pursuant 10 ldahu C.ode §§

11-120 and 12-121 and Rule 54 of the Idaho Rules ofCi'ftil Procedl.lnll.
3. Granting any other such rei ief <tS deemed proper and Just 1..IJlder the circumstance.<:~.

JURY DEMAND
Deteadaab demud trial by jury pursuant to Idaho Rule of CivU

DATED: May 7, 2Q i 2

0. J

~un

38

CERTJFJCATE OF SERVICE

I certify l am a licensed attome)' in the !Mte of Idaho and oo May 1, 2012. l

served a true and correct copy of the ANSWER TO AMENDED COMPLAINT AND
.rtJRY DEMAND on the following by the method of d~iivery designated below:

Dave R Gallafenr
R. WiHiam Hancook.
Merrill & Merril.l
PO Btlx 991

0

U.S. Mail

0

~facsimile

Hand-delivered

Poontello. lD 83204-0991

fax: 232-:2499
Fhmnook County Coonhouse

624 E. Center
Pocatello, rD 8320!
Fax: (208) 236.-7012

Honorable Mitchell Bro..-..n
Caribou County Courwruse
POBox77S
Soda Springs.lD 83276
Fax: (208) 547-2l47
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U.S. Mail

U.S. Mall

0

0

~Hand--delivered

l'acsimile

~Uniie

Hand--deli,ered
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IN ".tHE DISTIUCT COtTRT OF THE SIXTH ,JUDICJAI, DIBTRJCI' OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN A..~D FOR THE COt.J'!\"TY OF BANNOCK
)

POCATELLO HOSPITAL. LLC, D/B/A
PORTNEtTF MEDICAL CE:NTE:R, I..l•.C..

)

)

Case NtY CV-1011-0000108

)

PLAINTIFF',

)
)

VS

)

MINt!TE ENTRY Al'ID ORDER

)

Qt:AIL RIDGE MEDICAL INVESTORS,

)

LLC AND CENTURY PA.ftK
ASStlCM.TES, LLC,

)

On May 10, 2012, this rn.atter came before the Court for

anno~

of the Court's

decision on a Motion to Dismiss Defendant's Denumd fur Jury Truu and Oral Motion in Linli.ue
fb:r a Judicial Determination of the 2001 Landlord Consent and Estoppel Certificate. Kem L.
Ha:wk:i:ns and R William Hanoock appeared telephonically for and on behalf of the Plaintitf and

,\{tehael D. Gaftbey, Win.••ton V. Bear~ and John M. A'll'mldet appeared telephm:licaUy fur and

on behalf of the D~ts. Rodney ~t Felshaw acted a~ oourt reporter.
~ Court shall STR.IK.l! Defendant's

to the extent that it demands a jury trial.

Further, the Court shall

O~'JT

Quail Ridge Medicallnvestot~ Ammded An~

The Court stated the bam for the ruling on the record.
Plai:nti:frs Motion fur

~on and

hereby :finds

rlmt the Estoppel Ce:tritlcate is clear and unambiguous, and therefun: the Court will oot hear
e~iMic

e"idenee at trial on the 2001 Landi<ud and Estoppel Cet.1ificate. The ·l:nuris fur this

nding "'"'s al~o set forth on the reoord.
This matter is curtently set fur trial on Monday, May 14, 4012 at ?:00 a.m. and the Court

w'iU allow the parties fifteen (15) minutes fo-r any openiug ~ents.
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IT IS SO ORDERED.

CERTIFICATE OF MARJNGJSERVICE
I h~by cmify that oo the lOth day of May, 2012, I mailed/served a true Cop}' ofthe Mhlute
Entry a..."ld Order oo ~ attamey(~)lpen>oll(s) listed below by mail v.ith correct postage thereon or
causing the same to be hand deli~d.

Pl.AIN'TIJ!'li ATTOIDI.'EY:

QURMail

Dave R. Ga!J.afent

DE-Mail
0 Cot:ttthome Box

Kent l'Jawk:ins
PO Box 991

rE;i Fax:

(208) 2:32-2499

Pocatello, ID 83204

D£F:ENDAJ."ST ATTORNEY:

0US.l\4ail

Michael 0. Gatmey
2105 Coronado Streel
Idaho falls, ID 83404

DE-Mail

0

Comtlwusc Box

~ Fax: (108) 529-9732

J

c

11 f\l""'f\14

Michael D. Ciaffiley, ISB No. 3558

BEARD ST. Cl ,AIR GAFFNEY PA
21 OS Coronado Street
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404
Telephone: (208) 523-5171
Facsimile: (208) 529-9732
Email: gaffney(il}beardstclair.com
Attorney lt)r the Defendants

DISTRICT COURT SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
BANNOCK COUNTY IDAHO
POCATELLO HOSPITAL, LLC d/b/a
POR'fNEUF MEDICAL CENTERS, LLC,

Case No.: CV-10-2724 OC

Plaintifl:
DEFENDANTS' EXHIBIT LIST
vs.
QUAIL RIDGE MEDICAL INVESTORS,
LLC and CENTURY PARK
ASSOCIATES, LLC,
Defendants.

Defendants, by and through counsel of record, hereby submit the following list of
exhibits that may be offered as evidence at the trial of this matter. Defendants reserve the
right to supplement this list and to utilize any exhibits identified by Plaintiff.
201.

Ground Lease Agreement dated January 27, 1983

202.

February 28, 1983 Memorandum of Ground Lease

203.

December 15, 1983 Deed of Trust Note

204.

January 15, 1996 letter from Jade Millington to Mark Hall

205.

February 9, 1996 Guaranty
Defendants' Exhibit List Page 1

206.

February 27, 1996 Landlord Consent and Estoppel Certificate

207.

February 29, 1996 letter to Forrest Preston from Sterling Development Co.

20X.

First Interstate Loan Coupons

209.

March 5, 1996 letter from Forrest Preston to Jade Millington

210.

Subordination and Amendment Agreement, November 1996

21 I.

1996 Estoppel Certificate

2 I 2.

Sublease Agreement with Purchase Option dated January 1, I 996

2 I3.

Leasehold Deed of Trust, Assignment of Rents and Security Agreement, June

26,1996
214.

Promissory Note, June 26, 1996

215.

February 17, 1998 letter from Richard Stem to Victor Lund

216.

February 27, 1998 letter from John Yuditsky to Richard Stern

217.

January 26, 2001 letter from Richard Faulkner to Tracy Farnsworth

218.

Bi II of Sale and Assignment from Sterling Development Group to Pa1tners

dated January 31, 200 l
219.

Bill of Sale and Assignment dated January 31,2001

220.

Sale and Assumption Agreement and Agreement for Substitution of Liability

dated January 31, 200 I
221.

January 31, 2001 Notice of exercising option by John Yuditsky to IHC Health

Services, Inc.
222.

Base Rent and Refinancings

223.

First Amendment to Leasehold Deed of Trust, Assignment of Rents and

Security Agreement, January 31, 2001
224.

Amended and Restated Sublease Agreement dated February 1, 2001
Defendants' Exhibit List Page 2

225.

r:ehruary 26, 200 I letter fi·om Richard Faulkner to Guy Kroesche

226.

April 10,2001 letter from Guy Krocschc to Richard Faulkner

227.

June I, 200 I letter from Rich Faulkner to Guy Kroesche

228.

Landlord Consent and Estoppel Certificate dated June 1, 2001

229.

Amendment to Subordination and Amendment Agreement dated June 1, 200 I

230.

June 21, 200 I letter from Guy Krocsche to Richard Faulkner

231.

Redline draft of Landlord Consent and Estoppel Certificate dated June 21,

2001
232.

July 25, 2001 letter from Richard Faulkner to David Jensen

233.

July 26, 2001 email from Guy Kroesche to Richard Faulkner

234.

August 2, 2001 email from Guy Kroesche to Richard Faulkner

235.

September 5, 2001 letter from Richard Faulkner to Guy Kroesche

236.

Amendment to Subordination and Amendment Agreement dated December

18,2001
237.

September 19, 2002 letter from Nile Eatmon to Forrest Preston

238.

October 1, 2002 Assignment and Assumption Agreement

239.

October 1, 2002 Assignment of Leases and Contracts

240.

October I, 2002 Notice of Lease Assignment

241.

Unsigned October 1, 2002 Consent and Estoppel Certificate

242.

Guarantee of Payment and Performance dated June 1, 200 I

243.

May 7, 2003 letter from Shirley Annen to Quail Ridge

244.

January 5, 2004 letter from Shirley Annen to Quail Ridge

245.

January I, 1996 Sub Lease Agreement

246.

February 2, 2005 letter from Shirley Annen to Quail Ridge
Defendants' Exhibit List Page 3

247.

January 4, 2006 letter IJ·om Shirley Annen to Quail Ridge

248.

January 18, 2007 letter from Shirley Annen to Quail Ridge

249.

h~bruary

250.

.January 27, 2009 emails between Laura Adcox and Naomi Fahsholz

251.

January 29, 2009 Special Warranty Deed

252.

General Summary of Complete Appraisal Report by Bowman Appraisal,

5, 2007 letter th)Jn Cal Northam to Forrest Preston

September 24, 2009
253.

Integra Realty Resources Appraisal of Real Property, December 15,2010

254.

Reserved

255.

Reserved

256.

Portneuf Medical Center Invoices

257.

Check No. 8496 from Pocatello Medical Investors to PortneufMedical Center

in amount of$9,562.50 and receipt
258.

June I, 2007 letter from Davis Partnership Architects to Quail Ridge

259.

Wells Fargo Bank Payoff Worksheet dated August 15,2007

260.

August 27, 2009 Memorandum regarding Quail Ridge-PortneufLand

Valuations
261.

August 27, 2009 Memorandum regarding Quail Ridge Land Rental Charge

262.

October 26, 2009 letter from Don Wadle to Jodi Thomas

263.

February l, 2010 letter from Norman Stephens to Jodi Thomas

264.

March 29, 2010 letter from Dave Gallafent to Quail Ridge

265.

April I, 2010 letter from Forrest Preston to Norman Stephens

266.

April 1, 2010 letter from Forrest Preston to Dave Gallafent

267.

Email correspondence by and to Jodi Thomas
Defendants' Exhibit List Page 4

268.

Email correspondence by and to Don Wadle

269.

April I 3, 20 I 0 letter th>m Forrest Preston to Norman Stephens

270.

April 13, 2010 letter from Forrest Preston to Dave Gal latent

271.

April 26, 20 I 0 letter from Winston Beard to Dave Galla tent

272.

May 21, 2010 letter from Dave Gallatcnt to Winston Beard St. Clair Gaffney

273.

May 26, 20 I0 letter from Winston Beard to Dave Gallafent

274.

September 9, 2010 Integra Realty Resourses letter to Kent Hawkins

275.

Undated letter evidencing agreement of Pocatello Medical Investors'

agreement with Sterling Development regarding Sublease Agreement and Purchase
Option
276.

July 22, 20 ll Affidavit of Brent Thompson

277.

July 22, 201 I Affidavit of Greg Kelley

278.

Deposition of Jodi Thomas

279.

Deposition of Richard Faulkner

280.

Deposition of Forrest Preston

/

Defendants' Exhibit List Page 5

I certify I am a licensed attorney in the state ofldaho and on May 7, 2012, 1
served a true and correct copy of the DEFENDANTS' EXHIBIT LIST on the following
by the method of delivery designated below:
Dave R. Gallalent
R. William Hancock

0

//

r::::t

U.S. Mail~ Hand-delivered

0

Facsimile

Merrill & Merrill
PO Box 991
Pocatello, ID 83204-0991
Fax: 232-2499
///

Bannock County Courthouse
624 E. Center
Pocatello, ID 8320 I
Fax: (208) 236-7012
Honorable Mitchell Brown
Caribou County Courthouse
PO Box 775

0 U.S. Mail? Hand-delivered O Facsimile

0

Hand-delivered

0

Facsimile
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EXHIBIT LIST
MITCHELL W. BROWN, DISTRICT JUDGE
BRANDY PECK, DEPUTY CLERK
COURT REPORTER

CASE NO. CV-2010-2724

fZ_cdmo ft'lf}av)

CASE:

vs.

19.

~012 _ _ _.

DATE:

Pocatello Hospital LLC
Quail Ridge Medical Investors, et al

NO DESCRIPTION

DATE

ID

OFFD

OBJ

ADMIT

l!:fv~

v

rJ1)

L~

201

Ground Leas Agreement

1/27/1983

202

Memorandum of Ground Leas

2/28/1983

203

Deed of Trust Note

12/15/1983

204

Letter fr. Millington to Hall

205

Guaranty

1---

1/15/96
2/9/96

206

Landlord Consent and Estoppel Cert. 2/27/96

207

Letter to Preston from Sterling

208

First Interstate Loan Coupons

209

Letter from Preston to Millington

210

Subordination and Amendment Agmt

211

Estoppel Certificate

2/29/96

3/5/1996
11/1996
1996

212

Sublease Agreement with Purchase
Option

213

Leasehold Deed of Trust

214

Promissory Note

6/26/1996

Letter from Stern to Lund

2/17/98

1/1/96
6/26/1996

-215
216
217

Letter from Yuditsky to Stern

2/27/98

Letter from Faulkner to Farnsworth 1/26/01

SCHEDULING ORDER, NOTICE OF TRIAL
SETTING AND INITIAL PRETRIAL ORDER - 8

(

EXHIBIT LIST
MITCHELL W. BROWN, DISTRICT JUDGE

CASE N O . - - - - - - - - - -

BRANDY PECK, DEPUTY CLERK
COURT REPORTER

DATE:

CASE:

vs.
NO
218
219

DESCRIPTION
Bill of Sale and Assignment re
Sterling

DATE
1/31/01

ID

.S·

~.j

Yfs

OFFD

OBJ

ADMIT

/

IJ(/L

416

Bill of Sale and Assignment

1/31/01

220

Sale and Assumption Agreement

1/31/01

~·

221

Notice of exercising option

1/31/01

Yls /

222

Base Rent and Refinancings

223

First Amendment to Leashold Deed

1/31/01

224

Amended and Restated Sublease

2/1/01

225

Letter from Faulkner to Kroesche

2/26/01

u~

~

Y;t-.; /

~6 /
~- ,/

4'; r.·J v

226

Letter from Kroesche to Faulkner

227

Letter from Faulkner to Kroesche

228

Landlord Consent and Estoppel Cert

4/10/01
)/1 /01
6/1/01

Amendment to Subordination and
Amendment agreement
230 Letter from Kroesche to Faulkner

6/1/01

231

Redline draft of Landlord Consent

6/21/01

232

Letter from Faulkner to Jensen

7/25/01

233

Email from Kroesche to Faulkner

229

234

Email from Kroesche to Faulkner

~/

\ ./

I

6/21/01

7/26/01
8/2/01
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EXHIBIT LIST
MITCHELL W. BROWN, DISTRICT JUDGE
BRANDY PECK, DEPUTY CLERK
COURT REPORTER
CASE:
VS.

NO
235
236
237

CASE N O . - - - - - - - DATE:

------·-----

DESCRIPTION

DATE

Letter from Faulkner to Kroesche

9.5.01

Amendment to Subordination and
Amendment Agreement
Letter from Eatmon to Preston
Assignment and Assumption Agmt

10/1/02

239

Assigment of Leases and Contracts

10/1/02

240

Notice of Lease Assigment

10/1/02

241

Consent and Estoppel Certificate

242

Guarantee of Payment and Performance

243

Letter from Annen to Quail Ridge
Letter from Annen to Quail Ridge

245

Sub Lease Agreement

246

Letter from Annen to Quail Ridge

247
248

Letter from Annen to Quail Ridge
Letter from Annen to Quail Ridge

10/1/02
6/1/01
5/7/03
1/5/04

2/2/05
1/4/06
1/18/ 07

249

Letter from Northam to Preston

2/5/07

250

Emails between Adcox and Fahsholz

1/09

251

Special Warranty Deed

SCHEDULING ORDER, NOTICE OF TRIAL
SETTING AND INITIAL PRETRIAL ORDER· 8
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12/18/01
9/19/02

238

244

ID

1/29/09

5/l!f) LfCd

l

/

~

v

EXHIBIT LIST
MlTCHELL W. BROWN, DISTRICT JUDGE

CASE NO. _ _

BRANDY J>ECK, Db"'PUTY CLERK
COURT REPORTER

DATE:

CASE:
VS.

NO

DESCRIPTION

DATE

252

General Summary, Bowman Appraisal

9/24/09

253

Integra Realty Appraisal

12/15/10

254

Reserved

255

Reserved

256
257

Portneuf Medical Center Invoices
Check No. 8496, $9,562.50

258

Letter from Davis Partnership to QR 6/1/07

259

Wells Fargo Payff Worksheet

260

Memo regarding QR/Portmeuf Valuatio fl 8/27/09

261

Memo regarding QR Land Rental Charg ~ 8/27/09

262

Letter from Wadle to Thomas

8/15/07

10/26/09

263

Letter from Stephens to Thomas

2/1/10

264

Letter from

3/29/10

265

:etter from Preston to Stephens

266
267
268

Gallafent to Quail

4/1/10

Letter from Preston to Gallafent
4/1/10
Email correspondence by and to Thorn as
Email correspondence by and to Wad ~e

SCHEDULING ORDER, NOTICE OF TRIAL
SETrfNG AND INITIAL PRETRIAL ORDER - 8
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EXHIBIT LIST
MITCHELL W. BROWN, DISTRICT JUDGE
BRANDY PECK, DEPUTY CLERK
COURT REPORTER

CASE NO.
DATE:

CASE:

vs.

NO DESCRIPTION

DATE
4/13/10

269

Letter from Preston to Stephens

270

Letter from Preston to Gallafent

271

Letter from Beard to Gallafent

4/26/10

272

Letter from Gallafent to Beard

5/21/10

-

4/13/10

273

Letter from Beard to Gallafent

5/26/10

274

Integra letter to Hawkins

9/9/10

275
276

Letter evidencing agreement with
IOMI and Sterling Dev.
Affidavit of Brent Thompson

277

Affidavit of Greg Kelley

278

Deposition of Jodi Thomas

279

Deposition of Richard Faulkner

280

Deposition of Forrest Preston

1--·

--
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Undated

7/22/11
7/22/11

ID

OFFD

OBJ ADMIT

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK
)

POCATELLO HOSPITAL, LLC
PLAINTIFF,

vs

)
)
)

Case No: CV-2010-0002724-0C

)

MINUTE ENTRY AND ORDER

)
)

QUAIL RIDGE MEDICAL INVESTORS, LLC )
CENTURY PARK ASSOCIATES, LLC
)
)
DEFENDANT
)

________________________________ )
The above entitled matter came before the Court on the 4th day of May, 2012 for
announcement of the Court's decision on the motions heard Friday, Apri130, 2012 in Caribou
County. Plaintiff appeared by and through counsel, Kent L. Hawkins, R. William Hancock, and
Tyler H. Neal. Defendants appeared telephonically by and through counsel, Winston V. Beard
and John M. Avondet. Rodney Felshaw was the Court Reporter.
Hearing proceeded before the Court on the record. The Court GRANTED Plaintiff's
Motion to Enforce Jury Waiver Clause in 2001 Landlord Consent and Estoppel Certificate and
ordered that this matter would proceed to trial before the Court. The Court announced its
decision DENYING Plaintiffs Motion in Limine on 2001 Landlord Consent and Estoppel
Certificate and Defendants' First Motion in Limine. The basis for this determination was also set
forth on the record.

MINUTE ENTRY AND ORDER -I

With respect to the Plaintiff's Motion in Limine on Defendants' Experts, Motion in
Limine on Presentation of Irrelevant Extrinsic Evidence and Motion in Limine on Speculative
and Opinion Testimony, the Court declined to rule on these motions, instead deferring rulings to
individual objections as they may arise at the time of trial.
Finally, the Court DENIED Plaintiff's Motion to Vacate the Trial again stating the basis
for decision on the record.
Counsel discussed with the Court this issue of ambiguity as to the 2001 Landlord Consent
and Estoppel Certificate and requested the Court make a ruling as to this. After hearing from
counsel, the Court gave Plaintiff until Monday, May 7, 2012 at 5:00p.m. to file briefing on the
issue. Defendant shall then have until Wednesday, May 9, 2012 at 5:00p.m. to respond. The
Court will issue an oral decision on Thursday, May 10, 2012 at 12:00 p.m. by telephone from
Franklin County.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: May 11th 2012.

MITCHELL BROWN
District Judge

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING/SERVICE

The undersigned certifies that on the

day of May, 2012, she caused a true and correct

copy of the foregoing Minute Entry and Order to be served upon the following persons in the
following manner:

MINUTE ENTRY AND ORDER- 2
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PLAINTIFF ATTORNEY:
Kent L. Hawkins
P.O. Box 991
Pocatello, Idaho 83204-0991
DEFENDANT ATTORNEY:
Michael D. Gaffuey
2105 Coronado State
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404

MTNUTE ENTRY AND ORDER - 3

0

Faxed

0

Hand Delivered

•

Mailed

0

Faxed

0

Hand Delivered

•

Mailed

PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBIT LIST
MITCHELL W. BROWN, DISTRICT JUDGE
BRANDY PECK, DEPUTY CLERK

DATE: _

~rey re /WouRT REPORTER
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CASE NAME: POCATELLO HOSPITAL, LLC d/b/a PORTNEUF MEDICAL CENTER, LLC

vs.
QUAIL RIDGE MEDICAL INVESTORS, LLC and CENTURY PARK ASSOCIATES, LLC
No.

Description

Date

101

January 27, 1983: Ground
Lease Agreement
January 1, 1996: Sublease
Agreement and Purchase
Option
January 31, 2001: Sale and
Assumption Agreement and
Agreement for Substitution of
Liability
October 1, 2002: Assignment of
Leases and Contracts
October 1, 2002: Assignment
and Assumption Agreement
October 1, 2002: Notice of
Lease Assignment
February 24, 2003: Articles of
Amendment/ BRMC changes
name to Portneuf Medical
Center Auxiliary, Inc.
February 4, 2009, Special
Warranty Deed, Instrument#
20902430
Bowman Appraisal

5/ it?

.!din

sft~

/.J;iJ

102

103

104
105
106
107

108

109
110

Integra Realty Resources
Appraisal

111

October 26, 2009: Letter from
Don Wadle to Jodi Thomas
February 1, 2010: Letter from
Norman Stephens to Jodi
Thomas

112

ID

OFFD

OBI

ADMIT
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14

~
16
17
18
19

April 9, 2012: Appraisal Review
Statement from Langston &
Associates

.....
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK

POCATELLO HOSPITAL, LLC
PLAINTIFF,

vs

)
)
)
)

Case No: CV-2010-0002724-0C

)

)
)
QUAIL RIDGE MEDICAL INVESTORS, LLC )
CENTURY PARK ASSOCIATES, LLC
)
)
DEFENDANT
)

MINUTE ENTRY AND ORDER

________________________________ )
The above entitled matter came before the Court on the 141h day of May, 2012 for Court
Trial. Plaintiff appeared by and through counsel, Kent L. Hawkins, and R. William Hancock.
Defendants appeared by and through counsel, Michael D. Gaffney and John M. Avondet.
Rodney M. Felshaw was the Court Reporter.
At the outset, counsel for the Plaintiff placed a stipulation on the record as to several of
Plaintiff's exhibits. Pursuant to the stipulation, Plaintiff's Exhibits #101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106,
108, and 115 were admitted by the Court. Exhibit # 107 is withdrawn at this time.
Plaintiff's counsel, Kent L. Hawkins gave an opening statement, followed by Defendants'
counsel, Michael D. Gaffney.
Plaintiff called Don Wadle who was administered an oath and testified. Mr. Hawkins
conducted direct examination of the witness. Mr. Gaffney cross examined the witness.
Plaintiff called Brad Janoesh who was administered an oath and testified. Mr. Hancock
conducted direct examination. The Court took its morning recess at 10:50 a.m. Upon

MINUTE ENTRY AND ORDER- I

reconvening at 11: I 0 a.m., Mr. Gaffney conducted cross examination of the witness. Brief redirect examination was conducted and the witness was excused. Plaintiff advised that it had no
further witnesses for today and the Court adjourned at 11:40 a.m. for the day.
Trial reconvened at 9:00a.m. on Tuesday, May 15,2012. At the outset, counsel for the
Plaintiff informed the Court they were resting their case. Mr. Gaffney then made a number of
oral motions to the Court. A Motion for Directed Verdict as to the breach of contract claim of
the Complaint was made and stipulated to by Plaintiffs counsel. The Court GRANTED the
Motion for Directed Verdict as it related to Count I of the Complaint. Mr. Gaffney moved to
dismiss Defendant Century Park Associates, LLC from this litigation. Again, Plaintiff stipulated
to this motion and the Court GRANTED the Motion to Dismiss Century Park Associates, LLC
from this litigation.
The Court heard further argument from counsel as to Defendants Motion to Strike the
Testimony of Mr. Janoesh and Motion for Directed Verdict as to the declaratory relief claim of
the Amended Complaint paragraphs 46, 47, and 48. Additionally, Mr. Gaffney made an oral
Motion to Dismiss Count II of the Amended Complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
The Court recessed to give counsel time to confer with clients before offering additional
argument to the Court.
Upon reconvening, the Court ruled on the pending Motions as follows: Defendant's
Motion to Strike Testimony of Mr. Janoesh is DENIED. Defendant's Motion for Directed
Verdict as to paragraphs 46, 47, and 48 of the Amended Complaint is DENIED. Defendant's
Motion to Dismiss Count II of the Amended Complaint is DENIED. The Court stated on the
record the basis for denying each of these motions. .

MINUTE ENTRY AND ORDER- 2

Defendant's counsel then called its first witness, Earl Christison whose deposition was
published and accepted by the Court. Mr. Gaffney then called Richard Faulkner, who was
administered an oath and testified. Direct examination was conducted by Mr. Gaffney.
Defendant's Exhibits #256, #257, and #211 were offered and admitted without objection. Exhibit
#228 (pages 1-8) were offered, objected to and admitted over objection. Plaintiff's Exhibits #218
through #224 were offered, objected to and not admitted by the Court. Exhibit #227 was also
offered, objected to and not admitted by the Court. Plaintiff Exhibit #242 was offered, objected
to and admitted over objection. The Court took an afternoon recess at 1:05 p.m.
Court reconvened at 1:30 p.m. Plaintiff counsel had no cross examination of Mr.
Faulkner and the witness was excused. Defendant's counsel then called Brent Thompson who
was administered an oath and testified. At the outset, Plaintiff's counsel renewed their Motion in
Limine as to this Mr. Thompson's testimony and the Court again DENIED the motion. Direct
exam was conducted by Mr. A vondet. No cross examination was conducted and the witness was
excused. Defendants then rested their case.
The Court took a brief recess waiting on the arrival of Plaintiff's rebuttal witness. The
Court reconvened with Plaintiff rebuttal witness Tracy Farnsworth who was administered an oath
and testified. Direct examination of the witness was handled by Mr. Hawkins. Cross examination
was conducted by Mr. Gaffney. The witness was excused and evidence was closed.
The Court and counsel then discussed preparation of the trial transcript in this matter and
submission of proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. Counsel would like the
transcript prepared prior to the submission and agreed the costs associated with the preparation
of the transcript shall be shared by the parties. Upon receipt of the transcript, the Plaintiff shall
have 14 days to submit proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law to the Court with a

MINUTE ENTRY AND ORDER- 3
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separate document containing closing arguments. Defendant will then have 14 days to submit
the same. Counsel for Plaintiff shall then have 7 days for any reply argument (but no additional
findings of fact or conclusions of law) they may wish to submit. At that time the matter will be
taken under advisement by the Court.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: May 15,2012.

MITCHELL W. BROWN
District Judge

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING/SERVICE

The undersigned certifies that on the{l day of May, 2012, she caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing Minute Entry and Order to be served upon the following persons in the
following manner:
PLAINTIFF ATTORNEY:
Kent L. Hawkins
P.O. Box 991
Pocatello, Idaho 83204-0991

0

Faxed

0

Hand Delivered

•

Mailed

DEFENDANT ATTORNEY:
Michael D. Gaffney
2105 Coronado State
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404

0 Faxed

MINUTE ENTRY AND ORDER- 4

0

Hand Delivered

•

Mailed

em~
Brandy Peck, Deputy Clerk
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK

POCATELLO HOSPITAL, LLC
PLAINTIFF,

vs

)
)
)
)

Case No: CV-2010-0002724-0C

)
)

ORDER

)
QUAIL RIDGE MEDICAL INVESTORS, LLC )
CENTURY PARK ASSOCIATES, LLC
)
)
DEFENDANT
)

_________________________________ )
The Court has now been notified by the Court Reporter, Rodney M. Felshaw that the
transcript of the court trial conducted on May 14 and 15,2012 is complete. At the conclusion of
this court trial the parties agreed to share equally the cost associated with preparation of a transcript
of the trial proceedings to aid the parties in preparation of their proposed findings of fact, conclusion
of law and closing arguments.

THEREFORE IT IS HEREBY ORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the
parties shall have until June 11, 2012 to remit payment to Rodney M. Felshaw for the trial
transcript. Upon receipt of the same, Mr. Felshaw will provide each party with a copy of the trial
transcript. Mr. Felshaw shall notify the Court and the parties of the date upon which the trial
transcript sent to the parties. The briefing schedule set forth in the Court's Minute Entry and Order
dated May 15, 2012 will then be controlled from the date of mailing to the parties.

ORDER -I

IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: May 11 1h 2012.

MITCHELL BROWN
District Judge
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Kent L. Hawkins
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK

POCATELLO HOSPITAL, LLC d/b/a
PORTNEUF MEDICAL CENTER, LLC,
Plaintiff,
vs.
QUAIL RIDGE MEDICAL INVESTORS,
LLC, and CENTURY PARK ASSOCIATES,
LLC

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-10-2724
PLAINTIFF'S CLOSING ARGUMENT

Defendants.
______________________________
)

COMES NOW the Plaintiff, Pocatello Hospital, LLC d/b/a PortneufMedical Center, LLC,
("PMC") by and through its attorneys, Merrill and Merrill, Chartered, and for its Closing
Argument respectfully states:

Introduction
In its Amended Complaint, PMC formally requested this court to declare the rights and
obligations of the parties under Section 1.3(b) of the January 27, 1983 Ground Lease Agreement
("Lease Agreement").
Finding the "taking into account" language found in Section 1.3(b) of the lease to be
ambiguous, this court directed that this matter proceed to trial so that the parties could present the
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court with relevant extrinsic evidence so as to assist the court, as the trier of fact, in interpreting
this ambiguous language. The trial has now been completed and the parties have presented the
court with the best evidence available on this ambiguous language.
Yet, in truth, no relevant extrinsic evidence was presented at trial by either party explaining
why the original parties to this ground lease included this "taking into account" language in
Section 1.3(b) and how they intended such language to be applied for rent adjustment purposes.
PMC contends that this evidence was not presented because it does not exist.

Further, no

evidence was presented at trial revealing that any of the parties to this lease had every engaged in
the rent adjustment process as outlined in Section 1.3(b) ofthis Lease Agreement. As such, there
is no history to guide this court in the application of the "taking into account" language at issue in
this case.
Regardless, as will be discussed more thoroughly below, there was sufficient evidence
presented at trial to enable this court to interpret this ambiguous "taking into account" language in
such a way as to reasonably give meaning to all the other unambiguous provisions of this Lease
Agreement and, in so doing, to declare the rights and obligations of the current parties to this lease.
Furthermore, because the Defendant, Quail Ridge Medical Investors, LLC, has failed to establish
its affirmative defenses in this matter, this court is able to grant the declaratory judgment being
sought by Quail Ridge for the 2007 and 2010 rent adjustment periods.

Argument
I.

PMC is Entitled to Declaratory Judgment in Its Favor:

The parties stipulated prior to trial that PMC and Quail Ridge are the current parties to the
1983 Ground Lease Agreement, which was admitted into evidence at trial as Exhibit 101. It is
undisputed in this case that PMC acquired the Leased Land and the rights of the lessor under the
Lease Agreement from Bannock County in 2009 and that Bannock County became the successor
in interest to IHC with respect to the Leased Land and the Lease Agreement in 2002. · PMC is the
current owner of the subject 4.25 acre parcel of real property at issue in this action ("Leased
Land") and is the current lessor under the Lease Agreement. Quail Ridge acquired its interest as
lessee under the Lease Agreement from the original lessee, Sterling Development Co. Subject to
the terms of the Lease Agreement, Quail Ridge is also the current owner of the building that its
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predecessor in interest, Sterling Development Co., constructed on the Leased Land. Quail Ridge
operates its assisted living facility out of that building.
It is clear from the evidence presented at trial that the 1983 Ground Lease Agreement is the

only agreement that controls the rights and obligations ofPMC and Quail Ridge with regard to the

Leased Land. It is also plainly apparent from the evidence presented and the arguments rriade at
trial that an actual controversy exists between PMC and Quail Ridge on how to interpret the rent
adjustment provisions of Section 1.3(b) of this Ground Lease Agreement.
Pursuant to Idaho Code Title 10, Chapter 12, the Court is authorized and has power to enter
a declaratory judgment on the construction of a written agreement when an actual controversy
exists between the parties to the agreement. From the numerous pleadings filed by both parties to
this action and from the trial record, there can be no doubt to the court that such actual controversy
exists in this case. Through its earlier motion for summary judgment and as later formally pled in
its amended complaint, PMC is asking this court to enter a declaratory judgment that interprets the
ambiguous language of Section 1.3(b) of the Lease Agreement, that determines the fair market
value as required by the contract for the adjustment periods of 2007 and 2010, that calculates the
rent due pursuant to the terms of the contract for the years within those adjustment periods, and
that clarifies the process for determining fair market value for adjustment periods after 2010.
Actually, it is not all of Section 1.3(b) that requires judicial interpretation but only
Paragraph 3 of Section 1.3(b). This court has made clear that none of the other paragraphs in
Section 1.3(b) of this lease are in dispute between the parties. Even within Paragraph 3 of Section
1.3(b), the only language that really appears to be in dispute between the parties is the "taking into
account" language, which this court has previously found to be ambiguous.
Because this "taking into account" language cannot be read and understood in isolation, it
is important for this court to initially step back and see how the other undisputed language of
Section 1.3(b), directs the interpretation of the disputed "taking into account" language. For
instance, the first paragraph of Section 1.3(b) clearly provides that the annual rent for the Leased
Land shall be adjusted "every three (3) years beginning on the Commencement Date of this
Lease." The lease identifies each of these every three year dates as a "rent adjustment date."
The Lease Agreement is dated January 27, 1983, which means that the first rent adjustment date
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was January 27, 1986 and that subsequent rent adjustment dates occurred every three years
thereafter until the most recent rent adjustment date of January 27, 2010 and, before that, January
27,2007.
A review of the next full paragraph under Section 1.3(b) reveals that there are two
approaches available to the parties for arriving at an adjusted annual rent: (1) the parties may
reach a "written agreement within ninety (90) days before the applicable rent adjust date" and, if
such a "written agreement" is reached, it "shall be a conclusive determination between the parties
of the fair market value for the period to which the adjustment applies"; or, (2) if a written
agreement is not reached between the parties within this 90-day window of opportunity before
each respective rent adjustment date, then determination of fair market value for a rent adjustment
period "shall be made as in the paragraph on Arbitration in Article 13."
There can be no doubt or confusion that, under the above-identified plain language of this
lease, the only way an agreement between the parties could become a "conclusive determination"
of fair market value is for such an agreement to be in writing.

Notably, no such written

agreements were offered into evidence at the trial of this matter. No doubt, if any such written
agreement existed, it would have been a key piece of evidence at trial. Yet, the testimony at trial
makes clear that the parties to this lease never engaged in this possible approach to rent adjustment
recognized under Paragraph 2 of Section 1.3(b).
Not only did the lessee and lessor never negotiate a written fair market value agreement in
advance of a rent adjustment date, they also never, until now, seek to have the fair market value of
the Leased Land established pursuant to Article 13 of the lease.

Furthermore, but for the

self-admitted speculative testimony from Earl Christison, no reliable evidence was presented at
trial as to why the parties never engaged in this "written agreement" approach to rent adjustment or
why, prior to 2010, neither Quail Ridge of PMC or their predecessors in interest ever sought to
have the fair market value of the Leased Land determined by arbitration or through court
proceeding.
In any case, with respect to the 2007 and 2010 adjustment periods that are now ~he focus of
this action, it is undisputed that Quail Ridge and PMC did not enter into a written fair market value
agreement for either adjustment period; however, in 2010 PMC filed this law suit to .ask the court

Plaintifrs Closing Argument

Page4

138

to make that determination for those particular adjustment periods. As noted above, when the
parties do not enter into a timely written agreement on value, then the determination of the fair
market value of the Leased Land "shall be made as in the paragraph on Arbitration in Article 13 ."
This court has already determined that although paragraph 2 appears to make arbitration
mandatory in the rent adjustment context, this mandatory provision had been waived when PMC
filed its action in district court and Quail Ridge failed to request that the matter be resolved by
arbitration as required by Article 13. Because this issue has already been resolved by the court, it
need not be further argued here.
What the court should recognize from the provision in Paragraph 2 of Section 1.3(b)
calling for arbitration when a written fair market value agreement is not reached is the fact that this
Lease Agreement contemplates the reality that the parties to the lease may fail for any number of
reasons, whether by conscious choice or otherwise, to timely enter into a "written agreement"
before the respective rent adjustment dates. This failure to enter into a written agreement does not
preclude a later determination of the appropriate adjusted rental rate for each such rent adjustment
date. Rather, the Lease Agreement simply provides that when the parties have failed to timely
reach a "written agreement" a different mechanism must be employed for determining the fair
market value of the Lease Land for rent adjustment purposes.
As further support of the fact that this lease contemplates and allows for later determined
rent adjustments, the court simply needs to look at Paragraph 4 of Section 1.3(b). This paragraph
states: "If the determination of adjusted rent is made after the applicable rent adjustment date,
lessee shall continue to pay rent at the rate applicable to the preceding period until the adjusted

rate is determined." (emphasis added).

Indeed, not only does this lease contemplate that

adjustments can be made after any applicable rent adjustment date, but it also details what the
lessee's obligations are until such later rent adjustment is made.
In this case, Quail Ridge has attempted to make much ado of the fact that it or its
predecessor has paid the same rental rate of$9,562.50 since this lease was entered into in January
of 1983. In light of Paragraph 4 of Section 1.3(b), there is nothing significant about the lessee
making those rent payments other than the fact that Quail Ridge and its predecessors were simply
doing what they were obligated to do under this lease until a rent adjustment is determined by a
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subsequent written agreement or by an arbitrator (or, in this case, the court). It further stands to
reason that, if Quail Ridge and its predecessors in interest were obligated under the lease to pay
that annual amount until a rent adjustment is determined by an arbitrator (or, in this case, the
court), then PMC's or its predecessors' acceptance of payments in that amount did not constitute a
waiver of the lessor's rights under the lease or a modification by course of performance. PMC
and its predecessor's acceptance of payment in that amount cannot constitute a waiver or
modification by course of performance because, under Paragraph 4 of Section 1.3(b ), they were
obligated to accept payments in that amount until a later rent adjustment is determined by either a
written fair market value agreement or by an arbitrator (or, in this case, the court). In fact, it was
because of this language in Paragraph 4 of Section 1.3(b) that PMC chose to not further pursue its
breach of contract claim and, therefore, stipulated at trial to the dismissal of its breach of contract
claim. PMC acknowledges that, under Paragraph 4 of Section 1.3(b), there could be no breach of
this ground lease until a determination of adjusted rent is made by an arbitrator (or, in this case, the
court) and, thereafter, the lessee does not "promptly ... pay any difference for the period affected
by the adjustment." The obligation to pay the increased annual rental amounts for the 2007 and
2010 rent adjustment periods has not been triggered in this case because a determination has not
yet been made by the court on the fair market value of the Leased Land for those rent adjustment
periods.
Because the parties to this action did not timely reach a "written agreement" of fair market
value of the Leased Land for the 2007 and 201 0 rent adjustment periods as contemplated in the
first sentence of Paragraph 2 of Section 1.3(b ), this court is now charged with making that fair
market value determination through PMC's declaratory judgment action.
Paragraph 3 of Section 1.3(b) guides this court on how this determination of fair market
value is to be made. It states:

The rent as adjusted shall be equal to fifteen percent (15%) percent
[sic] of the fair market value of the leased land, exclusive of the
improvements on the premises. Determination offair market value shall
be based on the highest and best use of the land on the applicable rent
The
adjustment date without taking the leasehold into account.
determination shall take into account the parties' agreement that the initial
minimum rent is the above-stated percentage applied to a fair market value
of Fifteen Thousand and No/100 Dollars ($15,000.00) per acre and shall
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also take into account any determinations of market value made under this
lease for the purpose of adjustments for periods preceding the applicable .
rent adjustment date.
The first sentence of Paragraph 3 of Section 1.3(b) is that paragraph's topic sentence. A
clear reading of this sentence reveals that the court's principal function is to determine for the rent
adjustment period in question the "fair market value of the leased land, exclusive of the
improvements on the premises" and to set the rent at fifteen percent (15%) of that determined fair
market value amount. This court has previously found that, standing alone, this first sentence of
Paragraph 3 of Section 1.3(b) is clear and unambiguous.
The subsequent sentences in Paragraph 3 of Section 1.3(b) only provide guidance to help
the court reach the goal of determining the fair market value of the leased land exclusive of
improvements. Specifically, the second sentence of Paragraph 3 of Section 1.3(b) provides that
the determination of fair market value must "be based on the highest and best use of the land on the
applicable rent adjustment date without taking the leasehold into account."

The court has

previously found that this sentence, standing alone, is also clear and unambiguous.
The so-called problems only arise with the third sentence of Paragraph 3 of Section 1.3(b),
which sentence is often referred to as the "taking into account" language." This third sentence
states:
The determination shall take into account the parties' agreement that the
initial minimum rent is the above-stated percentage applied to afair market
value of Fifteen Thousand and No/100 Dollars ($15,000.00) per acre and
shall also take into account any determinations ofmarket value made under
this lease for the purpose of adjustments for periods preceding the
applicable rent adjustment date. (Emphasis added).
Although there was no relevant evidence presented at trial as to the original parties' intent
for including this "taking into account" language in the Lease Agreement, or how they anticipated
it would be applied for rent adjustment purposes, there was sufficient relevant evidence presented
at trial to assist this court in understanding how it should handle this "taking into account"
language in interpreting the rent adjustment provision of this ground lease. This is especially true
when the court applies the well recognized principles of contract interpretation to the evidence
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presented at trial. That is, this court must:
( 1) construe the contract as a whole including all of the circumstances giving rise to
it, while giving consistent meaning to every part of the contract; (2) give the
language in the contract its ordinary meaning unless there is evidence indicating
that a special meaning was intended; (3) consider any communications, conduct or
dealings between the parties showing how they intended and how they construed
the ambiguous language, provided that such evidence does. not completely change
the agreement and provided that one term is not construed inconsistently with the
remainder of the terms; and (4) construe the contract in a manner that avoids any
contradiction or absurdities. IDJI 6.08.1.
In applying the above principles of contract interpretation to the ambiguous "taking into
account" language at issue in this case, the court must find as a preliminary matter that no evidence
was presented at trial demonstrating that the original parties to this lease intended a special
meaning to be given the phrase "take into account." This phrase certainly has no special legal
significance. As such, this court must give these words their ordinary meaning. One of the
dictionary meanings of the word "account" is "consideration." See Merriam-Webster On-Line
Dictionary, available at www.meriam-webster.com. Thus, to "take into account" as used within
the third sentence of Paragraph 3 of Section 1.3(b), simply means that the court should "consider"
those outlined factors.
Considering these factors in reaching a determination of fair market value in this context
should be no different than a trier of fact considering the various factors outlined in Idaho Jury
Instruction 7.07 for determining fair market value. That instruction states:
In determining the fair market value of property, [the trier of fact]
should consider not only the opinions of the various witnesses who
testified as to market value, but also all other evidence in the case
which may aid in determining market value, such as location of the
property, the surroundings and general environment, any peculiar
suitability of the property for particular uses, and the reasonable
probabilities as to future potential uses, if any, for which the
property is or would be suitable or physically adaptable, all as
shown by the evidence in the case ...
While Idaho Jury Instruction 7.07lists factors a trier of fact may consider (if those factors
are supported by the evidence) in reaching a determination of fair market value, the trier of the
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fact's consideration of those factors does not ultimately change the fact that court or jury is trying
to reach a determination of fair market value, which is a term that has legal meaning. Black's
Law Dictionary, 1587 (Bryan A. Gamer ed.,

gth

ed., West 2004) defines fair market value as "The

price that a seller is willing to accept and a buyer is willing to pay on the open market in an arm's
length transaction; the point at which supply and demand intersect."

Indeed, Idaho Jury

Instruction 7.09 gives a similar definition of"fair market value." That instruction states:
The term "fair market value" means the cash price at which a wiling
seller would sell and a willing buyer would buy the subject property, in an
open marketplace free of restraints, taking into account the highest and most
profitable use of the property.
It presumes that the seller is desirous of selling, but is under no
compulsion to do so, and that the buyer is desirous of buying, but is under no
compulsion to do so.
It presumes that both parties are fully informed, knowledgeable and
aware of all relevant market conditions and of the highest and best use
potential of the property, and are basing their decisions accordingly.
It presumes that the market is open and competitive, and that the
subject property has been exposed to the market for a reasonable time.

Similarly, although the court may "consider" (or, ''take into account"}, as supported by the
evidence, the factors outlined in the third sentence ofParagraph 3 of Section 1.3(b) in reaching its
determination of fair market value, such consideration does not change the fact that the court is
ultimately trying to reach a determination of the fair market value, as that term is legally defined,
of the Leased Land for the 2007 and 201 0 rent adjustment periods. The mere fact that thes~ items
may be considered does not alter or undo the legal meaning of the term "fair market value"
especially since no evidence was presented at trial indicating that any separate or special
meaning was to be given that term as used within this Lease Agreement.
Although Quail Ridge called its appraiser, Brent Thompson, to offer an opinion on the
interpretation of Paragraph 3 of Section 1.3(b), the most that Mr. Thompson testified to in this
regard is:

As far as an increase goes, it apparently is supposed- it says that they are
to take into account any determinations of market value made under this
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lease for the purpose of adjustments for periods preceding the applicable
rent adjustment date. So, as far as this section goes, all I could say is that
it's - a mathematical calculation by the stipulated rent rate, or stipulated
market value.
Ultimately, the most that Mr. Thompson could do is recite a portion of the "taking into account"
language at issue and then baselessly opine that there was to be a "mathematical calculation by the
stipulated rent rate, or stipulated market value." Although, Mr. Thompson suggests that there is
to be a "mathematical calculation," he notably never testified what this "mathematical calculation"
was to be. As a result, Mr. Thompson's trial testimony gives the court absolutely no assistance in
understanding what to do with the ambiguous "taking into account" language. There was simply
no testimony offered at trial by either Mr. Thompson or any other witness of any stipulated rental
rate or stipulated market value ever being reached between the parties to this Lease Agreement.
Indeed, under Paragraph 2 of Section 1.3(b), the only way any such stipulation could be conclusive
evidence of the fair market value of the lease land for a rent adjustment period is if such agreement
was in writing. There was no such evidence presented at trial and, as a result, Mr. Thompson's
testimony in this regard is of no substantive value to this court in interpreting the rent adjustment
provisions of this ground lease.
The better approach for this court to follow is to recognize that it is unclear from the
evidence presented at trial how the original parties to the Lease Agreement wanted the court to
"take into account" any previous fair market value determinations for purposes of rent adjustment.
The court should find, however, that this "taking into account" language cannot be interpreted in a
way that would diminish the ultimate requirement for the court to determine the "fair market
value" of the Leased Land, exclusive of improvements and at its highest and best use because such
an interpretation would lead to an impermissible contradiction within this lease, or worse, an
absurdity.
This court should find that there are ways for the court to interpret this "taking into
account" language that would not contradict the court's ultimate responsibility of finding the "fair
market value" of the Leased Land. For example, the third sentence in Paragraph 3 of Section
1.3(b) may simply mean that the court is to consider any prior determination of fair market value
(i.e. either those made by the parties in writing or those made by an earlier arbitrator or court) as a
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starting point for determining the current fair market value of the Leased Land. Or, this sentence
can be reasonably be construed as a direction to the court or arbitrator to use the previous
determination(s) of fair market value as a floor below which the current fair market value cannot
fall. This latter interpretation is certainly consistent with the first clause of the third sentence of
Paragraph 3 of Section 1.3(b), which states that the determination of fair market value " ... shall

take into account the parties ' agreement that the initial minimum rent is the above ·stated
percentage applied to a {Qir market value of Fifteen Thousand and No/100 Dollars
($15,000.00) .... " (Emphasis added).

Because the court is to consider this initial rent as a

"minimum rent" it should recognize that the earlier determination of fair market value became a
floor below which the current determination of fair market value cannot drop.
How the original parties to the lease decided that $15,000 per acre was the 1983 fair market
value of the Leased Land is irrelevant to the court's duty to find fair market value of the land for
the 2007 and 201 0 rent adjustment period. The important point to be taken from parties' 1983
agreement on market value is that they, as lessee and lessor, dealing at arm's length, agreed upon a
value. In other words whatever approach the parties would have taken in 1983 to decide on that
value would have been perfectly consistent with the legal definition of fair market value as "the
price that a seller (or in this matter the lessor) is willing to accept and a buyer (or in this case the
lessee) is willing to pay on the open market in an arm's length transaction."

(Black Law

Dictionary, Infra.) From IHC's perspective the $15,000 per acre value was certainly consistent
with what it thought the property was worth in 1983.

Chris Anton, the IHC Hospital

Administrator in 1983, was the only witness presented at trial who was present when this lease was
entered into in 1983. Mr. Anton testified to the following concerning the initial agreed to amount
of $15,000.00 per acre:

2
3
4
5
6
7

8

A. Well, I think we had-- the hospital was
relatively new -- like a year old or so -- something in
that neighborhood. So at that time we would have had a
pretty good idea of what the land value was or the cost
involved in that land.
Again, I would assume that the percentage
equated to a value that seemed reasonable.

See Anton Deposition at 12:2.
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After considering the third sentence of Section 1.3(b) in light of this language and that the
two parties to the Lease Agreement ultimately agreed that $15,000 per acre was fair market value
of the Leased Land, this court is able to conclude that the original value was the fair market value
of the Leased Land as that term is traditionally and legally defined. Therefore, the rental rate for
the 2007 and 201 0 rent adjustment periods should also be based upon the fair market value of the
leased land as that term is traditionally and legally defined.
The court may also simply find that by determining the fair market value of the leased land
in 2007 or in 201 0 is higher than the land's 1983 fair market value, it has considered taking into
account that 1983 value.

That is, the court will have determined that the "minimum rent"

requirement of the taking into account language has been satisfied. Additionally, since there was
no evidence presented to the court of any written agreement ever being reached between the parties
on the fair market value for any previous rent adjustment period after 1983, there is nothing else
for the court to take into account or consider. In other words without any written agreement, there
is nothing for this court to consider (or, "take into account") with respect to the second clause of
the third sentence of Paragraph 3 of Section 1.3(b).
After considering (that is, taking into account) the 1983 value and finding that there has
been no other subsequent determination of fair market value, this court should conclude t}:lat the
Lease Agreement ultimately requires the court to find the "fair market value" of the leased land as
that term is traditionally used and legally defined.

Interpreting Section 1.3(b) of the Lease

Agreement in this manner avoids any contradictions within the contract and also avoids the court
reaching an absurd result. The court should then find that the only evidence that was presented to
the court at trial on the fair market value of the Leased Land as that term is traditionally used and
legally defined, is the trial testimony ofPMC's expert witness, Brad Janoush. It was established
at trial that Mr. J anoush is a qualified, independent appraiser and that he performed a fair market
analysis of the Leased Land for the 2007 and 2010 rent adjustment periods. It was further
established at trial that Mr. Janoush's appraisals did not take into account the improvements on the
Leased Land and his fair market value appraisal was based upon the highest and best use of the
Leased Land, as required by Paragraph 3 of Section 1.3(b).
Ultimately, Mr. Janoush testified that the fair market value of the Leased Land, exclusive
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of improvements, and considering the highest and best used of the land, was $1,080.00 on January
27, 2007 and was $990,000.00 on January 27,2010. Because Mr. Janoush was competent t? offer
this testimony and because this is the only evidence this court has of fair market value of the
Leased Land for these respective rent adjustment periods, these are the numbers the court should
use in calculating the adjusted rent for the 2007 and 2010 rent adjustment periods.
Applying Mr. Janoush's testimony to the undisputed facts of this case, Quail Ridge should
have paid a total of$486,000.00 in annual rents for the 2007 adjustment period, which includes the
years 2007, 2008, and 2009. Instead, Quail Ridge paid a total of $28,687.50 in annual rents for
the 2007 rent adjustment period. Therefore, Quail Ridge is obligated to pay PMC the sum of
$457,312.50 for unpaid adjusted annual rents for the 2007 rent adjustment-period.
Similarly, Quail Ridge should have paid a total of $445,500.00 in annual rents for the 2010
rent adjustment period, which includes the years 2010, 2011, and 2012. Instead, Quail Ridge paid
a total of$28,687.00.50 in annual rents during the 2010 rentadjustment period. Therefore, Quail
Ridge is obligated to pay PMC the sum of$416,812.50 for unpaid adjustedrents for the 2010 rent
adjustment period.
Finally, under Paragraph 4 of Section 1.3(b), Quail Ridge is obligated to promptly pay the
above-identified differences for the 2007 and 2010 rent adjustment periods once the Court declares
the fair market value of the Leased Land for these respective rent adjustment periods.

II.

Quail Ridge Has Failed to Establish Its Affirmative Defenses:

Although Quail Ridge pled nine affirmative defenses to PMC's Amended Complaint,
Quail Ridge made clear in its opening argument on the first day of trial that it was only pursuing
three affirmative defenses at trial: (1) laches; (2) waiver; and (3) modification through course of
conduct. Quail Ridge bore the burden of proof on these affirmative defenses and ultimately failed
to offer evidence at trial sufficient to establish these defenses.
In order to prevail on its defense of laches, Quail Ridge had to present evidence in support
of the following four elements:

(1) defendant's invasion of plaintiffs rights; (2) delay in

asserting plaintiffs rights, the plaintiff having had notice and an opportunity to institute a suit; (3)
lack of knowledge by the defendant that plaintiff would assert his rights; and (4) injury or
prejudice to the defendant in the event relief is accorded to plaintiff or the suit is not held to be
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barred.

Thomas v. Arkoosh Produce, Inc., 137 Idaho 352, 359, 48 P.3d 1241, 1248 (2002)

(citations omitted).
Importantly, under Idaho law, a lapse of time alone is not controlling on whether laches
applies. !d. Yet, a review of Quail Ridge's counsel's opening arguments at trial demonstrates
that the only thing Quail Ridge is relying on in support of its defense oflaches is the lapse of time
on which rent had not been adjusted.
Quail Ridge certainly had the opportunity at trial to put on its case and establish the other
elements of this defense and it failed to do so. For instance, there was no evidence presented at
trial that Quail Ridge or its predecessors in interest had ever invaded the rights of PMC or its
predecessors in interest. Instead, the evidence at trial established that this ground lease has never
been breached because no determination of fair market value for any rent adjustment period has
ever been made as allowed under Paragraph 2 of Section 1.3(b). Because no determinations of
fair market value have been made, Quail Ridge and its predecessors were within their rights to
continue to pay an annual amount of $9,562.50 until an adjusted rental rate was or is estabFshed.
Additionally, PMC and its predecessors in interest were obligated to accept payment in that
amount until an adjusted rental rate was or is established. The mere fact that these payments
continued unaltered does not establish laches because, for the reasons stated immediately above,
there was no breach of contract (or, in other words, an invasion of the Plaintiffs rights) by
continuing to make payments in this amount until a determination of fair market value is made by
an arbitrator or court for a respective rent adjustment period.
Similarly, Quail Ridge failed to offer proof at trial in support of its affirmative defense of
waiver. Under Idaho law, waiver is a voluntary relinquishment of a known right and may be
evidenced by conduct, by words, or by acquiescence. IDJI 6.24.1. The party asserting the
waiver must show that he has acted in reliance upon the waiver and reasonably altered his position
to his detriment. Dennett v. Kuenzli, 131 Idaho 21, 936 P .2d 219 (1997) (citations omitted)
(emphasis added).

In fact, "waiver is foremost a question of intent." Knipe Land Co. v.

Robertson, 259 P.3d 595, 603 (2011) citing Seaport Citizens Bank v. Dippel, 112 Idaho 736, 739,
735 P.2d 1047, 1050 (Ct.App.1987). "A clear intention to waive must be shown before waiver
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shall be established." Knipe Land Co. citing Margaret H. Wayne Trust v. Lipsky, 123 Idaho 253,
256, 846 P.2d 904, 907 (1993) (emphasis added).
In this case, Quail Ridge offered no evidence that PMC or its predecessors in interest ever
intentionally or knowingly waived their rights to adjust rent under Section 1.3(b) of the Lease
Agreement. Quail Ridge bears the burden of proof to demonstrate that PMC or its predecessors in
interest had a clear intention to waive their rights. As with laches, the only thing that Quail Ridge
points to in support of its defense of waiver is the fact that rent had never been adjusted from 1983
until PMC sought to adjust rent sometime in 2009. As was· outlined in the first section of this
closing argument, while this Lease Agreement certainly allowed the parties to adjust the rent every
three years, it did not require that the rent be adjusted. Indeed, various language earlier cited in
Section 1.3(b) of this ground lease demonstrates that the original parties to the lease contemplated
and recognized the fact that rent may not be adjusted at the rent adjustment dates for any variety of
reasons. As such, the original parties to this lease set-up a mechanism whereby the fair market
value of the leased land could be determined after the fact and applied to a preceding rent
adjustment period.
Because this lease contemplates that rent may not be adjusted by the parties, the mere fact
alone that the rent was never adjusted does not constitute a waiver of the lessor's rights to adjust
rent under Section 1.3(b) of the ground lease. Quail Ridge has pointed to no other evidence
demonstrating that PMC or its predecessors intentionally or knowingly waived their right to adjust
rent.
Indeed, the evidence presented at trial establishes quite the opposite. For instance, the
1996 Landlord's Consent and Estoppel Certificate stated that the rent adjustment clause was still in
effect. Furthermore, the 2001 Estoppel Certificate clearly and unambiguously states that the
terms of the Lease Agreement remain in full force and effect. There can be no doubt from these
certificates that the lessor, IHC, was not waiving its right to adjust rent under the provisions of
Section 1.3(b) of the Lease Agreement. Therefore, even if Quail Ridge or its predecessors argue
that they believed that the lessor had waived its right to adjust rent under section 1.3(b) of the lease
and altered its position based upon this belief, this court should find that it was not "reasonable" for
Quail Ridge to alter its position when the plain language ofthe above-cited documents reveals that
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all of the terms of the 1983 Ground Lease remained in full force and effect at the time these
estoppel certificates were issued.
Finally, Quail Ridge failed at trial to offer proof in support of its affirmative defense of
modification by course of performance. Modification is essentially a contract in itself, requiring
offer, acceptance, and consideration.

See, e.g., Scwinder v. Austin Bank of Chicago, 348

Ill.App.3d 461, 809 N.E.2d 180, 188 (1st Dist. 2004).

Further, modification by conduct or

otherwise requires a meeting of the minds. Ore-Ida Potato· Products, Inc. v. Larsen, 83 Idaho
290,296,362 P.2d 384, 387 (1961). Conduct is merely evidence of the meeting ofthe minds, as
opposed to explicit consent. /d.
In this case, modification by course of conduct as raised by Quail Ridge violates the Statute
of Frauds as outlined in Idaho Code§ 9-505. This statute requires that contracts for the lease of
real property for than one year must be in writing. This same rule applies to any new contract or
contract modification for the lease of real property for more than one year. Furthermore, the
doctrine of partial performance does not apply to a contract subject to the statute of frauds if the
contract cannot be performed within one year. Treasure Valley Gastroenterology Specialties,
P.A. v. Woods, 135 Idaho 485,489,20 P.3d 21,25 (2001) (citation omitted).
Regardless, Quail Ridge has failed to establish modification by course of conduct in this
case because it presented no evidence that there was ever a meeting of the minds on any proposed
modification of the rent adjustment provisions of the 1983 Ground Lease Agreement. Although
Quail Ridge's corporate representative, Richard Faulkner, testified that he believed that the 2001
Estoppel Certificate modified the rent adjustment provisions of the 1983 Ground Lease, this court
need only look at the deposition testimony ofiHC's legal counsel at the time of the 2001 Estoppel
Certificate, Guy Kroesche, to easily see that there was never a meeting of the minds for any
proposed modification of the rent adjustment provisions in the 2001 Estoppel Certificate. Mr.
Kroesche's deposition testimony was admitted at the end of trial. Mr. Kroesche plainly testifies
that he knows that the 2001 Estoppel Certificate did not modify any provisions of the 1983 Ground
Lease Agreement because he would have never agreed to include a contract modification in an
estoppel certificate. Mr. Kroesche further testified that if there had been an agreement to modify
the 1983 Ground Lease, any such modifications would have been in a separate document and
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would have been clearly identified as a modification. Finally, Mr. Kroesche testified that he had
never been directed by any representative of IHC to modify the rent adjustment provisions of the
1983 Ground Lease.
Similarly, Tracy Farnsworth, who was the CEO of the Pocatello Hospital from March of
2000 to October of 2002, testified that as the senior officer of the hospital he would have been
made aware of any modifications of the 1983 Ground Lease and that he had no knowledge or
memory of any of the terms of that lease agreement being modified during his tenure at the
hospital.
Based upon the foregoing evidence, it is clear that there was never a meeting of the minds
between the parties for any alleged modification of the rent adjustment provisions of the 1983
Ground Lease. Because there was no meeting of the mirids, there could be no modification by
course of conduct.

Indeed, the most that can be assumed from the totality of the evidence

presented at trial is that Quail Ridge attempted to slip a contract modification into the 2001
Estoppel Certificate by leaving out certain language in Paragraph 5 of that agreement without
making IHC aware of its intentions to modify the ground ·lease by this estoppel certificate. Not
only does this attempted modification fail because there was never a meeting of the minds nor
consideration given for this alleged modification, such attempted modification fails because the
plain language of the 2001 Estoppel Certificate demonstrates that the 1983 Ground Lease
remained in full force and effect. In signing the estoppel certificate IHC did not waive or alter any
of its rights under the Lease Agreement. This court has previously held that the 2001 estoppel
certificate is clear and unambiguous and that it does not modify the rent adjustment provisions of
the 1983 Ground Lease.
Ultimately, Quail Ridge failed to establish any of its affirmative defenses at trial. As a
result, this Court should provide PMC the declaratory judgment sought in this action.
DATED this

day of June, 2012.
Submitted by:
MERRILL & MERRILL, CHTD.
By

.%Y:l..~
Kent L. Hawkins
Attorneys for Plaintiff, PMC
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, Kent L. Hawkins, the undersigned, one of the attorneys for the Plaintiff, in the
above-referenced matter, do hereby certify that a true, full and correct copy of the foregoing
document was this ~ 7

day of June, 2012, served upon the following in the manner indicated

below:
Michael D. Gaffney
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY PA
2105 Coronado Street
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404

LJ U.S. Mail
LJ Hand Delivery
LJ Overnight Mail

Judge Mitchell Brown
159 S. Main
Soda Springs, ID 83276
(Chambers Copy)

~U.S.

~

Facsimile 529-9732

Mail
[_j Hand Delivery
[_j Overnight Delivery
[_j Telefax 547-2147

Kent L. Hawkins

Plaintifrs Closing Argument

Page 18

rage;

Michael D. Gatmey, ISB No. 3558
BEARD ST. CLAJR GAFFNEY Pi\
2:105 Coronado Street
Idaho hillS. ldabo 83404
Tdt.-phone: (208) 523-5111
Facsimile: (208) 529-9732
Email: gaifney@~lair.com
Attorney tor .Defendants

DISTRICT COURT SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
BANNOCK COUNTY IDAHO
POCATELLO I lOSPIT AL. LLC d/bla
P'ORTNElJF MEDICAL CEJ'I.'TERS, I .LC,

Case No.: CV- Hl·27Z4 OC

Plaintiff,
DEFENDANT'S CLOSING
ARGUMENTS

QVAJL RIDGE MEDICAL tNVESTOR.1.i,
LLC and CENTIJRY PARK
ASSOCIATES, lLC,

Ck•sing ArgumeniS for consideration by the Court.

modified the 1983 Ground Lease Agreement in 2001.

ThOUGh the plaintiff' (hereafter
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2001 transaction involved many changes to the parties' relationship and busine&'>
dealings. One chan@e in particular involved a personal guarmttee by forrest Preston.
Quail Ridge's principal and o\liner. Such a personal guarantee had never existed before
and was a new item added during 2001. (n addition, the 2001l:r!m:S3.ctionjolned
P'<Jeatdlo Medical investors Limited Pru'tneti>hip, the subtenant, as a plllty to the Ground
lease and added a cross-detault between dre sublease and tbe CJI'Oimd Lease. Each of
these material modifications were made by the imor. Rich faulkner testified that one of

the primary pu~ of the 200! Landlord Consent and Esroppel Certificate wu to
tighten down the amount of rent to be paid in order to justifY tbe personal guarantee and
to m<."tnorialize the parties' coUTSe of conduct since the start of the 1983 Ground lease.
Clearly. the parties intended to modi!}:. and did modify. the Ground l.ea.<re 112 a part of the
200 l restructure l:f'llnS.aCtioo.

111e second issue that PRMC has to deal with. and it cannot effectively do so, is
the significant and prejudicial passage of ti.me. 'The equitable defense of laches is ve:ry

applicable iu this situation because there bad never previ<n.l!lly been any indication that
!.he rent would e\rer be adjusted. The parties had over twenty years of course of dealing
behind them before PJU\<fC decided that it should attempt to raise the rent. Though the
passage of time is. not dispositive in the Jachel\ defense. it is one 1.lf tile prom.im.>nt

elcrru:nts.
Third, the Court ha.<J to consider whether PRMC a.ffumati•tely waived the rent
adjustnwnt provision in 200L 'The evidence establishes that PRMC affirmatively entered

into the 2001 transaction and requested several changes in the term.~ of the parties'
arr.mgement. The cllangc to ParagraphS oftbe lOOt cslt.)flpel certificate from the 1996
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estoppel certificate were evident from th-e start. Guy Krocsche. the anomey for n IC.
PRMC's predecessor in interest, saw the change, knew about the change. and men IHC

executed and fonnatly delivered the 200 l estoppel certificate with a clear change to
Parag.raph S.

Alternatively, the CtJurt should consider the evidence of an impiioo in fact
agreement every ~.btu y(,"3fS since commer~ee.ment of the 1983 Ground Lease that the rent
would remain the same. Such an agreement is evidenced by the patties' course of
conduct Thus. any adjustment to the rent woufd t.lnly be allowed for 2010 since there
was no evidence of any ch<Ulge in land ..·aJues fn.1m 2004 to 2007. The rent should just
!ita)'

the same fOt' the 2007 period. The 20 l 0 adjustmmt. however, should take into

account the facl tbat land va!lle:S decreased from 2007. This would lead to an adjustment
in the rent l~s than the $9,562.50.

I.

Modifil'!ation
Quail Ridge asserts modification a~ a conclusive defense to PRMC's claim. Quai!

Ridge has previously briefed the modification l.i'k.'Ory for the Court; however, now that the
record hus been fully developed. the Court !>hould find dun the 191B Ground ~
Agreement had been modit1ed. The dereme is based on the 2001 Sale and Assumption
Agreement and Assignmcmt of Liability, b; v.1Uch me consented in 200 I. In the 200 I
Sale and Asswnptioo Agreement and Assignme:nt ot' Liability, Sterling J.kvelopmcnt

Group expressly rcvreserm:d the rent to he $9,562.50, and IHC expressly consented to
this agreement. Moreover, IHC signed the 2001 Landlord Consent and f::Stoppel
Certitic.ate consenting to the terms of the 2001 restructuring. and Paragraph 5 ofthe 2001

Landlord Consent and Estoppel Certificate clearly sets forth tbe rent under tbe Ground
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LetL.;e as being $9,562.50. The Consent and Estoppel C.ertificate c1.nuains similar

represc::ntations that l'1n.: unambiguot.1s as to the amount of rent due from the tcnmt to the
landlord.

The evidence supporting the modification detense is undisputed in the record,

There was a long course of dealing by the parties to ncv<rr aft1rmadve•y meet and a4just
the rent. In fact, Earl Christison testified that it was a conscious decision by the hospital
to not adjust the rent while lie worked for IHC. Thus, for well over t\\renty )'CllrS the
parties acted as if the rent was to remain at $9,562.50.
The evidence shows that in 2001 !HC consented to the resti'UI:tun: of the subl~
arrangement. The entire ~of the 2001 restrU(;ture was to facilitate Quail Ridge's
involn~ment and

buy out Sterling Development group. However, the lessor astcd for

changes to sublease and the changes v;ere made. The existing agreements were rewritten,

ll.Ccording to K.rocsche, and tHC rt."quested that Forrest Preston personally gwmmtee the
rent payments. This \\1\S a new condition imposed by me on Quail Ridge given in
oonsidemtion of altering and revising the existing agreem~:nts. llo"'-ever, as Rich
Faulkner testified if Mr. Pn.'!lton "'a~ going to personally guaranrtee the rent then
everyone n«'ldcd to agree on what the rent ·would be. Conscqucndy, the adjusttnenl
language was removed from the 200 I estoppel certificate and the Sale and Asslllliption
Agreement and Agreement for Substi1ution. of f.iabili~y. Quail Ridge then relied on the

ta<t that the rent had been ··pinned Jow1f' by paying oft' miUions of dollars in liability on
the I'ERSIIoan and also invesring more than t>ne rniiHon dollars in renovating the

facility. fhi.s wouid nor have been done except the parties had moditied the rent
adjustment provision.
Detlmdants· Closing Arguments
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The bottom line is that the parties modi.ficd the deal. The course of d~ing is
strong e\·idencc of modification~ The 200 l

~icn

is evidence of rnoditi~. The

panies• conduct after th(! 2001 transaction only~ the argument 1hat the 2.001
tra.n~'ticn

II.

modified the rent adjustment provision.

Laebes
The Court should not allow PRMC to adjust the rent based oo its equitable powers

and the afi~tive defense of laches. There is no question that a '')~ of rime" C!<.i:sts in

this case from when the right to adjust the rent came into e1<istence and til¢ bospltat tiM
attempted to assert that right There is over twenty years of oourse of dealings where the
parties nc'lter affirmatively tnet and adjusted the rent. Quail Ridge reasonabl)' attempted
to pin 00\\<'11 the amoiUit c>f rent m"'ed un.der the J983 Ground Lease Agreement in 200 l.
Quail Ridge relied on the elimination of the adjustment provision to (a) pay off the

mortgage fmancing on the building and (b) invest OV\.'f a million dollars in renovating the
Quail Ridge facility. PRMC' s attempt to now as..'li«t the right to adjust the rent is
extremely prejudicial to Quail RidgcL There is a personal guarantee that never would

have bc."en provided had the rent adjustment provision remained in the parties' asreemcnt.
Further, Quail Rid~e never wouid have invested the substantial resources that it did if the

rent could still be adjusted.
The 1enns of the Gtt.mnd Lease entered in 1983 gave the lessor the right to invoke
the rent adjustment provisions of Section 1.3(b). \'lilich it \\'88 estopped from doing under
the terms of the 2001 Estoppel Certificate. This is sufficient to satisfy MY reqmrement

that the ddbndant invade the plaintiffs right~~;.
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All of the elements of laches exist in this case. PRMC and its ~sors
allowed a signitlcant lapse of time to ()C(:Uf before attempting to assert a right to adjust
the rent. Quail Ridge: has reasonably relied on PRMC and its pred«essoffl' wltm: to

ad.iw.1 the rent and actually took~ to affi.nnativcly identity the amount of rent to paid.
It would be ine,quirable for the Court to allow l,RMC to a.djw.t the rent under the 1983
Ground Lease Agreement, Tb: Court should bar PRMC's claim ba5ed on laches.

IU.

Waiver
The evidence of waiver is quite simpte based on the ctitirc re\:ord developed at

trial. There can be no question that PRMC Md its pred~ \\lliYed the right to adjust
!he rent by. at a minimum. acquiescing to the rent remaining at $9.562.50. This is course
of condoct. h is an undisputed fact mat the n:nt was nev«..-r adjusted from 190 until the
request by PRMC directly leading to tbjs suit. In fact. on three separate()((:~ the

parties agreed that the rent was fi"ed at $9,562.50, The parties knowingly and
voluntarily agreed to~ agreements that the rent would be a fe<ed mte, without a
subsequent adjustment
Waiver can also be sh<>wn by acqcie~ence. And :it is cica.r that at the ''eTY least

PRMC and it<> pn,'tk.~essors acquiesced to the rent not being adjusted lor tlver twenty
years since tbe creation of the 1983 Ground Lease Agreement Such conduct constitutes a
waiver as a matter of law.

IV.

PRMC did not meet its burdea at triaL
PR.\1C failed to meet its burden during triaL PRMC never presented any

evidence that addressed how the Court should adjw.'t the rent. PRMC's only att.."mpt at
meeting its burden was the testimony of Brad Janoush, an appmill4."1', wtlo by bis own
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admission never reviewed the 1983 Orouoo lease Asreement Janoush, of necessity,

iadu:d the requisite foundation to offer any te$timony that could be of assistance t(l the
Court in adjusting the rent based on the cm1tract language. Instead, PRMC would
interlincate a textbook definition of fair market value into the 1983 Ground tease
Agreement and excise the ..taking into account" verbiage. 11tis is obviously

irmppropriate.

that ignores the Ground tease requirements to take inro account (a} prior agreements

way dmt the Court should rely on PRMC•s approach as it pertains to construing the

remotely assists the Court in construing the language or in applying tlu:tllild evidence of

value under the terms of lhe Ground (.ease.
V.

AJternatwely, if the Court ia indiaed to adjut the ftai it mut be deae buft
on tlte origiaat. value and the mcnmeatat ehaap in valae trom Dt1 to 2010.

facts of this case, PRMC should nat be awarded the full !«:ope of reiief' that it is asking

ftw in this case. The 1983 Ground f..ease Agreement uses the variations of the t<.'t'ln
"a<ijust" in :>cctiun 1.3(b). At no point in time does the wotd ''incre.ll!ie" appear in tha:t
section. 'The rent is to be adjusted by (a) taking into account prior adjustments and (b)
that the initial rent was applied to a market value of$15,000.00 per acre. Since the Court
is being asked to con:strue and dcchve rights arising under the oontracL the C;0urt should

100.51.87 :3080/pub/up.cgi?cmd=uinBoxEJ159&Rec=r00000f93&nrint= 1
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for it
'The word ''adjust" is defined as "to settle or ammge; to tree from differences or
discrepancies; to bring to satist'aetory state so that parties are agreed. as to adjust amount
ofloss by fire."

Bt.i\CI<:"S LAW DICTIONARY

64 (4th Ed. 1968}. 1 The tlnm'S defmition

discrepancies must be resolved.
Quail Ridg:e submits that I)RMC"s adjustment ofthe rent is flawed and lhat the

adjusted rent has been miscalculated by PRMC. PAA1C wants to just run f~ and usc
current values without taking into acrount the parties· COUI'SJC of dealing,<> and the initial

period. The value that has been used by all parties si nee the inception of the 1983

Ground L~ has been $15,000.00/acre. PRMC would ignore that past course of
colldw:t and simply use a c!U't"ent apprai~ value for decided bow the rent should be

deafly contemplates that the rent liihoWd not be adju~ted In a vacuum and with abject
disregard to the provisions of st."\:tlon 1.3(b}. Although the Court admitted Brad
Janou.<dt' s tl;:Stimuny. it should now find that Jruwush' s logic: is fatally and give it no

probative value. He never reviewed the 1983 Ground Lease Agreement and never

' There illfil! Qtber rofmmces in dtl:' deffnleioo. of"l)dj!tit" but thil.t i5 ~raity lht' Willy that !be IJil:m i5 used
ihrougb aH ather aspects of the <kfinitioo. They are simp!)' dit'f'm:nt appficuaiorn!; of !he prime OOflnitioo.
Oef~rnianu.'
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vacuum. This is simply not btlpful to the resolution of this case given the oontmctual
language at issue.
Quaii Ridge submits that the parties' course of dealing wammts a finding that
there was an implled in fact contract betw-een the parties for the entire dumtron of the
1983 Ground Lease Aareement that the market value continued to be S I 5,000.00/acre.
The Court should take that into account when adjusting the rent This bears directly on
the equities and fairness of PR.MC ~ request to iDCn."<''Se the rent in such a dramatic
fashion tor .2007 and 2010. PRMC simply advocates for the Court to t:rea.le a new
contract and not apply tbe actuallanguqe in I.J(b}. The Coort should reject PRMCs

position in that regard as being meritless.
Quail Ridge's position is simply that if the rent is to be adju.<~ted then it should be
the incremental change in land values for tbe adjustment period11 at issue in this case. No
party submitted evidence about how market val~ of land changed from the adjustment

period prior to 2007. PRMC ~ted evidence of land \tW'I.IeS in 2{)07 but there was no
evidence of how the 2007 value differed from 2004. 'fbere is no evidentiary basis for the
Court to make any informed adjustment to the rent to be paid during the 2007 adjU$tmellt
period. Quail Ridge submits that in the absence of such infonn"tion the Court should

main•ain the rent a.t the level that if had been prior fl.) 2007: $9.562.5\i per <mnum.
for 2{}1 o. the issue i:1; different because botb J~BKtush and Brent Thompson
ccstitied that there was a decrease in land vul ues from 2007 to 20 Ht The de~rense in land
values was -8.33%. If the Court is to adjust the K"'lt, tuk:ing all factors id~dfied in
section l.J(bl into account. then should adj!JS't the rent based on the -8.33% decrease in
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the market value of land in Pocatello. This results in a reduction of the rent to be paid
under the 1983 Ground Lease A~t and would entitle Quail Ridge to a refund.

mandates that the prior value be raken into consideration. Adopting PRMC's approach of

u.,-.ing the objective market value tbr tbe property. i.e., the Janou~d1 value of$990,000,
ignores the prior agreement of the parties. It docs not lake that agreement into account.

periods was $15 ,000.00/a<:re. Thus, when adjusting the rent. the only way t!mt the Court

resulting in a reduction of the rem.
For all ofthe foregoing reasons, this Court should find that PRMC's remaining
claim faits and should declare the Ground L~ rent fixed at $9,562,50. Alternatively, if

DATED: July 11, 2012

I D.Gaffuey

St. Clair Gaffney PA
Attorneys for the Defendant
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i certify I run a Ik.'et'L<Ied attorney in the state of Idaho and on July I i . 2012. I

served a true and correct copy of the DEFENDANTS" CLO..~ING ARGUMENTS on !he
following by the method of delivery designated below:
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Dave R. Oalhdcnt
R. William Hancock
Merrill & Merrill
PO BtlX 991
Pocatello, lD 83204·0991
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U.S. Mail

0
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~
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Bannock County Courthouse
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0

U.S. Mall
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Honorable Mitchell Brown
Carib;)U Cmmty Courthouse
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE-STATE
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK

POCATELLO HOSPITAL, LLC

)
)

)
PLAINTIFF,
VS

Case No: CV-2010-0002724-0C

)
)

)
)
QUAIL RIDGE MEDICAL INVESTORS, LLC )
)
CENTURY PARK ASSOCIATES, LLC
)
DEFENDANT
)

MINUTE ENTRY AND ORDER

_______________________________ )
The Court's post trial briefing order set out in the Court's Minute Entry and Order dated
5-15-12 having been complied with, the Court now takes this matter under advisement.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: July 20,2012.

District Judge

MINUTE ENTRY AND ORDER- I

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING/SERVICE
The undersigned certifies that on

th~ay of July, 2012, she caused a true and correct

copy of the foregoing Minute Entry and Order to be served upon the following persons in the
following manner:
PLAINTIFF ATTORNEY:
Kent L. Hawkins
P.O. Box 991
Pocatello, Idaho 83204-0991
DEFENDANT ATTORNEY:
Michael D. Gaffney
21 05 Coronado State
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRI2f!/
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BA~
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******
)

POCATELLO HOSPITAL, LLC, dba
)
PORTNEUF MEDICAL CENTERS, LLC, )
) Case No.
Plaintiff,
)

CV -201 0-0002724-0C

)

vs.

)
) FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS
QUAIL RIDGE MEDICAL INVESTORS, )
OF LAW AND MEMORANDUM
LLC and CENTURY PARK
)
DECISION AND ORDER
ASSOCIATES,
)
)

Defendants.

)
)

This action came before the Court for a two (2) day court trial commencing on May 14
and continuing through May 15, 2012. The Plaintiff, Pocatello Hospital, LLC d/b/a Portneuf
Medical Center, LLC (PMC) was represented at trial by counsel, Kent L. Hawkins and R.
William Hancock. Defendants, Quail Ridge Medical Investors, LLC (Quail Ridge) and Century
Park Associates, LLC (Century Park) were represented by Michael D. Gaffney and John M.
Avondet. At the conclusion of trial, the Court set forth a post-trial briefmg schedule. The parties
agreed to share the cost associated with the preparation of a transcript of the trial in advance of posttrial briefing. See Minute Entry and Order entered on May 17, 2012. The Court entered an order
regarding remitting payment to the Court Reporter and preparation of the transcript of the trial. See
Order entered on June 5, 2012. The parties were instructed to submit post-trial arguments along
with their proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. There were four (4) depositions which
were submitted to the Court for its review as part of the trial record. Pursuant to stipulation of the
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parties, the Court allowed the parties to submit their respective objections to the deposition
testimony and corresponding exhibits in separate post-trial submissions. The Court will rule on
these objections as part of its Findings of Fact, Conclusions ofLaw and Memorandum Decision and
Order. 1
The parties submitted the requested post-trial filings in accordance with the Court's order
and the Court took this matter under advisement. The Court now enters its Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and Memorandum Decision and Order pursuant to Rule 52(a) of the Idaho
Rules of Civil Procedure.
SUMMARY OF CASE

This litigation involves a Ground Lease Agreement (Lease Agreement) entered into
between Intermountain Health Care, Inc. (IHC) and Sterling Development Co. (Sterling). 2 The
parties' lease agreement was reduced to writing and entered into by the parties on January 27,
1983. Although this is a lengthy and detailed agreement, the parties' dispute revolves around
Article I of the Lease Agreement and the provisions concerning how, if at all, rent will be
adjusted going forward.
PMC originally filed its Verified Complaint asserting that Quail Ridge was in breach of
contract with respect to the parties' Lease Agreement. At the summary judgment stage of this
proceeding, PMC requested that the Court find, as a matter of law, that Quail Ridge was in
breach of the Lease Agreement due to its failure to cooperate in the rent adjustment

1
The record should reflect that the Court was presented with the sealed original deposition of each of these witnesses: (1) Earl
Leone Christison; (2) Guy P. Kroesche; (3) Everett N. Goodwin; (4) Christian Joseph Anton. The Court has opened and read
these depositions and, to the extent the Court has not sustained an objection interposed by one party or the other, has relied upon
the same in its determination of the issues before the Court. The Court should also note that as the Court commenced reading the
Christison deposition, it inadvertently began marking up this deposition, forgetting that this was the original. The Court
immediately discontinued this practice. However, the markings on the original deposition of Christison at page five (5) are the
Courts.
2
PMC and Quail Ridge are the successors in interest to this Lease Agreement. PMC is the successor in interest to the original
"Lessor" IHC and Quail Ridge is the successor in interest to the original "Lessee" Sterling.

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER- 2

process contemplated by the Lease Agreement. Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's Motion
for Summary Judgment, p. 3. PMC also requested that the Court enter summary judgment in its
favor and declare that Quail Ridge owed PMC back rent for the years 2007 through 2011 in the
amount of $735,187.50 and rent in the sum of $148,500.00 for 2012. Id at p. 5. PMC argued
that this result was justified under the clear and unambiguous language of the parties' Lease
Agreement.

Quail Ridge also filed a counter-motion for summary judgment.

Quail Ridge

argued that the Court should deny PMC's motion for summary judgment and grant summary
judgment on its behalf. Quail Ridge argued that in 2001, "the ability to adjust rent was removed
from the parties' agreement." Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 1. The Court
denied both parties' motions for summary judgment finding that the parties' Lease Agreement
contained ambiguities that would require extrinsic evidence concerning the parties' intent,
specifically as it related to Article I, section 1.3(b) of the Lease Agreement.
Numerous pre-trial motions were filed in anticipation of trial. Two (2) of these are
procedurally significant. The first was PMC's Motion to Amend Complaint and the second was
PMC's Motion to Enforce Jury Waiver Clause in 2001 Landlord Consent and Estoppel
Certificate. PMC's Motion to Amend Complaint was granted without objection by Quail Ridge.
See Defendants' Notice of Non-Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion to Amend Complaint. The

Court likewise granted PMC's Motion to Enforce the Jury Waiver Clause in 2001 Landlord
Consent and Estoppel Certificate. 3
PMC's Amended Complaint sought damages that were not requested in the original
Complaint, based upon an updated appraisal. The Amended Complaint also asserted a claim for

3

Quail Ridge, in its initial Answer, demanded a jury trial as required by Rule 38 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. It also
made a jury demand in its Answer to the Amended Complaint. PMC's Motion to Enforce Jury Waiver was granted by the Court
on grounds different than argued by PMC, but was nonetheless granted and the Court ordered that the trial would proceed to the
Court rather than the jury. The basis for this determination was set forth in detail on the record on May 4, 2012.
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 3

declaratory relief pursuant to I.C. §10-1201 et. seq., specifically PMC sought a declaration of the
parties' rights under Article I, section 1.3(b).
At the conclusion of PMC's case in chief, Century Park made a motion to be dismissed
from these proceedings.

PMC stipulated to this requested dismissal. Therefore, the Court

granted Century Park's motion and dismissed it from this proceeding. Quail Ridge moved to
dismiss PMC's breach of contract count. Again, PMC did not oppose this motion and the Court
granted Quail Ridge's motion dismissing Count I of PMC's Amended Complaint. As such, the
only remaining issue for the Court's determination is PMC's Declaratory Judgment claim against
Quail Ridge.
DEPOSITION TESTIMONY

The Court will first address the deposition testimony and the parties' respective
objections.
1. Deposition Testimony- Earl Leone Christison, III.

Quail Ridge's first witness with respect to its case in chief was Earl Leone Christison, III
(Christison). His testimony was submitted by way of deposition. PMC interposed no objection
to any of the deposition testimony of Christison. See Plaintiff's Objections to Certain Deposition
Testimony Admitted into Evidence (Objections to Deposition Testimony), p. I. Likewise, Quail
Ridge made no objections to any of PMC's cross-examination.

As such, the entirety of

Christison's deposition testimony will be ADMITTED.
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2. Deposition Testimony- Guy P. Kroescbe. 4
PMC submitted the deposition of Guy P. Kroesche (Kroesche) as part of its case
on rebuttal.

PMC submitted the following with regard to Kroesche's testimony: (1)

During Quail Ridge's cross-examination ofKroesche the following question was asked:
Okay. But you would agree that that language could have been easily inserted in
the 200 1 and 2002 estoppel certificates as it had been in the 1996 certificate, right.
Depo. Kroesche, p. 34, LL.ll-14. The propounded question does require a yes or no response.
Further, Kroesche's response is non-responsive. Instead, he explains that typically estoppel
certificates are not identical from transaction to transaction. However, Kroesche fails to respond
to the specific question, that being that certain language could have easily been inserted in the
2001 and 2002 estoppel certificates just as it had been in the 1996 certificate. Quail Ridge
moved to strike this response as non-responsive. Id at p. 35, LL. 10-11. PMC argues Kroesche
was entitled to explain his reasons for not being able to answer "yes" or "no." The Court will
SUSTAIN Quail Ridge's objection and find that Kroesche's answer was non-responsive and will
strike the same. 5
PMC also addresses an objection made by Quail Ridge during PMC's re-direct
examination as being beyond the scope of Quail Ridge's cross-examination. This exchange
centered on the following questions:
First of all, there was a question about whether if there had been a modification
to the 1983 Ground Lease Agreement, would it have been included in the estoppel
certificate. Can you answer that?
4

PMC withdrew any of the objections to questions asked by Quail Ridge during Kroesche's deposition. PMC's Objections to
Deposition Testimony, p. 3. Therefore, the Court will address only those issues raised by PMC in PMC's Objections to
Deposition Testimony.
5
The Court has crossed through that portion ofKroesche's response which has been stricken by the Court. See original Kroesche
deposition at p. 34, LL. I 5-25, p. 35, LL.l-6. The same question is re-asked on p. 37 of Kroesche's deposition when he is asked
"you could have, when you prepared the "01 estoppel certificate and the '02 estoppel certificate, or when you were reviewing
them, inserted language like that found in the 1996 estoppel certificate related to the rent adjustment provision, correct?" The
response was "[y]es, I could have put many different words in this estoppel certificate ... including I could have written that
[referring to the language from the 1996 estoppel certificate] in as well." This response will be ADMITTED over the objections
of counsel as stated in the deposition.
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Kroesche Depo., p. 38, LL.5-8.

The Court will OVERRULE said objection and allow

Kroesche' s answer to stand.
Quail Ridge reasserts all of the objections made during the course of Kroesche's
deposition. The only objection asserted by Quail Ridge that has not been addressed above is its
objection, on the ground that it was leading and lack of foundation, to the following question:
[A ]re you aware that the language referred to as the adjustment language or the
1983 lease agreement was ever modified or adjusted in any way?
Koersche Depo. p. 12, L. 25, p. 13, LL. 1-3. The Court will OVERRULE this objection on
both leading and foundation grounds.
3. Deposition Testimony of Everett N. Goodwin, Jr. 6

PMC submitted the deposition of Everett N. Goodwin, Jr. (Goodwin) as part of its case
on rebuttal. The first disputed question addressed by PMC is as follows:
Were you aware between 1983 and 2003 that Quail Ridge or Sterling were
making payments to the hospital?
Goodwin Depo. p. 14, LL.9-11. Quail Ridge objects on the basis that the question is compound
and Quail Ridge "wasn't even in the picture at this point." The Court will OVERRULE the
objection and allow the answer to stand. Although this is a compound question, the Court, in its
discretion, will allow the same to stand. The answer of Goodwin is not of much evidentiary
value because it is undisputed that a lease agreement was in place and all that Goodwin's
testimony adds to the picture is that he "assumed that lease payments were being made." See
Goodwin Depo. p. 15, LL.5-11. The other basis for the objection is OVERULED as well
because it fails to assert a recognizable objection, i.e. relevance, foundation, speculation etc.

6

PMC withdrew any of the objections to questions asked by Quail Ridge during Goodwin's deposition. PMC's Objections to
Deposition Testimony, p. 4. Therefore, the Court will address only those issues raised by PMC in PMC's Objections to
Deposition Testimony.
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PMC next argues that Quail Ridge's objection to the following question, on leading
grounds, should be overruled because the question is not leading:
[a]t any time did you ever promise or make a representation to a Quail Ridge
representative, or representatives from the Pocatello Medical Investors that you
would waive or limit the rights under the 1983 contract to limit or increase the
rent provision the amount of rent under that agreement?

Goodwin Depo. p. 18, LL.15-21. The Court will OVERULE this objection and allow the
answer to stand. 7 The Court concludes that this question is not leading because it does not
suggest the answer.
Quail Ridge reasserts all of the objections made during the course of Goodwin's
deposition. The only objection asserted by Quail Ridge that has not been addressed above is its
objection, on the ground of lack of foundation, to the following question:
What I want to know is if during the period from 1983 to 2003 you were aware of
this adjustment provision in the 1983 Ground Lease Agreement.
Goodwin Depo., p. 15, LL.l8-21. The Court will OVERRULE this objection. The question
asked if Goodwin was aware of the adjustment provision found in the Lease Agreement. He
answers that he "was not specifically aware of this arrangement." The Court will allow this
answer. Obviously Goodwin lacks foundation to answer any further questions about the so
called "adjustment provision" of the Lease Agreement based upon his admission, but he certainly
can testify to what he testified in response to this question.

7

Goodwin's answer to this question was "no, sir." However, Goodwin then adds this unsolicited response "In fact, in paragraph 5
of that document, the last sentence of that paragraph says, 'Rent has been paid through and including February 28, 1996. Under
Section 1.3(b) of the lease, the rent shall be adjusted on the next rent adjustment date, March I, 1999- 1998."' This response is
non-responsive and will be STRICKEN by the Court. PMC's question was limited in scope to whether Goodwin ever made any
promises or representations to Sterling or Quail Ridge. The question called for a yes or no response. Goodwin's "no, sir"
response will be allowed; the balance is non-responsive and will be struck. The Court has crossed through the stricken portion of
the testimony in the original deposition of Goodwin.
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4.

Deposition Testimony of Christian Joseph Anton.

PMC submitted the deposition of Christian Joseph Anton (Anton) as part of its case on
rebuttal. There were no objections made during the course of this deposition. PMC has not
raised any objections to any of the testimony of Anton as part of its Objections to Deposition
Testimony.
Quail Ridge has raised a number of objections to Anton's deposition testimony. The first
two (2) objections deal with the following exchange:
[Refering to the Lease Agreement Anton is asked] Is that your signature?
A. I see the signature. I don't know if that's my signature.
Q. What is it that makes you question that?
A. It looks different than the way I would be signing things today.
Anton Depo., p. 6, LL.3-8. Counsel for Quail Ridge then asks:
Q. Let me ask this instead, then: Do you recognize this document as something
that you would have seen in 1983?
A. I'm sure I did see it in 1983.
Jd at p. 6, LL.l2-15. It is to this question and answer that Quail Ridge objects, arguing that

there is a lack of foundation for this testimony, that it is speculative and that it assumes facts not
evidence.
In order for the Court to effectively rule on this objection, it must evaluate the next series
of questions. PMC next asks:
Q. Okay. Why are you sure?
A. Well, if I was the Chief Executive Officer at the time, I would have been

involved in the Ground Lease.
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Id at p. 6, LL.16-18. Again, Quail Ridge objects on the basis that the question assumes
facts not in evidence, lack of foundation of the witness to answer, and speculation.
The Court will OVERRULE both objections. The answers are really of no evidentiary
value. Anton responds generally that he is sure that he would have seen the Lease Agreement
and the reason he believes this is that he was the CEO of PMC from 1981 through 1984. Anton
Depo., p. 5, LL.1 0-11.

This is sufficient foundation to take the matter out of the realm of

speculation. Further, the Lease Agreement is in evidence. The balance of Anton's deposition
establishes that he has little or no recollection, surrounding the Lease Agreement or the facts or
circumstances leading to its creation.
Quail Ridge next objects to the following question and answer:
Q. Do you know what involvement he [Gerald Olson] had, if any, in the drafting
of this Agreement?
A. I do not, but he may have drafted the Agreement.
!d. at p. 7, LL.6-8. Quail Ridge objects to this response as being non-responsive. The Court will
OVERRULE as it relates to Anton's response that he does not know what involvement Olson

may have had in drafting the Lease Agreement. The balance of the answer and the objection
based upon non-responsiveness will be SUSTAINED.

The balance of this response is

speculative and apparently beyond Anton's personal knowledge and/or recollection. Therefore,
it will be STRICKEN. 8
Next, Quail Ridge objects to the following exchange on the basis of vagueness, lack of
foundation, and assumes facts not in evidence:
Q. Do you have any recollection of that language in this Agreement at all from
1983?

8

The Court has crossed through the portion of this response that has been stricken in the original deposition on file with the
Court.
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A. I don't recall any of the details of the Agreement. I do recall that we did put
together a land lease with a group to build their psychiatric hospital facility on
that property.
!d. at p. 9, LL.l-6. The Court will OVERRULE this objection. Once again, the subject of the

question, the Lease Agreement, is in evidence. The question is obviously referring to the Lease
Agreement. As stated earlier, the fact that Anton was the CEO of the hospital at the time of the
creation of the Lease Agreement establishes sufficient foundation to allow him to testifY
concerning his recollection of the Lease Agreement. Unfortunately, his recollection is very
limited, but the Court will allow his testimony to stand despite its marginal evidentiary value.
Finally, the last objection asserted by Quail Ridge involves the following exchange:
Q. And I'll keep reading- "The determination shall take into account the parties'
agreement that the initial minimum rent is the above-stated percentage applied to
a fair market value of Fifteen Thousand and No/100 Dollars ($15,000.00) per acre

"
Do you have any information as to that language in the contract?
Again, let me make it clear I'm not asking you to tell us what you think it means
now.
We're looking for information at or near the time of this Agreement or during or
anything during your term as Administrator that would shed light on that
language.
A. Well, I think we had -the hospital was relatively new- like a year old or so something in that neighborhood. So at that time we would have had a pretty good
idea of what the land value was or the cost involved in that land.
Again, I would assume that the percentage equated to a value that seemed
reasonable.
!d. at p. 11, LL. 14-25, p. 12, LL.1-8. Quail Ridge objects to this question on the basis that it is

leading, vague, and that necessary foundation has failed to be established for Anton to testify
regarding this matter, and that it seeks speculative testimony. The Court will OVERRULE
Quail Ridge's objection. Certainly the question is convoluted. However, the Court does not find
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that the call of the question, seeking Anton's understanding as the CEO of what specific
language meant, is suggestive of an answer. It is therefore, overruled on leading grounds. The
Court has previously found that adequate foundation has been laid, establishing Anton's status as
CEO at the time the Lease Agreement was entered and created, to allow him to testify regarding
his recollection of this Lease Agreement and the circumstances surrounding its creation.
Therefore, the objection is overruled on the foundation objection. Finally, the Court overrules on
the speculation basis. Although Anton is being asked to recall matters that occurred nearly thirty
(30) years ago, that will go to weight.

To the extent he remembers the circumstances

surrounding the creation of the Lease Agreement, his testimony will stand.

FINDINGS OF FACT
To the extent that any of the Court's Findings of Fact are deemed to be Conclusions of
Law, they are incorporated in the Court's Conclusions of Law.
(1) PMC is a Delaware Limited Liability Company authorized to do business in the state

ofldaho. PMC's principal place of business is 651 Memorial Drive, Pocatello, Idaho. Amended
Complaint, p. 1, ~1, Answer to Amended Complaint, p. 1, ~1.
(2) Quail Ridge is a Tennessee Limited Liability Company authorized to do business in

the state of Idaho. Quail Ridge's principal place ofbusiness is 3570 Keith Street NW, Cleveland
Tennessee. Amended Complaint, p. 2, ~2, Answer to Amended Complaint, p. 1, ~1.
(3)

Quail Ridge operates an assisted living center located in Pocatello, Idaho.

The

assisted living center is located on a 4.25 acre piece of real property which is currently owned by
PMC.
(4) The building from which the assisted living center is run and operated is owned by
Quail Ridge.

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - II
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(5)

PMC and Quail Ridge are successors in interest to a certain Ground Lease

Agreement (Lease Agreement) entered into on January 27, 1983.
(6) The Lease Agreement was originally entered into between IHC and Sterling whereby
IHC leased 4.25 acres of real property, as Lessor, to Sterling, as Lessee.
(7) PMC is the successor in interest to IHC and Bannock County as it relates to the Lease
Agreement and occupies the role as lessor. Quail Ridge is the successor in interest to Sterling
and occupies the role of lessee.
(8) The Lease Agreement is for a thirty (30) year term of years commencing on February
1, 1983 and concluding on January 31, 2013. However, the Lease Agreement provides for one
( 1) ten ( 10) year option to extend the term of the lease. This option is to be exercised, if at all, by
"giving Lessor written notice ... not later than 120 days prior to the expiration date of the
Term."9 (Lease Agreement, p. 2, §1.2)
(9) The Lease Agreement also provides that rent shall be paid on an annual basis as
follows:
An initial annual rental [sic] shall be calculated on the basis of fifteen percent
(15%) of the value of the leased land. For purposes of the first three (3) years
from the Commencement Date of this Lease, the leased land shall be valued at the
rate of Fifteen Thousand and No/100 Dollars ($15,000.00) per acre. 10
(Lease Agreement, pp. 2-3, § 1.3(a)).
(1 0) The total acreage of leased land was 4.25 acres. Therefore, the annual rent for the

first three (3) years of the Lease Agreement was $9,562.50.

9

The option appears to be personal to Sterling. However, this does not appear to be an issue between the parties, despite the fact
that there was no evidence at trial concerning the personal nature of the option and the option having been exercised, the parties
seem to agree that the option has been exercised, that it is assignable to Quail Ridge, and that the Lease Agreement is and will be
in place through January 31, 2023. This state of affairs seems to be further confirmed by the Landlord Consent and Estoppel
Certificate entered in 2001 where the parties state that the Lease Agreement has been extended through and including January 31,
2023. Therefore, these issues will not be addressed or considered by the Court.
10
The Commencement Date of the Lease Agreement is defined as the I st day of February, 1983, or on or before thirty (30) days
after a building permit is issued whichever is later. See Lease Agreement, p.2, § 1.2. No evidence has been introduced regarding
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$15,000.00
_ _. . :,.:4.=2:: :. . 5(acres)
$63,750.00
x
.15 (percent)
$ 9,562.50
( 11) The Lease Agreement also calls for periodic adjustments to the annual rent amount.
This periodic adjustment is to occur every three (3) years from the Commencement Date of the
Lease Agreement. See footnote 10. Therefore, the first date for adjustment of the annual rent
was February 1, 1986. (Lease Agreement, p. 3, § 1.3(b)).
(12) The Lease Agreement contains a lengthy discussion concerning the rent adjustment.
It begins as follows:

The parties' written agreement within ninety (90) days before the applicable rent
adjustment date shall be a conclusive determination between the parties of the fair
market value for the period to which the adjustment applies.
(Lease Agreement, p. 3, §1.3(b)).
(13) No evidence was introduced that the parties ever reached such a written agreement
with respect to the first three (3) year rent adjustment period or any subsequent three (3) year
rent adjustment period. Further, the parties freely admit that there has not been any such written
agreement.
( 14) The Lease Agreement next provides:
If the parties have not so agreed by the applicable adjustment date, the
determination shall be made as in the paragraph on Arbitration in Article 13.
(Lease Agreement, p. 3, §1.3(b)). [Bold Emphasis Supplied by the Court].

issuance of a building permit. Therefore, the Court, for purposes of discussion in these Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Memorandum Decision and Order, will use February I, 1983 as the Commencement Date of the Lease Agreement.
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(15) No evidence was introduced that the parties ever submitted this matter to arbitration
as mandated in the Lease Agreement. Further, the parties freely admit that there has not been
.

any attempt to arbItrate.

II

( 16) The Lease Agreement next provides that in arriving at the adjusted rent every three
(3) years, the parties should consider the following:
The rent as adjusted shall be equal to fifteen percent (15%) percent [sic] of the
fair market value of the leased land, exclusive of the improvements on the
premise. Determination of fair market value shall be based on the highest and
best use of the land on the applicable rent adjustment date without taking the
leasehold into account. The determination shall take into account the parties'
agreement that the initial minimum rent is the above-stated percentage applied to
a fair market value of Fifteen Thousand and No/100 Dollars ($15,000.00) per acre
and shall also take into account any determinations of market value made under
this lease for the purpose of adjustments for periods preceding the applicable rent
adjustment date.
(Lease Agreement, p. 3, §1.3(b)).
( 17) The evidence at trial established that the parties have never followed the provisions
contained in the Lease Agreement to effectuate an adjustment in the rent.
(18) Finally, the Lease Agreement provides that "if the determination of adjusted rent is

made after the applicable rent adjustment date, lessee shall continue to pay rent at the rate
applicable to the preceding period until the adjusted rate is determined." (Lease Agreement, p. 3,
§1.3(b)).

(19) Richard Faulkner, Quail Ridge's designated representative at trial, testified that
Quail Ridge has paid rent, annually, in the original and unadjusted amount of $9,562.50 and is
current on its annual obligation.

11

When the Court inquired of the parties concerning this matter they both advised the Court that they were waiving this
requirement of the Lease Agreement. The Court relied upon what the Court determined to be a mandatory arbitration provision
when it granted PMC's motion requesting that Quail Ridge be denied its jury demand.
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(20) In 1996, an entity known as Pocatello Medical Investors (PMI) began to operate the
facility located on the leasehold estate, having become a subtenant of Sterling. Richard Faulkner
testified that Sterling, having decided that it no longer wished to operate a psychiatric hospital on
the leasehold, invited PMI to covert the facility into an assisted living center. In doing so, PMI
was created and entered into a sublease with Sterling as it related to the building located on the
leasehold and owned by Sterling.
(21) On February 27, 1996 IHC, PMC's predecessorin interest, signed a document titled
Landlord Consent and Estoppel Certificate (1996 Estoppel Certificate). This 1996 Estoppel
Certificate attached and incorporated the Lease Agreement. 12 The 1996 Estoppel Certificate also
acknowledged IHC' s consent to the sublease of the leasehold from Sterling, tenant or lessee, to
IHC as subtenant or sublessee. Apparently the 1996 Estoppel Certificate also made IHC aware
of the fact that the sublease contained a purchase option on the building located on the
leasehold. 13 (1996 Estoppel Certificate, ~1 ).
(22) The 1996 Estoppel Certificate also acknowledges that Sterling has not been in
default nor is it currently in default. (1996 Estoppel Certificate, ~4).
(23) The 1996 Estoppel Certificate also articulates the current amount of the annual rent
under the Lease Agreement as follows:
Under the Lease [Agreement], the Tenant is obligated to pay rent currently at the
rate of NINE THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED SIXTY TWO DOLLARS AND
50/XX CENTS ($9,562.50) per annum. Rent has been paid through and including
February 28, 1996. Under Section 1.3(b) of the Lease [Agreement], the rent
shall be adjusted on the next rent adjustment date, March 1, 1998.
(1996 Estoppel Certificate, ~5). [Bold Emphasis added by the Court].

12
Although the 1996 Estoppel Certificate references "any and all amendments and modifications," no modifications to the lease
were attached to the 1996 Estoppel Certificate produced as an exhibit at trial nor was there any testimony concerning a
modification or amendment to the Lease Agreement.
13
The 1996 Estoppel Certificate purports to attach as an exhibit the Sublease and Purchase Option. This exhibit was not part of
the 1996 Estoppel Certificate introduced as an exhibit at trial.
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(24) Finally, the 1996 Estoppel Certificate provides that the "Landlords consent to the
Sublease as set forth herein shall not constitute or be construed as (a) a waiver or modification by
Landlord of Tenant's duties or obligations under the Lease [Agreement], or (b) excuse Tenant's
performance of any term or condition of the Lease [Agreement]." (1996 Estoppel Certificate,

,;1 0).
(25) No evidence was introduced that IHC attempted to proceed with the three (3) year
annual rent adjustment in 1998 as referenced by the 1996 Estoppel Certificate. 14
(26) Between 1996 and 2001 the relationship between the parties and Lease Agreement
remained static. IHC was the Lessor, Sterling was the Lessee, and PMI was the Sub-tenant or
Sub-Lessee. In 2001, the relationships changed.
(27) Sometime between 1996 and 2001, Sterling determined that it wanted to sell the
building located on the leasehold and Sterling's principals wanted to be released from their
personal guarantees associated with the financing of the building located on the leasehold.
Likewise, PMI wanted to purchase this building.
(28) Richard Faulkner testified that for a number of reasons, not particularly germane to
this litigation, in order to facilitate the transaction between Sterling and PMI wherein PMI would
purchase the building located on the leasehold, a new entity was created. This entity was Quail
Ridge Medical Investors (Quail Ridge). Quail Ridge then purchased the building located on the
leasehold from Sterling and PMI continued on as a subtenant of Quail Ridge.
(29) Richard Faulkner testified that the transaction was complex and involved a number
of parties (IHC, Sterling, Quail Ridge, PMI, and the Public Employee Retirement System of

14

The only evidence introduced at trial regarding a demand by IHC or any of its successors in interest was in October of 2009
when PMC made a demand for a rent adjustment which led to the present controversy and litigation.
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Idaho (PERSI), 15 as well as the negotiation and preparation of a number of legal documents. He
testified that this process took the better part of one (1) year. Richard Faulkner testified that
during the course of this year long process, no one generally, and specifically Guy Kroesche, the
attorney representing IHC, brought up or discussed modifying the rent or the rent adjustment
provision of the Lease Agreement.
(30) On June 1, 2001, representatives of IHC, Sterling, Quail Ridge, PMI and PERSI all
signed a document titled Landlord Consent and Estoppel Certificate (200 1 Estoppel Certificate).
(31) Richard Faulkner, counsel for Quail Ridge, drafted the 2001 Estoppel Certificate.
Guy Kroesche was involved in this process, representing IHC.

He was sent drafts of all

documents involving this transaction generally and specifically all drafts of the 2001 Estoppel
Certificate. Guy Kroesche reviewed different versions of the 2001 Estoppel Certificate and
made suggestions for revisions to the same which were incorporated into the final version.
(32) The 2001 Estoppel Certificate provides as follows:
The Lease [Agreement] is in full force and effect, is valid and enforceable in
accordance with its terms and has not been terminated. Except as otherwise
referenced herein, the Lease [Agreement] constitutes the only agreement of any
kind or nature between the Landlord [IHC] and the Tenant [Sterling] relating to
the Demised Premises. The Landlord is the current holder of all of the lessor's
right, title and interest under the Lease [Agreement].
(2001 Estoppel Certificate, ~2). [Bold Emphasis Supplied by the Court].
(33) The 2001 Estoppel Certificate also acknowledges that Sterling has not been in
default nor is it currently in default. (2001 Estoppel Certificate, ~4).
(34) The 2001 Estoppel Certificate also articulates the amount of the annual rent under
the Lease Agreement as follows:

15

PERSI's involvement was that of lender. Sterling's original financing for the building situated on the leasehold was through
PERSI. As part of the overall transaction between Sterling and Quail Ridge, Quail Ridge was going to assume the loan made to
Sterling by PERSI.
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Under the Lease [Agreement], the Tenant is obligated to pay rent at the rate of
NINE THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED AND SIXTY TWO DOLLARS AND
FIFTY CENTS ($9,562.50) per annum. Rent has been paid through and
including FEBRUARY 28,2001.
(200 1 Estoppel Certificate, ,5). This provision contains two (2) dramatic alterations from the
1996 Estoppel Certificate. First the 1996 Estoppel Certificate states that Sterling (the Tenant) "is
obligated to pay rent currently at the rate of ... $9,562.50 per annum." The term "currently" has
been deleted from the 2001 Estoppel Certificate and reads Sterling (the Tenant) "is obligated to
pay rent at the rate of ... $9,562.50 per annum." Further, while the 1996 Estoppel Certificate
provides that "under Section 1.3(b) of the Lease [Agreement], the rent shall be adjusted on the
next rent adjustment date"; this language is glaringly absent from the 2001 Estoppel Certificate.
(35) Richard Faulkner discusses, from his perspective and that of Quail Ridge, why the
language of 2001 Estoppel Certificate differs from the 1996 Estoppel Certificate. At trial, the
following dialogue occurred:
Q. If you'lllook at exhibit 228 [2001 Estoppel Certificate] again, going back to
paragraph five, it says that "under the lease tenant is obligated to pay rent at the
current rate of $9,562.50 per annum. The rent has been paid through and
including February 281h, 2001."
Now, the language talking about rent adjustment that appears in the '96 estoppel
certificate is not in this certificate here?
A. That's correct. I did not include it in the first draft.
Q. And why was that left out?
A. Because I had looked at what the parties had been doing since 1996, and for
the five years that our group had been involved in the facility the rent adjustment
mechanism had never been raised. And then I spoke with the folks from Sterling
Development Group and understood that in the entire 13 years preceding our
involvement no one had ever raised the section of the rent adjustment in order to
increase or change the rent. So I wanted to confirm in the course of dealing that
that had been waived.
Faulkner Trial Testimony, p. 165, LL.22-25, p. 166, LL.1-17.
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(36) The 200 1 Estoppel Certificate also contained the language that was present in the
1996 Estoppel Certificate that reads as follows:
Landlord's consent to the Sublease as set forth herein shall not constitute or be
construed as (a) a waiver or modification by Landlord of Tenants duties or
obligations under the Lease [Agreement], or excuse Tenants performance of any
term or condition of the Lease [Agreement], or (b) a waiver or modification by
Landlord to any rights, under the Lease [Agreement], including without
limitation, Landlords right pursuant to Section 12.1 of the Lease Agreement.
2001 Estoppel Certificate, ,-r1 0.
(37) One of the conditions attached to IHC's willingness to sign the 2001 Estoppel
Certificate was that Forrest Preston, a principal of Quail Ridge, sign a personal guarantee of the
"payment and performance of any and all obligations of ... [Quail Ridge] and/or ... [PMI], under
the 'Ground Lease' and the 'Sublease' .... " (2001 Estoppel Certificate, p. 7).
(38) Richard Faulkner testified that in reliance upon its perception that IHC had waived
or modified the three (3) year adjustment provision of the Lease Agreement, it entered into the
transaction, paid off several million dollars in debt associated with the building located on the
leasehold and made significant improvements and renovations to the building located on the
leasehold.
(39) Not once during the term of the Lease Agreement from 1983 through 2009 did
either party request that the rent be adjusted in accordance with section 1.3(b) of the Lease
Agreement. Don Wadle, vice-president of clinical support at PMC, testified that while he was
conducting a review of the Lease Agreement, he understood, attributing this understanding to a
statement of Cal Northam, that the annual rent adjustments had been overlooked due to a mistake
on the part of its predecessors in interest. 16

16
Mr. Northam was not called as a witness, but neither was this statement objected to by Quail Ridge on hearsay or evidentiary
grounds.
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(40) In 2009, shortly after PMC acquired and became successor in interest to the Lease
Agreement, as part of its larger purchase of the hospital operated and known as Portneuf Medical
Center, Don Wadle was asked to review the Lease Agreement. He was informed that a previous
adjustment had not taken place and asked to determine the appropriateness of making an
adjustment to the annual rent.
(41) Don Wadle determined that an adjustment to the annual rent would be appropriate
and that there was a process in the Lease Agreement to obtain an adjustment.
(42) In 2009, PMC began the process of having the 4.25 acre leasehold appraised and
following the appraisal PMC made Quail Ridge aware of its intent to increase the annual rent in
accordance with the Lease Agreement.
(43) At trial Brad Janoush, a principal with Integra Realty Resources in Boise, Idaho
testified regarding the market value of the 4.25 acres of property which is the subject of the
Lease Agreement.
(44) Mr. Janoush was admitted to testify at trial as an expert real estate appraiser and
consultant.
(45)

Mr. Janoush opined, after discussing his methodology, that the 4.25 acres of

property that are the subject of the leasehold had a value of$1,080,000 on January 27, 2007. He
further testified that on January 27, 2010, the value of this 4.25 acre leasehold had declined in
value from the January 27, 2007 date to $990,000Y
(46) Christian Joseph Anton (Anton) testified, by way of deposition introduced at trial,
that he "assumed" that the $15,000 per acre figure utilized by the parties as the "fair market

17

PMC has argued that the applicable modification date is January 23. The Court is not sure where this date comes from. The
copy of the Lease Agreement admitted into evidence at trial reflects a signature date of January 27, 1983. However, the Lease
Agreement itself provides that the applicable date for the rent adjustment is February I. See Court's Findings of Fact Number 9
and footnote I 0.
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value" of the 4.25 acres was arrived at because IHC had "pretty good idea of what the land value
was or the cost involved in the land, because the hospital was "relatively new -like a year old or
so."
(4 7) Christison, former CEO/administrator at IHC from 1989 through 2000 testified that
during his tenure he undertook an extensive review of the hospital's operation. He testified as
follows:
[I] went through all of our operational strategies and told everyone that we were
going to re-evaluate how we did business. And in a two-hospital town and kind
of breaking through everything that we did, we went through every existing
contract and every operational way in which we did business, and we would have
gone through every one of our contracts from top to bottom and either
renegotiated them or re-evaluated how they existed, and I'm sure without a doubt
that this contract would have been re-evaluated on a local level and on a corporate
level.
(48) Christison also testified that he had no specific recollection of the Lease Agreement
itself or any discussions regarding the Lease Agreement or decisions concerning whether or not
to seek an adjustment. He did testified that he believes that the $15,000 per acre figure was
initially high and that its "value never was at 15 [fifteen thousand dollars per acre] ... we always
saw it as much less than what the original value was when we purchased it or used this as a base
number." Christison Depo., p. 12, LL.l-4.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

To the extent that any of the Court's Conclusions of Law are deemed to be Findings of Fact,
they are incorporated into the Court's Findings of Fact.
(I) Idaho Code §10-1201 provides as follows:

Courts of record within their respective jurisdictions shall have power to declare
rights, status, and other legal relations, whether or not further relief is or could be
claimed. No action or proceeding shall be open to objection on the ground that a
declaratory judgment or decree is prayed for. The declaration may be either
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affirmative or negative in form and effect, and such declarations shall have the
force and effect of a final judgment or decree.
(2) Idaho Code §I 0-1202 provides as follows:
Any person interested under a deed, will, written contract or other writings
constituting a contract or any oral contract, or whose rights, status or other legal
relations are affected by a statute, municipal ordinance, contract or franchise, may
have determined any question of construction or validity arising under the
instrument, statute, ordinance, contract or franchise and obtain a declaration of
rights, status or other legal relations thereunder.
[Bold Emphasis Added by the Court]
(3) Finally, Idaho Code §10-1203 provides as follows:
A contract may be construed either before or after there has been a breach thereof.
(4) Pursuant to the foregoing, the Court has authority and jurisdiction to declare the rights
of PMC and Quail Ridge as the successors in interest to the Lease Agreement.
(5) In 1983, IHC and Sterling entered into a legally binding and valid Lease Agreement
whereby Sterling leased 4.25 acres of property from IHC.
(6) PMC and Quail Ridge are the successors in interest to this Lease Agreement. PMC is
the Lessor and Quail Ridge is the Lessee.
(7) In Bakker v. Thunder Spring-Wareham, LLC, 141 Idaho 185, 190, 108 P.3d 332, 337

(2005), the Idaho Supreme Court discussed contract interpretation, in doing so it stated as follows:
When the language of a contract is clear and unambiguous, its interpretation and
legal effect are questions of law. An unambiguous contract will be given its plain
meaning. The purpose of interpreting a contract is to determine the intent of the
contracting parties at the time the contract was entered. In determining the intent
of the parties, this Court must view the contract as a whole. If a contract is found
ambiguous, its interpretation is a question of fact. Whether a contract is
ambiguous is a question of law. A contract is ambiguous if it is reasonably subject
to conflicting interpretations.
(8) This Court, upon review of the Lease Agreement concludes that section 1.3(b) of the
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Lease Agreement is ambiguous, in part. The Court concludes that the balance section 1.3 is clear
and unambiguous. Specifically, the Court concludes that sections 1.1, 1.2 and lJ(a) are clear and
unambiguous.
(9) As such, the unambiguous provisions of the Lease Agreement will be given their clear
and plain meaning. Section 1.1 of the Lease Agreement creates a lease relative to the 4.25 acre
leasehold: IHC as the lessor and Sterling as the lessee.
(1 0) Section 1.2 of the Lease Agreement creates the term of the lease. The lease, by its

initial terms, is a thirty (30) year lease, with an option, personal to Sterling, to extend the lease one
(1) time for an additional ten (10) year period. The parties appear to have agreed to allow the
personal option to be assigned to Quail Ridge and appear to agree that the option has been
exercised. See footnote 9 to the Court's Findings of Fact. As such, the lease term runs through
January 31, 2023.
(11) The Court also concludes that section 1.3(a) of the Lease Agreement is clear and
unambiguous. It provides rent shall be paid annually under the terms of the Lease Agreement. The
annual rent is to be calculated on the basis of fifteen percent (15%) of the value of the lease hold.
The parties expressly agreed that for the first three (3) years of the Lease Agreement, effective
February 1, 1983, the agreed upon value of the property would be Fifteen Thousand Dollars
($15,000.00) per acre. Therefore, the initial annual rent was $9,562.50.
(12)

The Court also concludes that first paragraph of section 1.3(b) is clear and

unambiguous. This provision provides that the annual rent shall be adjusted every three (3)
years, beginning on the Commencement Date of the Lease Agreement.

This Court has

determined that the Commencement Date of the Lease Agreement was February 1, 1983. See
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footnote 10 to the Court's Findings of Fact.

Therefore, the Lease Agreement called for

adjustments to the annual rent on the following dates:
February
February
February
February
February
February
February
February
February

1, 1986
1, 1989
1, 1992
1, 1995
1, 1998
1, 2001
1, 2004
I, 2007
1, 2010

It also calls for adjustments to the annual rent on the following prospective dates:

February
February
February
February

1, 2013
1, 2016
1, 2019
1, 2022

(13) No adjustment to the annual rent under the Lease Agreement was effectuated pursuant
to the terms of the Lease Agreement between 1986 and 2010. Further, no party to the Lease
Agreement even attempted to adjust the annual rent until September and October of 2009 when
PMC attempted to invoke section 1.3(b) of the Lease Agreement to effectuate a modification in the
annual rent amount.
(14) The Court concludes that the second paragraph of section 1.3(b) is clear and
unambiguous. It provides the procedure whereby the rent adjustment process is implemented. It
allows for the parties to negotiate and submit by way of ''written agreement" their agreement
concerning the "fair market value" of the 4.25 acre leasehold for the upcoming three (3) year
adjustment period. This period in which the parties are to negotiate and arrive at an agreed upon
"fair market value" of the 4.25 acre leasehold is to occur within ninety (90) days of rent adjustment
date.

If the parties are successful in this endeavor, their agreed upon value is "a conclusive

determination ... of fair market value for the period to which the adjustment applies." If the parties
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are unable to arrive at an agreed fair market value of the leasehold, the parties are required to submit
the matter to arbitration in accordance with the section of the Lease Agreement dealing with
Arbitration, Article 13. 18
(15) Finally, the first sentence of paragraph 3 of section 1.3(b) is clear and unambiguous. It
provides that adjusted annual rent for the next three (3) year period will be fifteen percent (15%) of
the fair market value of the lease hold, exclusive of improvements on the leasehold. As such, the
same formula utilized in creating the original annual rent remained in place. The only variable was
the determination of a fair market value to be determined either by an agreement of the parties or by
the arbitration process.
( 16) However, at this point the Court concludes that an ambiguity arises in the Lease
Agreement.

The Court concludes that the balance of the third paragraph of section 1.3(b) is

ambiguous on its face. The Court, in reviewing this specific language and applying the plain and
clear meaning of the verbiage, cannot determine what the parties' intent was at the time the contract
was negotiated and entered in 1983. The ambiguous portion of section 1.3(b) paragraph 3 provides
as follows:
Determination of fair market value shall be based on the highest and best use of the
land on the applicable rent adjustment date without taking the leasehold into
account. The determination shall take into account the parties' agreement that the
initial minimum rent is the above-stated percentage applied to a fair market value of
Fifteen Thousand and No/100 Dollars ($15,000.00) per acre and shall also to take
into account any determinations of market value made under this lease for the
purpose of adjustments for periods preceding the applicable rent adjustment date.
(I 7) When provisions of a contract are ambiguous, the interpretation of those provisions is
a question of fact which focuses upon the intent of the parties. Triad Leasing & Financial, Inc.

18
This Court has previously held that despite the fact that arbitration under Article 13 appears to be optional, based upon the
"shall" language in section l.3(b), arbitration is mandatory with respect to the rent adjustment provisions set forth in 1.3(b).
Arbitration may be optional with respect to other disputes which arise under the Lease Agreement, but it is mandatory with
respect to disputes arising out of the operation ofthe three (3) year rent adjustment.
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v. Rocky Mountain Rogues, Inc., 148 Idaho 503, 513, 224 P.3d 1092, 1102 (2009). "The
determination of a parties' intent with respect to a contract provision 'is to be determined by
looking at the contract as a whole, the language used in the document, the circumstances under
which it was made, the objective and purpose of the particular provision, and any construction
placed upon it by the contracting parties as shown by their conduct or dealings."' Beus v. Beus,
151 Idaho 235,238,254 P.3d 1231, 1234 (2011).
( 18) The Court concludes that "fair market value" is a term of art in the legal and real estate
fields. Black's Law Dictionary defines fair market value as "the price that a seller is willing to
accept and a buyer is willing to pay on the open market and in an arm's-length transaction." Black's
Law Dictionary, Seventh Edition. In Logan v. Grand Junction Associates, 111 Idaho 670, 671, 726
P.2d 782 783 (Ct.App.l986), the Idaho Court of Appeals considered a case where the trial court
applied a nearly identical definition of fair market value (the legal definition of fair market value is
what a willing buyer would pay a willing seller). Although the Idaho Court of Appeals did not
rule on the correctness of this definition, neither did it indicate that this was not the correct
definition. Rather, it reversed the trial judge on the basis that the methodology it applied in arriving
at fair market value was in error. Brad Janoush, PMC's real estate appraiser expert, testified that
fair market value is an antiquated term that was created and used back in the 1980's. He testified
that the term now used is "market value." He defined market value as "the property's most
probable sales price." He further testified that although the term "fair market value" "is hardly ever
used currently, [it] ... may be thought of as being synonymous with market value."
(19) The Court concludes that these two (2) definitions of market value and fair market
value are consistent and appear to be manageable definitions for the rent adjustment provision of the
Lease Agreement if standing alone. However, they are not left standing alone.

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER 26

(20) The Lease Agreement goes on to complicate the analysis by including the qualifYing
phrases: ( 1) "determination of fair market value shall be based on highest and best use of the land
... without taking the leasehold into account"; (2) "the determination [of fair market value] shall
take into account the parties' agreement that the initial minimum rent is the above-stated percentage
applied to a fair market value of Fifteen Thousand and No/100 Dollars ($15,000.00) per acre"; and
(3) "and shall also take into account any previous determinations of market value made under this
lease."
(21) The Court determines that these qualifYing phrases make the process of arriving at
market value or fair market value uncertain, vague and ambiguous. There is a scarcity of evidence
concerning how the fifteen thousand dollar per acre figure was arrived at. The only evidence
introduced at trial was Anton's testimony that he "assumed" the fifteen thousand dollar per acre
figure was derived from the price per acre paid by the hospital when it purchased the property a few
years previous. However, this is countered, to some extent, by Christison's testimony that IHC
never believed the value of the property to be fifteen thousand per acre. As such, the Court is left to
wonder whether the original determination of fifteen thousand dollars per acre was based upon a
market value determination, or whether Sterling was being given a discount from fair market value
as an incentive to lease a barren piece of property adjacent to the hospital, or whether Sterling paid a
premium, more than fair market value, in order to get in on the ground floor, so to speak, on a
location that would grow, develop, and appreciate around the hospital, but at present, did not
possess the value of fifteen thousand dollars per acre.
(22) There is also a paucity of evidence concerning a course of dealing between these
parties or their predecessors in interest concerning their course of dealings. It appears to this Court
that the Lease Agreement was poorly managed by IHC and its immediate predecessor, Bannock
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County, and forgotten in its entirety except at times when ownership changed hands. It appears that
there was no course of dealing between IHC and Sterling as well as their successors dealing directly
with the three (3) year adjustment provision. Christison's testimony seems to intimate that IHC
never sought a rent adjustment because it determined that the value of the leasehold acreage had not
increased in value. Therefore, an adjustment process would have resulted in no change in the
annual rent or a decrease. However, good management practices and compliance with the Lease
Agreement would have required that they advise Sterling that they did not believe the value of the
leasehold justified an increase in rent rather than just ignoring or forgetting about the rent
adjustment provision.
(23) As stated in Beus v. Beus, supra, under Idaho law the parties' intent is to be determined
by the express language of the document and reviewing the document as a whole. This is an issue
of law. If there are ambiguities, then it becomes a question of fact concerning the intent of the
parties. In ascertaining that intent, the fact finder may consider extrinsic evidence touching upon the
parties' intent. In this case, the Court is the finder of fact. In discerning the intent of the parties, by
way of extrinsic or parol evidence, the Court can consider the circumstances under which the
Lease Agreement was made, the objective and purpose of the particular provision, and any
construction placed upon it by the contracting parties as shown by their conduct or dealings.
Beus v. Beus, 151 Idaho 235,238,254 P.3d 1231, 1234 (2011) (Beus).

(24) As stated and discussed above, there is almost no credible or relevant evidence on
these issues. The Court, in researching this issue, can find no controlling case law in Idaho that
discusses how the Court should proceed when the record is entirely lacking extrinsic evidence of
prior course of dealings and/or the parties' original intent.
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(25)

However, the Court will proceed on the limited record that exists.

The first

component of ambiguity deals with the fact that the parties expressed a desire that the value of
the 4.25 acre leasehold and its corresponding rent be based upon the "highest and best use of the
land on the applicable adjustment date without taking the leasehold into account." The Court
interprets the "without taking the leasehold into account" to be a restatement of the provision that
fair market value shall be determined based upon "the market value of the leased land without
improvements." Janoush testified that the highest and best use of this 4.25 acres of property
would be "a medical office" or a business with a "medically related special purpose." Janoush
further testified in conducting his market value assessment, he did so taking into account the
Lease Agreement's language that the valuation be "exclusive of improvements."
(26) The Court will give no weight to the language contained in the Lease Agreement
that when adjusting the rent "the determination shall take into account the parties' agreement that
the initial minimum rent is the above-stated percentage applied to a fair market value of Fifteen
Thousand and No/100 Dollars ($15,000.00) per acre." The reason the Court will give no weight
to this language is that there has been no credible evidence which this Court accepts concerning
whether this $15,000.00 dollar per acre figure was the result of a market analysis conducted by
the parties in 1983, or whether it was a figure higher or lower than market value as discussed in
the Court's Conclusion of Law number 21. 19
(27) Likewise, the Court concludes that there is no course of dealings between the parties
to assist the Court in determining what construction the parties placed upon this provision of the
Lease Agreement by observing and construing their conduct or dealings. The crux of the matter

19
ln arriving at this conclusion, the Court is mindful of the fact that there was some evidence on this point Anton testified that he
"assumed" that the $15,000 dollar per acre value was tied to IHC's recent purchase of property in which to operate the hospital.
Christison testified that he thought the $15,000 dollar per acre value was high. The Court finds both of these individuals
testimony on this issue to be lacking in credibility. Both testified that they had no specific recollection of the Lease Agreement,
its creation, terms or execution.
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is that there were no course of dealing for the following reasons: (1) Sterling, and later Quail
Ridge, had no incentive to seek a rent adjustment (in a manner of speaking if Sterling or Quail
Ridge "rocked the boat" they had nothing to gain and only increased rent to lose if they initiated
a rent adjustment under the Lease Agreement); (2) IHC and Bannock County, through poor
management and/or having forgotten about the rent adjustment provisions, never sought a rent
20
.
adJUstment.

(28) Therefore: (1) because there is no evidence to establish how the original fifteen
thousand dollar per acre figure was reached; and (2) because there is no evidence to establish a
course of dealing to establish what construction the parties intended to give to the language
related to subsequent adjustments, the Court will disregard these provisions of the Lease
Agreement. 21
(29) The Court will apply the current market value to the 4.25 acres of property which
make up the leasehold. The Court accepts Janoush's opinion with respect to the current market
value ofthe 4.25 acres, exclusive of improvements, as ofFebruary 1, 2007 as being $1,080,000.
The Court further accepts Janoush's opinion with respect to the current market value of the 4.25
acres, exclusive of improvements, as of February 1, 2010 as being $990,000.
(30) In 2009, when PMC attempted to invoke section 1.3(b) of the Lease Agreement for
purposes of modifYing the annual rent, PMC had become the successor in interest to the original

20

Again the Court recognizes that Christison testified that he reviewed all of IHC's executor contracts and that during his tenure
no increase in rent was sought because he believed that the value in the property was not there to support a rent increase. While
this may be an accurate state of affairs during Christison's tenure at IHC, 1989 through 2000; as Janoush 's testimony established,
in recent years, this area, east of 1-15, has become a hot-bed of commercial development in Pocatello, Idaho. For these reasons,
the Court concludes that there is no course of dealing with respect to IHC and Bannock County in their capacity as lessors due
solely to mismanagement and the fact that the provisions of the Lease Agreement were forgotten on two (2) occasions in 1983
after the Lease Agreement was created and in 1996 after IHC agreed to PM! becoming a subtenant.
21
Certainly these factors may play a role in future rent adjustments under the Lease Agreement, but there is no evidence in the
record to allow them to play a role in the adjustment process this Court is being asked to consider as part of the declaratory
judgment proceeding. For example, if the parties were, by written agreement, able to agree to rent adjustment that was based on
a value less than 15% of market value as that term was defined by Janoush or Black's Law Dictionary, that would certainly be a
relevant course of dealing evidence going forward.
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lessor, IHC. Similarly, Quail Ridge had become successor in interest to the original lessee, Sterling.
Quail Ridge resisted these efforts and litigation ensued.
(31) Pursuant to Idaho's Declaratory Judgment Act, the Court concludes that the value of
the 4.25 acres for purposes of the 2007 rent adjustment should have been calculated at $254,117.65
per acre, the total value of the 4.25 acre leasehold being $1,080,000.00. Therefore, had the rent
adjustment been properly invoked in 2007, the annual rent in calendar years 2007, 2008, and 2009
should have been $162,000.00. The total rent for this three (3) year period should have been
$486,000.00.
(32) Pursuant to Idaho's Declaratory Judgment Act, the Court concludes that the value of
the 4.25 acres for purposes of the 2010 rent adjustment should have been calculated at $232,941.18
per acre, the total value of the 4.25 acre leasehold being $990,000.00. Therefore, had the rent
adjustment been properly invoked in 2010, the annual rent in calendar years 2010, 2011, and 2012
should have been $148,500.00. The total rent for this three (3) year period should have been
$445,500.00.
(3 3) Quail Ridge has argued that the Lease Agreement entered into in 1983 was modified in
2001 as part of the restructure testified to by Faulkner and addressed in the Court's Findings ofFact
numbers 27 through 38.
(34) The Court rejects Quail Ridge's contention that the parties modified the terms of the
Lease Agreement as it related to future adjustments. The issue of a modification to an existing
contract was recently discussed by the Idaho Supreme Court in Watkins Co., LLC v. Storms, 152
Idaho 531, _, 272 P.3d 503, 508 (2012) (Watkins). The Supreme Court stated as follows regarding
modifications to existing contracts:
[t]his Court has recognized that a contract may be modified by mutual consent.
Ore-Ida Potato Prod., Inc. v. Larsen, 38 Idaho 290, 293, 362 P.2d 384, 385
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( 1961 ). As with all modifications, the terms of a contract cannot be altered by
one party without the other party's approval. !d. at 296, 362 P.2d at 386.
Additionally, the minds ofthe parties must meet as to the proposed modification.
!d. "The fact of agreement may be implied from a course of conduct in
accordance with its existence and assent may be implied from the acts of one
party in accordance with the terms of a change proposed by the other." !d.
Whether an alleged modification is proven "is one for the trier of the facts to
decide." Res. Eng'g, Inc. v. Siler, 94 Idaho 935,938, 500 P.2d 836, 839 (1972).
This Court, as the finder of fact, determines that the evidence at trial does not support a finding by
this Court of a modification to the terms of the Lease Agreement.

Both the 1996 Estoppel

Certificate and the 2001 Estoppel Certificate recite as follows:
The Lease [Agreement] is in full force and effect, is valid and enforceable in
accordance with its terms and has not been terminated. The Lease constitutes the
only agreement of any kind or nature between the Landlord and the Tenant relating
in any way to the Demised Premises.
1996 Lease Agreement, ,2 and 2001 Lease Agreement, ,2. Both the 1996 Estoppel Certificate and
the 2001 Estoppel Certificate also provided as follows:
Landlord's consent to the Sublease as set forth herein shall not constitute or be
construed as (a) a waiver or modification by Landlord of Tenants duties or
obligations under the Lease [Agreement], or excuse Tenants performance of any
term or condition of the Lease [Agreement], or (b) a waiver or modification by
Landlord to any rights, under the Lease [Agreement], including without
limitation, Landlords right pursuant to Section 12.1 of the Lease Agreement.
1996 Estoppel Certificate, ,1 0, and 2001 Estoppel Certificate, ,1 0.
(35) The only evidence in the record regarding the modification of the Lease Agreement is
the subjective intent of Faulkner. Faulkner testified as the individual drafting the 2001 Estoppel
Certificate that he purposefully left out certain language that existed in the 1996 Estoppel Certificate
because he "wanted to confirm in the course of dealing that that had been waived." The Court
would suggest that removing language that was present in an earlier document and not discussing
the same or making the other party aware of its deletion does not establish "mutual assent." In fact,
some might question the propriety of such conduct. The Court finds that this unilateral act of
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Faulkner does not establish a modification. Rather as stated by the Idaho Supreme Court in Beus,
supra, "a party's subjective, undisclosed intent is immaterial to the interpretation of a contract."

151 Idaho at 238.
(36) The Court is aware that the Watkins case discusses the fact that a modification to a
contract may be "implied from a course of conduct in accordance with its existence [a
modification] and assent may be implied from the acts of one party in accordance with the terms
of a change proposed by the other." However, this Court, as the finder of fact, has concluded
that IHC and Bannock County as the lessor, acted in a manner that demonstrated poor
management and oversight of the Lease Agreement. Furthermore, this Court finds that this poor
management and oversight resulted in the lessor forgetting that the Lease Agreement contained a
rent adjustment provision. However, the Court does not conclude that conduct or lack thereof by
IHC and Bannock County amounted to a modification in the terms of the Lease Agreement and
its rent adjustment provisions.
(37) Quail Ridge also asserts that IHC and/or Bannock County effectively waived the
rent adjustment provision contained in the Lease Agreement. The Court, for the same reasons
addressed with respect to its conclusion that there was not a modification to the Lease
Agreement, concludes that there was not a waiver by IHC or Bannock County of the right in the
Lease Agreement to pursue adjustments in the rent every three (3) years. The Court further notes
that the very document that Quail Ridge relies upon to support both its waiver and modification
claims, the 2001 Estoppel Certificate, expressly states that Landlords consent to the sublease
does not act as a waiver or modification by Landlord of Tenants duties or obligations under the
Lease Agreement or excuse Tenants performance of any term or condition of the Lease
Agreement.
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(38) The Idaho Supreme Court recently addressed the doctrine of waiver in Knipe Land
Co. v. Robertsen, 151 Idaho 449, 457-58, 259 P.3d 595,603-04 (2011). In doing so, it stated as

follows:
"A waiver is a voluntary, intentional relinquishment of a known right or
advantage, and the party asserting the waiver must show that he acted in
reasonable reliance upon it and that he thereby has altered his position to his
detriment." Fullerton v. Griswold, 142 Idaho 820, 824, 136 P.3d 291, 295 (2006)
(internal quotation omitted). "Waiver is foremost a question of intent." Seaport
Citizens Bankv. Dippel, 112 Idaho 736,739,735 P.2d 1047, 1050 (Ct.App.1987).
A clear intention to waive must be shown before waiver shall be established.
Margaret H Wayne Trust v. Lipsky, 123 Idaho 253, 256, 846 P.2d 904, 907
(1993). "Waiver will not be inferred except from a clear and unequivocal act
manifesting an intent to waive, or from conduct amounting to estoppel." /d.
(39) As the Court previously ruled with respect to Quail Ridge's claim of contract
modification, the Court, as the finder of fact, finds no facts to support the claim that IHC or
Bannock County voluntarily and intentionally waived a known right. Rather, what the Court has
found is that IHC and Bannock County, through poor management and oversight, neglected
and/or forgot about the rent adjustment provision of the Lease Agreement. Such conduct does
not establish the requisite intent to voluntarily waive the rent adjustment provision of the Lease
Agreement.
(40) Finally, Quail Ridge asserts that the Court should apply the equitable doctrine of
laches to the rent adjustment provisions and not allow PMC to modify the rent either
retroactively or prospectively. The Court will accept Quail Ridge's laches defense in part and
finds it to be inapplicable in part.
(41) In Thomas v. Arkoosh Produce, Inc., 137 Idaho 352, 359, 48 P.3d 1241, 1248
(2002), the Idaho Supreme Court discussed the defense of laches. In addressing this affirmative
defense, the Supreme Court noted that the party asserting the defense bears the burden of proving
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the same and that the defense is a question of fact. The Court also set forth the elements of this
defense:
( 1) defendant's invasion of plaintiffs rights; (2) delay in asserting plaintiffs rights,
the plaintiff having had notice and an opportunity to institute a suit; (3) lack of
knowledge by the defendant that plaintiff would assert his rights; and (4) injury or
prejudice to the defendant in the event relief is accorded to plaintiff or the suit is
not held to be barred.
(42) The Court hereby determines that as it relates to any attempt by PMC to obtain an
adjustment to the annual rent retroactive to February 1, 2007, the rent adjustment date under the
Lease Agreement, that attempt is barred by the doctrine of laches as well as the express terms of
the Lease Agreement. However, the Court feels the better basis to deny PMC's attempt to
retroactively obtain a rent adjustment for 2007, 2008, and 2009 is the express terms of the Lease
Agreement itself. The Lease Agreement contemplates a process to modify the Lease Agreement
prospectively. It requires that the parties attempt to work out an adjustment in advance of the
rent adjustment date, February 1 of every third year. This attempt must be made within ninety
(90) days of the rent adjustment date. However, if a rent adjustment is not mutually agreed to
within this ninety (90) day window, the parties are required to pursue arbitration.
(43)

First, PMC did not even request a rent adjustment during the ninety (90) day

window required by the Lease Agreement. Therefore, the mandatory arbitration provision was
never activated. Although there is no discussion of when the arbitration must be commenced,
the Court concludes that it must be initiated in a reasonable period of time. Although the Court
does not need to conclude what a reasonable time is in this context, a reasonable period of time
would seem to be thirty (30) to sixty (60) days. Under no view of the facts is nearly three (3)
years a reasonable period oftime. PMC did not initiate an appraisal until September of 2007 and
did not notify Quail Ridge of its intent to invoke the rent adjustment provision of the Lease
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Agreement until October of 2009. This was two (2) years and over seven (7) months into the
current rent adjustment period. This was not reasonable, nor was it compliant with the express
provisions of the Lease Agreement, nor was it reasonable to expect Quail Ridge to have its
annual rent adjusted two (2) years and seven (7) plus months into the current period.
(44) However, the Court does not find the same impediments to a prospective rent
adjustment. In October of 2009, PMC notified Quail Ridge that it was seeking to adjust the rent
in accordance with section 1.3(b) of the Lease Agreement. The Court concludes that this was
consistent with the intent of obtaining a written agreement within the ninety (90) window set by
section 1.3(b) of the Lease Agreement. These attempts were unsuccessful, and in June of 2010
litigation was initiated. The Court does not believe the doctrine of laches applies to PMC's
attempts to effectuate a rent adjustment for the 20 10 rent adjustment period as well as future rent
adjustment periods. The Court concludes that although both parties failed to comply with the
mandatory arbitration provision of the Lease Agreement, that PMC has complied with the
provisions of the Lease Agreement sufficient to justifY an adjustment to the annual rent.
(45) Therefore, the Court concludes that PMC is entitled to an adjustment in the rent for
the years 2010, 2011, and 2012 in the amount of $148,500.00 annually. Therefore, for the three
(3) year period applicable to the 2010 rent adjustment, the combined annual rent for these three (3)
years is $445,500.00 by January 31,2013, assuming that Quail Ridge remains current on its annual
rent, it will have paid $28,687.50 towards the annual rent for this three (3) year period. As such it is
entitled to a credit in this amount against the $445,500.00. This credit results in Quail Ridge being
obligated to PMC in the total amount of $416,812.50 for rent for the period of February 1, 2010
through January 31,2013.
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(46) The Court concludes that the rent adjustment provision remains in full force and effect
and the annual rent adjustment for 2013 shall proceed consistent with section 1.3(b) of the Lease
Agreement
(4 7) The Court determines that there is no prevailing party in this litigation and that
neither party is entitled to an award of attorney fees pursuant to the Lease Agreement
(48) The Court, upon submission by PMC, will sign a Declaratory Judgment consistent
with the Court's Conclusion of Law on this matter.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated this 16th day of October, 2012.

MITCHELL W. BROWN
District Judge
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PORTNEUF MEDICAL CENTERS, LLC, )
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)
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QUAIL RIDGE MEDICAL INVESTORS, )
LLC and CENTURY PARK
)
ASSOCIATES,
)
Defendants.
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ORDER CORRECTING
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

)
)
)

On October 16, 2012, the Court issued its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Memorandum Decision and Order in Pocatello Hospital, LLC, dba Portneuf Medical Centers,
LLC v. Quail Ridge Medical Investors, LLC and Century Park Associates.
On October 22, 2012, Plaintiff's filed a Motion to Correct Clerical Mistake in Findings of
Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Memorandum Decision and Order. The Court, upon review of
the motion and the Court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law has determined that
Plaintiff is correct that there is a mistake in the Court's Conclusion of Law No. 43. The Court
inadvertently stated that "PMC did not initiate an appraisal until September of 2007 and did not
notify Quail Ridge of its intent to invoke the rent adjustment provision of the Lease Agreement
until October of 2009" [Italics added by the Court]. The italicized portion of this sentence is
incorrect and inconsistent with the Court's Findings of Fact, specifically Fact No. 42. Finding of
Fact No. 42 finds that PMC began the process of having the leasehold appraised in September of
ORDER CORRECTING CONCLUSIONS OF LAW- 1

2009. Conclusion of Law No. 43 should be consistent with Finding of Fact No. 42. Therefore,
the sentence at issue in Conclusion of Law No. 43 should read: PMC did not initiate an appraisal
until September of 2009 and did not notify Quail Ridge of its intent to invoke the rent adjustment
provision of the Lease Agreement until October of2009.
It is hereby ORDERED that Conclusion of Law No. 43 as set forth in the Court's

Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Memorandum Decision and Order is corrected as set
forth herein.
Dated this 22nd Day of October, 2012.

MITCHELL W. BROWN
District Judge
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P.O. Box 991
Pocatello, Idaho 83204-0991

0

Hand Delivered

•

Mailed

DEFENDANT ATTORNEY:

0

Faxed

Michael D. Gaffney
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR tHE COUNTY OF BANNOCK

******
)

POCATELLO HOSPITAL, LLC, dba
)
PORTNEUF MEDICAL CENTERS, LLC, )
) CaseNo.
)
Plaintiff.

CV~201 0-0002724-0C

)
)

vs.

) ORDER ON FORM OF JUDGMENT
QUAIL RIDGE MEDICAL INVESTORS, )
LLC and CENTURY PARK
)
ASSOC~TES.
)
)
Defendants.
)
)

This action came before the Court for a two (2) day court trial conunencing on May 14,
2012 and continuing through May 15, 2012. On October 17. 2012, the Court issued its Findings

of Fact and Conclusions of Law. On October 22, 2012, the Court issued its Order Correcting
Conclusions of Law. Pursuant to the Court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the
Court Ordered that the Plaintiff prepare a Declaratory Judgment consistent with the Court's
ConclUsions ofLaw.
Consistent with the Court's order, Plaintiff submitted a proposed Judgment.

The

proposed Judgment was in a different fonn than anticipated by the Court. Plaintiff's proposed
Judgment was in the form of a money judgment against Defendant~ Quail Ridge, in the sum of

OnDER ON FORM OF JUDGMENT- 1
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$416,812.50 and a declaration that the rent adjustment. provision relative to the parties' Ground
Lease Agreement remains in full force and effect and is subject to adjustment in 2013. 1
Due to concerns that the Court had regarding whether a money judgment was
appropriate, the Court scheduled a conference call with counsel for both parties. The Court
expressed its concerns and advised the parties that they should submit briefing in support of their
respective positions on the nature and form of judgment the Court should enter in this matter.
Consistent with the Court's request, the parties filed simultaneous briefs on this issue. The Court
has considered the submissions and now enters its Order.
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff's initial Complaint was couched in terms of a complamt for breach of contract.
During the course of pre-trial motion practice, the Court· advised that it was not certain relief
could be granted to the Plaintiff on a breach of contract theory and opined that perhaps the relief
Plaintiff was seeking was a declaration of the parties' rights pursuant to I.C. §§10-1201 through
10-1203.
Shortly thereafter, Plaintiff moved to amend its complaint to assert a claim for

declaratory relief. The motion was granted, without objection from Quail Ridge. Therefore, this
matter proceeded to trial on two (2) separate claims: (1) Breach of Contract, and (2) Declaratory
Relief. At the conclusion of Plaintiff's case-in-chief, Quail Ridge moved for a directed verdict
on Plaintiff's breach of contract claim. Plaintiff did not oppose Quail Ridge's motion and the
Court granted the same.
However, had Plaintiff opposed Quail Ridge Motion for Directed Verdict on Plaintiffs
Breach of Contract Claim. the Court would have been constrained to grant the motion because

1Plainti:ff stated the date for adjustment to be January 27, 2013. Howe-ver, the Court's Findings of Fact and Conclusion of taw
establish that the effective date for the rent adjustment date is rebru!U)' 1, 2013 not Januaxy 27.2013.
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there was no evidence in the trial record to support a claim that Quail Ridge was in breach of
contract. Rather, Quail Ridge had paid rent each month in the original amount of$9,562.50. See
Court's Findings of Fact No. 18 and.l9, Findings of Fact. Conclusions of Law and Mem~
Decision ~d Order, p. 14,1118-19.
As such, there was no evidence that Quail Ridge was in violation or had breached the
terms of the Ground Lease Agreement. Similarly, the Court would also have concluded, had the
Court been asked to make fmdings of fact and conclusions of law on this issue, that Quail Ridge
had not violated the Ground Lease Agreement in failing to cooperate in the rent adjustment
provisions.
For th.ese reasons, the Court concludes that there are absolutely no facts in the record that
would justify this Court entering a money judgment in favor of the Plaintiff. All the Court's
Findings of Fact. Conclusions of Law and Memorandum Decision can properly be utilized for is
to declare the parties • respective rights in relation to the Ground Lease Agreement. There has
been no breach established to the Court as of the time of trial in this matter.
The parties' Ground Lease Agreement provides that "the party indebted shall, promptly
after the determination, pay any difference for the period affected by the adjustment." Ground
Lease Agreement, p.3, §1.3(b). Now that the determination has.been made as contemplated
under the Ground Lease Agreement. the Ground Lease Agreement requires "prompt,, payment of
the balance due under the Ground Lease Agreement.:z Although the Ground Lease Agreement
.

.

does not define the term prompt for purposes of the parties' agreement, a failure to pay this
amount in a reasonable time certainly would give rise to an action for breach of contract

It should be noted that the parties' Ground Lease Agreement contemplated this determination being made by rsrbiiration.
However, both parties clearly and expressly waived this requirement, instoad opting to proceed in this forum.

2
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Therefore, because there has been no breach and the breach of contract claim was
disi:nissed at . trial, the Court will decline Plaintiffs request for en1ry of a money judgment.

· Certafui~ if "prompt'' payment is not made consistent with this Court's detennination, Plaintiff is
entitled to avail itself of the courts in order to seek redress for this breach. However, this Court
will limit its judgment to one of declaring the respective rights and obligations under the Ground
Lease Agreement
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated this 12th day ofNovember, 2012.

~/!/~

MITCHELL W. BROWN
District Judge
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The undersigned certifies that on the 12th day of November, 2012. she caused a true and
correct copy of the foregoing Order on Form of Jud.voment to be served upon the following persons
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